Rather than calmly handling an eminently manageable situation, they have made Europe appear incompetent, near hysterical and without integrity.

This is not to deny credit where credit is due. Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, chancellor, Germany has welcomed hundreds of thousands of people — not without controversy but in relative calm. Berlin also has been honest in

declaring that the European asylum system is not working. “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, if this close link with universal civil rights is broken,” Ms Merkel stated bluntly this week, “then it won’t be the Europe we wished for.”

Greece and Italy, which have rescued more refugees than any other member states — and Sweden, the EU state that has taken in most per capita — also have acted honourably. Countless thousands of private citizens and non-governmental organisations have done the same.

But Europe’s failure to measure up to the human disaster has radically increased the human, financial and political costs of the crisis. One of the bedrocks of the EU, the Schengen free-movement zone, is now in jeopardy. It is not too late for the bloc to recover from a crisis largely of its own making. As hardline, anti-migrant parties surge in many countries, European governments must show they can work together to tame the chaos, uphold international law and show compassion to those in need.

Europe’s leaders and media need to start calling the situation what it is: a refugee crisis, not a migration crisis. At least two-thirds of those crossing the Mediterranean come from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan and other states from which they are legitimately fleeing persecution. Refugees have inalienable rights under international law, and their plight is well understood by the European public. Only a minority of those taking to the seas are economic migrants.

The EU also needs to give far greater help — starting straight away — to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, which together host 4m Syrian refugees. Such aid will be far more effective than military missions or yet more dogs and barbed wire at border posts. Most refugees prefer to stay close to home. But, if there are no schools or jobs for them in frontline countries, they will move on. Four years into the Syrian conflict, this is what is happening .

Simultaneously, the EU must make every effort to establish safe and legal means for asylum seekers to seek protection in Europe without risking their lives. This could be done through massively expanded resettlement; by establishing private sponsorship programmes so that individuals, churches and NGOs can take responsibility for integrating refugees; by issuing humanitarian, labour, family reunification and student visas — or a combination of all these.

Finally, EU member states should agree to a permanent system of sharing responsibility for processing and hosting asylum seekers and refugees. The European Commission’s plan to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy, rejected by member states, needs to be expanded and made mandatory. There are many details to work out, but such a programme is within reach.

This would be the first, necessary step towards a single European asylum system — not a hodgepodge of 28 systems that produce vastly different outcomes. So far this year, Hungary has granted asylum to just 278 out of 148,000 applicants — barely 0.2 per cent. By contrast, Germany has accepted 40 per cent of applications. This chasm makes a mockery of both the law and the notion of a common system.

An emergency meeting of EU interior ministers scheduled for September 14 needs to make inroads on this. But the rest of the world also needs to do far more. The world’s 20m refugees, a historic high, are a shared responsibility — one that at present falls most heavily on the developing world, where 86 per cent of refugees live.

The global refugee system was originally created to help Europeans, and it has helped save and rebuild the lives of millions of them. Now, with the system strained, faltering and outdated, Europe should reciprocate. It is time for the

EU to rescue its integrity and dignity before they, too, perish in the Mediterranean.

This article first appeared in The Financial Times on 3 September 2015.

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Faced with a tragedy in the Mediterranean, the EU risks transforming it into a self-inflicted political crisis that could divide the union.

After 900 people died on a single day, Europe was shocked into expanding its maritime presence. The carnage slowed: more than 1,500 died in April; just a few dozen in May. The European Commission then offered proposals to impose greater order on the chaos of human flows into Europe. It broke the crisis into three challenges: saving lives; protecting refugees; and thwarting smugglers.

The first was addressed by permanently expanding the seaborne search-and-rescue campaign. Member states did not want the moral taint of having desperate refugees die on their watch.

The commission’s proposal for protecting asylum seekers after rescue was equally commonsensical. Brussels said responsibility for processing asylum applications and hosting refugees should be shared across all EU states. Yet this set off a firestorm. At present, a handful of countries bear most of the burden. Politicians in countries that benefit from the status quo refused to support it. Estonia and Slovakia – each of which would have to take a few hundred refugees – are resisting. One wonders what the eastern

European refugees embraced by the west during the cold war might think.

Others obfuscated, dubbing the commission proposal a “migrant quota”, blurring the line between migrants and refugees. This is fiction. The commission has not suggested distributing economic migrants across the EU. This is about asylum seekers, who enjoy safeguards under international law.Economic migrants do not; the EU regularly returns them to their countries of origin.

Reasonable people might disagree about the details of the plan. Its so-called “distribution key” relies on a formula that takes into account a country’s population, economic output, unemployment rate, and how many refugees and asylum seekers it has accepted since 2010. But reasonable people would sit down to fine-tune it, not reject it outright. That only makes a future compromise even more difficult.

The response to the commission’s plan to resettle refugees was equally irresponsible. Resettlement involves taking refugees who have undergone rigorous health and security screening, which can take two years, and bringing them to host countries. This would save lives, by obviating the need for at least some risky sea crossings. It would signal to Europeans that an orderly system is in place. Twenty thousand people would be resettled. Compare this to the 1m refugees shoehorned into tiny Lebanon, with a total population of 4m, or to the 800,000 in Jordan, almost as small. These countries are overwhelmed.

No one is calling on the EU to do the impossible. But surely 500m EU citizens have enough generosity and resources to help at least a few hundred thousand — or even a few million — people who have lost everything. Not so long ago, Europeans themselves were desperately asking for such help.

The third commission proposal targets smugglers. But even if the EU stops all smugglers, an unlikely prospect, where would that leave the world’s 16.5m refugees? Europe will have cemented a reputation as being hostile to foreigners, and it will leave angry partners throughout Africa and the Middle East bearing almost the entire burden of the refugee crisis. These are conditions that would only elevate the far right and its principles.

Most Europeans are neither mean-spirited nor racist. They do not want to see families perishing in the seas. They want their governments to be in control of who enters Europe, and how. European leaders can deliver this while doing right by international law, and without undermining the union’s economy and foreign relations.

This article first appeared in The Financial Times on 22 May 2015.

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This month, 500 more migrants died off the coast of Malta, when a group of human traffickers responded to the passengers’ refusal to move onto smaller vessels by deliberately ramming the boat that had carried them from Egypt. Less than a week later, dozens of asylum-seekers died when their boat capsized near the Libyan coast – long before reaching their European destination.

Such large numbers of deaths in and around Europe should do more than briefly seize headlines; they should spur action. But Europeans seem inured to the plight of asylum-seekers and migrants, almost 3,000 of whom have died in the Mediterranean in 2014 alone. This situation is untenable, both morally and politically.

Of course, Europe cannot help all those fleeing violence and destitution. But, as the world’s wealthiest continent, it can certainly do more, especially if it adopts a unified approach.

At a time when the number of displaced people is at an historic high, the European Union – which accounts for 29% of global wealth – hosts just 9% of refugees, leaving far poorer countries to carry most of the burden. For example, tiny Lebanon shelters one million of the three million Syrians who are displaced, whereas the EU – 100 times larger – has taken in only 100,000.

The EU is hardly powerless to address the tragic situation in and around the Mediterranean. The new European Commission, Council, and Parliament should be able to uphold the EU’s humanitarian obligations by reducing the number of deaths at sea, thereby setting the stage for a more reasonable public debate about migration, while improving strained relations with Africa.

This will demand, first and foremost, that EU leaders overcome the forces that have so far impeded action. One obstacle is anti-migrant populism, which has intensified owing to the serious economic challenges that Europeans have faced. With far-right political parties nipping at their heels, most mainstream politicians avoid taking a stance on migration that might make them seem “soft.”

Equally paralyzing is the way the tragic episodes in the Mediterranean are portrayed: as sudden crises, rather than as part of a long-term pattern. As such, they often provoke fiery rhetoric and defensiveness, instead of thoughtful debate. For example, when the Arab Spring rebellions erupted in 2011, many Europeans immediately feared that millions of North Africans would descend on their shores. In the three years since then, just 30,000 have arrived.

Worse, this portrayal implies that little can be done to mitigate, or even prevent, such occurrences. But the longer-term trends driving these tragedies – including demographic shifts, inadequate legal routes to Europe, poor governance and economic prospects in origin countries, and skewed public perceptions of refugees and migrants – can, to various degrees, be addressed.

For starters, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Council President Donald Tusk, and the European Parliament should work to ensure that the public debate about refugees and migrants is anchored in fact. As it stands, misconceptions are rampant, with residents of many EU countries believing, for example, that they host three times as many foreigners as they actually do. By debunking such myths, EU leaders can create space for action, while undercutting the credibility of populists.

Second, in designing asylum and migration policies, the European Commission should involve member states’ foreign, employment, and development ministers, instead of just their interior ministers. The European Council also should deepen its engagement on these issues.

Third, the EU should craft asylum, migration, and border systems that equitably distribute financial, political, and other costs. The so-called “common” European asylum system that prevails today is perceived as unfair by many member states, and violates the rights of many asylum seekers.

Fourth, the EU should increase the number of refugees that it accepts, and give more people the option of applying for asylum without having to reach Europe’s borders. This would result in fewer asylum-seekers from making life-threatening voyages that leave their families deeply indebted – human traffickers charge as much as €15,000 ($19,700) to cross the Mediterranean – only to be turned away.

Finally, in order to help prevent the crises that lead to displacement, the EU should work to strengthen its relationships with African countries, especially those bordering the Mediterranean. Talk of an African Marshall Plan – with loans issued to local businesses, which would repay them to their national governments to use for infrastructure development – proliferated after the Arab Spring, but led nowhere. But such investment in Africa’s development, together with a regular, structured dialogue, could help to ease many Africans’ plight. This would reduce their incentive to migrate and, in cases where people still aspire to reach Europe, facilitate a more orderly process.

The EU’s new leaders have an important opportunity to fashion a fresh approach to asylum and migration – one that recognizes that safe, orderly migration can bring major benefits to countries of origin and destination alike. Given Europeans’ tendency toward generosity and reason – qualities that their political leaders often underestimate – such an initiative would likely even bring political gains. In short, there is no compelling reason not to extend the principled policy approach on which Europe prides itself to those who would risk their lives to reach its shores.

This article first appeared on Project Syndicate.

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For example, a poll conducted earlier this year determined that if a referendum on continued EU membership had been held in June in the UK as a whole, 47.1% would have voted to leave, with 39.4% voting to remain. But a poll in February 2014showed that in Scotland, 48.7% would vote for the UK to remain in the EU, with 35.4% voting to leave. Other polls have also shown a consistent and markedly more positive attitude toward the EU in Scotland than in England.

Of course, it is premature to draw any firm conclusions from these figures. The referendum on exiting the EU that Prime Minister David Cameron has proposed may not take place, regardless of the success (whatever that may mean) of his promised “renegotiation” of the terms of British membership. But, as a result of various ostensibly minor issues, the likelihood of a British exit seems to be increasing – which fundamentally alters the importance of the vote in Scotland.

For example, the proposal of the relatively unknown Jonathan Hill, the leader of the UK House of Lords, as the British member of the new European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker was just the latest in a long series of British EU errors. Cameron’s spokesmen said in July that, at his first meeting with the new Commission president, Cameron would seek a prestigious portfolio, such as the internal market, for Hill. Juncker’s office coldly replied that important portfolios in the new Commission would go to major political figures, and that Juncker “does not owe [Cameron] anything.”

Given Cameron’s opposition to Juncker’s candidacy for the Commission presidency, the abuse to which Juncker has been subjected by the British press, and Hill’s lack of centrality within British politics, Cameron may be justifiably nervous when Juncker announces his appointments to the new Commission. Juncker, after all, has many senior politicians to accommodate, and their approval by the European Parliament is no minor matter. And, though it was perhaps unsurprising that Cameron should be unenthusiastic about Juncker’s candidacy, the vehemence of his opposition was extraordinary.

Cameron no doubt wished to reassure those in his Conservative Party who doubt his euroskeptic zeal. Even so, Cameron’s supposed remark that the UK was more likely to leave the EU if Juncker’s candidacy succeeded was strange and disquieting, not least because any renegotiation of the terms of British membership will be carried out primarily with other member states, not with the Commission.

Cameron’s bid to thwart Juncker’s candidacy mirrored his unsuccessful attempt to prevent the adoption of the EU’s fiscal compact in 2012. He overestimated German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s willingness and ability to support the British position. Many influential Germans are reluctant to help Cameron in what they regard as his self-created European problem. They will not allow Merkel much latitude here, even if she seeks it.

If Cameron’s advisers overestimated the support that they might have received from Merkel and others, they clearly underestimated the power and effectiveness of the European Parliament. For many months, the European Parliament had made it clear that it had specific ideas about how it would exercise its new powers, granted by the Treaty of Lisbon, over the Commission presidency. But the rapid post-election agreement among the Parliament’s major political groups to support Juncker caught Cameron off guard.

Far from enhancing British influence, threats of withdrawal have undermined the Cameron government’s credibility and influence within the EU, as colleagues have become disinclined to engage in significant compromises with a UK that may not be a member in two years. Traditionally, EU heads of state and governments try to help one another with their domestic political problems. But there is a growing sense in the European Council that Cameron is abusing this goodwill.

Thus, Cameron’s claim that Juncker’s election would make it more difficult to ensure the UK’s continued EU membership risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. To present Juncker’s candidacy as a matter of high political principle, with Cameron heroically but unsuccessfully standing alone against the dark forces of federalism and centralization, could have only reinforced English feelings of alienation from Europe. That is less likely to be the case in Scotland.

If Cameron returns as prime minister after the general election in 2015, he will face an uphill battle in renegotiating the terms of British EU membership, owing to resistance not only from his European partners, but also from his own Conservative Party, which is close to advocating British withdrawal. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a re-elected Cameron could maintain the Conservative Party’s unity without endorsing a “no” vote in the referendum on the outcome of his own renegotiation.

Britain’s EU membership will be one of the major issues at stake in next year’s election. It would be a tragedy if British voters cast their ballots without fully understanding the European implications of their choice. One thing, however, seems certain: If Scotland votes for independence in September, a referendum within the rump UK on continued EU membership would be even less likely to produce a victory for those who wish to remain.

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The instant lesson of the US presidential election seemed to be about the power of Latino voters. But the meaning runs deeper and it is relevant to governments around the world.

Within hours of President Barack Obama’s re-election last month, a powerful belief took hold: that overwhelming support from Latino voters had helped secure his victory. Suddenly, the Republican Party, long identified with a hard line on immigrants, started talking about the need for comprehensive immigration reform. Pundits argued that if the Republicans resisted reform, they would lose the Latino vote for the next generation and be relegated to near-permanent opposition status.

This might or might not be true. But the meaning of the American election when it comes to immigration runs deeper than electoral expediency—and it bears lessons for governments around the world. The remarkable speed with which anti-immigrant positions buckled points to the fact that most Americans seek—above all—a rational approach to immigration. They want their political leaders to take responsibility for the issue rather than to run away from it.

When it comes to immigration, politicians usually are driven by fear—a fear that has become even more acute since the onset of the global financial crisis. The rise of extreme nationalists in places like Greece and Finland has reinforced the notion that talking about immigration, except to argue against it, is politically fraught. So politicians either address immigration in the context of border security and cultural identity, or they ignore it.

But they might well be misreading the concerns of their citizens. Voter reaction is often less about disliking immigrants than it is about a profound sense of frustration that governments have failed to create an immigration system that works: One that allows for the legal entry of needed workers, while preventing illegal entry; one that clamps down on exploitative employers; and one that provides resources to integrate immigrants into communities.

Voters might not like that some migrants enter their country illegally. But many find it equally or even more unconscionable that migrants are forced to live for decades in the shadows—or that children raised by immigrant parents could be deported to countries they have never seen before. When migration is undertaken in a legal, orderly way, the public supports it. A recent transatlantic survey by the German Marshall Fund found that while majorities in all countries were worried about illegal immigration, concern about legal immigration was low—with only 26% of European respondents expressing worry, and just 18% doing so in the United States.

Ceding the immigration debate to extremists has helped abet  another extraordinary distortion: Publics generally believe that the number of immigrants in their countries is far higher than it actually is. In the same German Marshall Fund survey, British respondents estimated a foreign-born population of 31.8%, when in fact just 11.3% of the population is actually foreign born. Americans estimated a foreign-born population of 37.8%, when the actual number is 12.5%. This false perception makes it even harder to have a reasonable debate about the issues.

Tackling migration-related challenges is a necessity regardless of whether one favours more or less immigration. Today, according to the UN, there are 214 million people living outside their country of birth, up from approximately 82 million in 1970. So even if not a single new person were to cross a border, the challenges would still be with us.

The reality of course is that many countries, especially those that constitute the OECD, will decide that they need more immigrants as their own populations age and shrink. Better, then, that they figure out how to do immigration well rather than outsource much of the process to smugglers and extremists. And in a world in which nearly half of migrants are now going from one developing country to another, the problems are no longer confined to the West.

The good news is that there have been important advances over the past decade in managing migration. Policymakers can draw on successful programs, for example, in how to integrate migrant children into educational systems. They can learn from how some countries are successfully matching the labour needs of their businesses with the skills of immigrants. Developing countries, meanwhile, are getting smarter about how to leverage the $406 billion that migrants will send home this year—by issuing diaspora bonds, for instance, or by creating targeted investment opportunities for their emigrants.

Many pivotal stakeholders also are advocating for a more rational immigration system. Labour unions, for instance, once known for their scepticism about immigration, are increasingly in favour of pro-immigration reforms. In fact, unions were a driving force behind last year’s Domestic Workers Convention that seeks to protect the rights of the world’s estimated 50-100 million domestic workers.

By supporting smart, progressive reforms, politicians should at least be able to neutralize the issue of immigration on election day, if not turn it to their advantage. More importantly, electoral politics aside, they will be helping craft better societies—ones whose politics are shaped by reasonable debate among citizens and not by the community-destroying actions of smugglers and extremists. This, after all, is what politics is all about.

This article first appeared on Project Syndicate in December 2012

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This view of Cameron’s position is now difficult to sustain. His long-gestating speech on Europe, although containing elements that many might share, also sows the seeds for a prolonged and acrimonious debate – and not just in Britain. Conservatives in the House of Commons (and in the wider party) want to be reassured that their leader shares their antagonism for the entire European integration process. They have not forgotten or pardoned his “treachery” in refusing to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, signed by his predecessor, Gordon Brown. With his speech, that reassurance may now have been given.

Cameron, of course, faced a difficult task with his party, which required a statement from him of his European policy. Cameron then had to find something appropriate to say. He needed to placate Tories and his domestic critics while avoiding the economic and political havoc that would be caused by announcing an imminent referendum that might lead to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. The time that he took to decide what he would say attests to the difficulty of squaring that circle.

In fact, as Cameron’s speech made clear, his solution to his dilemma – to buy himself short-term peace from his critics at the expense of potentially making his (and Britain’s) problems more intractable in the long term – is hardly new. It was already clear that Cameron wanted to push any possibility of a referendum into the most distant possible future. The idea that he would seek to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EU membership is also familiar from his earlier speeches and interviews.

Now that position has been bluntly and uncompromisingly expressed. The demand for far-reaching change in the structure and functioning of the EU, including repatriation of powers to Britain, is a major new demarche at a difficult time for Europe.

Cameron has said on several occasions that he wishes to avoid a referendum revolving around the simple choice of continued EU membership on the basis of the current terms of membership. Already some are claiming to discern in his European policy the makings of an heir to Harold Wilson, another famous “renegotiator” of Britain’s terms of membership in the then-European Community who went on to win a referendum on Europe.

Britain’s relationship with European integration has been a difficult one, regardless of which party has been in power (Wilson, after all, was a Labour prime minister). This was inevitable from the outset, owing to Britain’s deep and irreconcilable disagreement with virtually all other EU member states on the fundamental issue of pooling sovereignty.

Essentially, the British point of view has been that a loose confederation of nation-states cooperating on trade is as much Europe as the UK needs. But Britain joined the European Community, not just the free-trade area that Cameron now apparently wants.

Nonetheless, the undertow of Euro-skepticism in British politics has never diminished and was evident in Cameron’s speech. Even the supremacy of European law in defined areas was accepted only reluctantly by Britain, and long after many others had done so. Indeed, in his speech, Cameron could not resist a passing shot at the European Court of Justice.

Britain has made major positive contributions to Europe, particularly with respect to the single market. But it is no exaggeration to state that whenever Britain has perceived an opportunity to wage a war of attrition against the European supranational project, it has done so, opposing any substantial increase in the EU’s competences or resources. Given that this position reflects the British public’s attitude toward the EU, it is not surprising. But it nonetheless distresses other member states, particularly those, like Germany, that recognize the great benefit of having a country with a strongly pro-free trade position and a deep commitment to the rule of law play an important role in the EU.

The prolonged period of renegotiation now proposed by Cameron implies high costs for both sides. For starters, it creates a source of deep and prolonged uncertainty at a time when the eurozone crisis already has called into question the EU’s long-term health, if not its survival.

Moreover, Cameron’s strategy seems unlikely to lead to an outcome that satisfies anyone. If it is intended to be a negotiation that takes place in the context of broader treaty talks, it may not happen in the foreseeable future. European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, among others, seems to doubt the need for a new treaty, which would require the unanimous support of the member states – some of which are sharply opposed – to enter into force. Indeed, Cameron recognized this explicitly in his speech, so the new treaty to embody a “new settlement” for Britain may have to be negotiated with all member states as a separate exercise.

Part of this negotiation apparently would entail a repatriation of powers, requiring the consent of all EU members – and making the conditions under which Cameron’s renegotiation is supposed to take place both legally and politically uncertain. Many European politicians would view a member state’s repatriation of competences as a totally destructive precedent, and thus would oppose it resolutely.

The net result is that it seems highly probable that any attempted achievement of a “new settlement,” including repatriation of competences, will make it much more difficult for Britain to remain in the EU than would be the case if a straightforward “in/out” referendum were held now. So, far from reassuring anyone (including Tory Euro-skeptics), Cameron’s stance heralds a new era of turbulence and uncertainty for Britain and its European partners.

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By Peter D. Sutherland and Cecilia Malmstrom

Europe faces an immigration predicament. Mainstream politicians, held hostage by xenophobic parties, adopt anti-immigrant rhetoric to win over fearful publics, while the foreign-born are increasingly marginalized in schools, cities, and at the workplace. Yet, despite high unemployment across much of the continent, too many employers lack the workers they need. Engineers, doctors and nurses are in short supply; so, too, are farmhands and health aides. And Europe can never have enough entrepreneurs, whose ideas drive economies and create jobs.

The prevailing skepticism about immigration is not wholly unfounded. Many communities are genuinely polarized, which makes Europeans understandably anxious. But to place the blame for this on immigrants is wrong, and exacerbates the problem. We are all at fault.

By not taking responsibility, we allowed immigration to become the scapegoat for a host of other, unrelated problems. The enduring insecurity caused by the global economic crisis, Europe’s existential political debates, and the rise of emerging powers is too often expressed in reactions against migrants. Not only is this unjust, but it distracts us from crafting solutions to the real problems.

European countries must finally and honestly acknowledge that, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, they are lands of immigrants. The percentage of foreign-born residents in several European countries – including Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece – is similar to that in the US.

Yet, despite this, we do not make the necessary investments to integrate newcomers into our schools and workplaces. Nor have we done enough to reshape our public institutions to be inclusive and responsive to our diverse societies. The issue is not how many new immigrants are accepted into the European Union, but acknowledging the nature and composition of the societies in which we already live.

It is ironic – and dangerous – that Europe’s anti-immigrant sentiment is peaking just when global structural changes are fundamentally shifting migration flows. The most important transformation is the emergence of new poles of attraction. Entrepreneurs, migrants with Ph.Ds, and those simply with a desire to improve their lives are flocking to places like Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, China, and India. In the coming decade, most of the growth in migration will take place in the global south. The West is no longer the Promised Land, placing at risk Europe’s ability to compete globally.

The aging of Europe’s population is historically unprecedented. The number of workers will decline precipitously, and could shrink by almost one-third by mid-century, with immense consequences for Europe’s social model, the vitality of its cities, its ability to innovate and compete, and for relations among generations as the old become heavily reliant on the young. And, while history suggests that countries that welcome newcomers’ energy and vibrancy compete best internationally, Europe is taking the opposite tack by tightening its borders.

But all is not lost. Europe got itself into this situation through a combination of inaction and short-sighted policymaking. This leaves considerable room for improvement. In fact, there are rays of hope in certain corners of Europe.

Consider Sweden, which has transformed its immigration policy by allowing employers to identify the immigrant workers whom they need (the policy has built-in safeguards to give preference to Swedish and EU citizens). In more rational times, these reforms would be the envy of Europe, especially given the relative resilience of Sweden’s economy. They certainly have caught the attention of Australia and Canada, which aim to emulate them.

There have also been innovations in integrating immigrants. Some initiatives, albeit modest, encourage those with immigrant backgrounds to apply for public-sector jobs in police forces, fire departments, media, and elsewhere. Such measures also respond to the urgent need for public institutions that look like the populations they serve.

There are many other tools to advance integration. We understand well the importance of early childhood education, and what kinds of programs can bridge the gap between immigrant and native children. We know as well the importance of finding a job in the integration process. We know how to recognize immigrants skills better, and how to provide the right kind of vocational training. We know how to ward off discrimination in hiring.

But, while we know what to do, we now need to muster the political will to do it. The good news is that, if we get integration right, we will be far more likely to bring publics along on more open immigration policies.

Equally important is international cooperation on migration. Last year, during the Arab revolutions, the EU missed a historic opportunity to begin weaving together the two sides of the Mediterranean. It failed to open its doors to young students, entrepreneurs, and other North Africans. Today, the EU today is making a more serious effort to engage its southern neighborhood. Among the potential opportunities are free-trade agreements, an easing of visa requirements for university students, temporary work programs, and incentives to attract entrepreneurs.

No country is an island when it comes to migration, and none can address it alone. We have a long way to go, probably in a climate that will not turn favorable to immigration for many years. How much progress we can make will hinge on our ability to break through the myths about migration.

Migration is changing in fundamental ways, and we must continue to push ourselves to devise systems and approaches that respond to new realities. If we succeed, human mobility can become one of the great assets of the twenty-first century.

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It remains unclear how long-lasting the effects of Draghi’s intervention – or of the public support offered to him by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, and Italian premier Mario Monti – will prove to be. What we can say with certainty is that Draghi’s remarks and the reaction they evoked demonstrate that the fundamental problems of the eurozone are not primarily financial or economic; they are political, psychological, and institutional.

International observers took such notice of Draghi’s commitment to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro because so many of them have come to doubt other leading European players’ commitment to do likewise. (Some of these doubts are, of course, politically or financially self-serving; a certain model of financial capitalism perceives the euro as a threat, and its adherents will do everything they can to bring about its demise.)

But eurozone leaders’ inability to assuage doubt about their commitment to the euro after two and a half years of crisis suggests that the problem is deeply rooted. In their own defense, eurozone ministers point to the raft of reforms that they have introduced over the past 30 months, which will promote economic modernization, the restoration of sound government finances, and closer economic coordination.

Unfortunately, these reforms have all too often served as displacement activity – worthwhile in themselves, but failing to answer unambiguously the question posed with increasing urgency by international markets: Are the eurozone’s largest and currently most prosperous members absolutely committed to its continuation?

No one doubts that Germany and most other eurozone members would prefer the single currency to continue. Today’s uncertainty concerns whether this preference may be overridden by pressing considerations of national politics, or resentment at the slow pace of reform in certain eurozone countries.

Indeed, a German proverb to the effect that “trust is good, but control is better” has been the basis of eurozone leaders’ policy since the developed world’s debt crisis engulfed the single currency’s system of governance. The implication is clear: trust between the members of the eurozone cannot be taken for granted, but must be earned and maintained.

The limitations of this approach have now been revealed. While the eurozone’s richer countries have indeed done much to help their troubled neighbors, they have done so in an obtrusively conditional, transitional, and incremental fashion.

At one level, it is entirely understandable that Germany and other eurozone countries should demand assurances that their resources will not be wasted. But this constant need for reassurance, for the limiting of risk and involvement to the minimum necessary, provokes a fear that at some point Germany and others will judge their partners’ assurances insufficient and the risks run in helping them intolerable. If that happens, the euro’s demise cannot be far behind.

The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, represented a noble and ambitious departure in European history. Solidarity and predictability in international relations, based on common institutions and common interests, would ensure Europe’s prosperity and stability much more effectively than had the traditional balancing act of high-wire diplomacy, whose practitioners had too often crashed to the ground.

The euro was founded in this spirit of solidarity, and its contribution to limiting economic and financial instability in Europe over the past five years should not be underestimated. The example of the 1930’s is a reminder of how much worse things might have been. Eurozone leaders’ temptation to revert to earlier, discredited models of European relationships was bearable for a time, but it has now reached the limit of its tolerability.

My impression is that German public and political opinion is beginning to recognize the economic devastation for Europe and Germany implied by a euro breakup. German politicians bear the important democratic responsibility of reinforcing this realization and advocating the steps needed to avert a catastrophe.

It can be no part of a well-functioning democracy for leaders to hide unwelcome truths from their electorates. It would be a delusion to imagine that the eurozone need only follow its current path to ensure the single currency’s future. If nothing else, that current path unacceptably accentuates the differences between member states in a way that is politically and economically unsustainable in the longer term.

The philosophy of control and reciprocity that until now has characterized the eurozone’s approach to its crisis of governance needs to be replaced by one of solidarity and all that follows from it. This means a more balanced economic policy within the eurozone, an enhanced role for the ECB, a real banking and financial union, and a road map to partial and conditional mutualization of legacy debt.

Eurozone leaders have spoken about all of these, but the time has come for unequivocal commitments and a realistic timetable for action. We are now perilously close to the moment when “muddling through” could give way to renewed crisis. So the Bundesbank’s self-righteous zeal in asserting that its responsibilities are somehow graver – and more binding – than those of other central banks is dangerously wrong-headed. “Nein” merely brings calamity closer.

None of Europe’s financial problems would look remotely as challenging today if doubts about the eurozone’s future had been dispelled two years ago, and the reputational and financial costs would have been dramatically less than they have been in the past 30 months. In the long run, solidarity is cheaper for all involved, while its absence could become ruinously expensive in the foreseeable future.

The post Europe’s Solidarity Imperative appeared first on Peter Sutherland.

The “migration dimension” of the Arab Spring should evoke not only the potential short- and longer term movement of North Africans to Europe, but equally how Europe’s fear of migration dampened the broader political and public response to the historic revolutions in the Southern Mediterranean.

Europe and international agencies were effective in addressing the related humanitarian crises. EU bureaucracies also responded with relative speed to the dangers and opportunities generated by events. But a vacuum of political will meant that the response was fragmented, lacking conviction and vision.

The EU can still conceive and implement an ambitious plan to create a Mediterranean labour market uniting the region. Among its many advantages: endowing workers with skills EU companies need (they could be employed in their home countries or, if feasible, eventually as migrants in the EU), and helping to create a solid middle class of consumers for European goods.

The Arab Spring also revealed a series of governance gaps related to migration, mobility, and asylum that should be addressed by Europe and the international community.

In sum, there is an argument not for more migration, but better migration. In the age of globalisation, the EU could show the way in overcoming one aspect utterly underdeveloped: the orderly movement of people.

I. Introduction

The Arab Spring, in the context of migration, in particular, should surely be a catalyst for European governments to rethink their relationship with North Africa (and Africa as a whole). Doing so will require the development of a unifying vision for how to transform the trans-Mediterranean relationship.

The paranoia about migrant hordes and exaggerated fears of a tidal wave of immigrants fleeing to European shores can be explained by the profound fear of migration in Europe — a fear complicated by, and confused with, the effects of the economic and financial crises, chronic unemployment. The rise of anti-immigrant populism in many EU countries has inhibited some moderate politicians hoping to advance a more progressive vision for migration. Budget constraints, meanwhile, limit investments in immigrant integration, thus heightening divisions within Europe’s increasingly diverse communities. But severely restricting mobility in the Mediterranean is neither a pertinent nor an effective response to the economic crisis and social anomy that is roiling European politics.

This note focuses on mid- and long-term recommendations regarding mobility and migration between Europe and North Africa. It also offers a brief synopsis of how Europe responded to the immediate short-term humanitarian crisis triggered by the Mediterranean revolutions, as well as an assessment of the migration governance gaps that the crisis illuminated.

II. The Outflows from North Africa

To start and as a reminder, the world stock of migrants is small and the same as in 1965 i.e. “manageable”.

The immediate humanitarian response in North Africa, while revealing numerous gaps in how such crises are managed, was sufficient in general terms. The UNHCR, IOM, and other agencies and NGOs worked together effectively—improvising when needed—to provide emergency relief to over 667,000 refugees fleeing the conflicts and to repatriate 159,000 third-country nationals.

Nonetheless, since last winter, more than 1,500 people have lost their lives attempting to reach Italy’s shores, often because of unseaworthy vessels and an absence of qualified skippers on-board.

As of late August, according to the UNHCR, some 52,000 people had arrived in Italy as part of the North Africa outflow, with 27,000 having departed from Libya and the rest from Tunisia. Some of the European media and politicians portrayed these safety seekers and migrants as a serious threat to Europe. By way of contrast, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, over 2.7 million people were displaced, of whom 700,000 sought asylum in the EU. Similarly, the movement of workers from Europe’s east dwarfs the numbers from the southern Mediterranean: Spain alone has received over 800,000 workers from Romania, for example, while an estimated 700,000 Poles migrated to the United Kingdom after 2004.

Other significant facts:

Approximately 667,000 people—about half of them third-country nationals from poorer Asian, African, and other Middle Eastern countries—fled to Libya’s borders with Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, and Algeria.

IOM, UNHCR, and others have repatriated 159,000 third-country nationals using over 1,500 charter flights; over 120,00 more returned home over land (mainly to Chad and Niger).

Of these, 73,000 migrants returned to West Africa, 33,000 to Asia (mostly Bangladesh), and the rest elsewhere in the region and the world.

As of 23 September 2011, IOM notes a total of 696,079 migrants have crossed Libya’s borders.* This figure includes 309,874 third-country nationals (TCNs), which represent 45% of total crossings. Movements still continue, with another 10,073 migrants (1,386 TCNs) crossing the borders to Tunisia, Egypt, Chad and Niger between 14 and 22 September. IOM and its partners have assisted 209,210 migrants via a combination of charter flights, in-kind air assets, commercial flights, and land and sea vessels. The total caseload in need of evacuation at the Libyan borders is still estimated at 2,353 migrants. (*Cross-border movement statistics only refer to migrants leaving Libya.)

IOM Cross Border Movements as of 23 September 2011

III. The European Response to Date

It quickly became clear that there was no real desire to reframe the relationship between the two shores of the Mediterranean, let alone a 21st century Marshall Plan.

This is pitiful as the basis is there for such a project with the EU working in tandem with the US, Arab Gulf States, China and Japan. The mechanics of the Marshall Plan could be applied if the Arab countries – notably Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan – accept to join the initiative on their own free will.

The all-consuming sovereign debt crisis and the continent’s weak governments contributed largely to the absence of a real response.

Surely, the timing is difficult but as noted by Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne on American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea? in the current issue of The Washington Quarterly (CSIS, Fall 2011):

“… How can Europe and the US support democratic transitions in a way that is acceptable to the Arab countries…at a time when both continents are confronting fiscal crises? The best instruments available are enhanced trade agreements that not only promote market access, but even more importantly maximize competitiveness-enhancing and job-promoting reforms in the Arab countries….The new trade agreements should be far deeper and more comprehensive than those currently in force and contain many of the elements included in Eastern European countries’ accession agreements, including a bold multi-year trade assistance initiative designed to bolster competitiveness and the role of the private sector in the Arab countries”.

The Marshall Plan, in its time, was understood as being of benefit to both the United States and to Europe. But it had time to germinate and was supported by historic relationships and partnerships in the World Wars. Even in the early euphoria of the Arab Spring, by contrast, there was only a fleeting sense that a stable, democratic North Africa could emerge as a serious partner to Europe. This asymmetry, coupled with concerns over uncontrolled migration, dampened enthusiasm for an ambitious response, as did the focus on the financial crisis.

The European reaction can be identified in four main themes:

An effective, timely humanitarian response: The European Commission and individual Member States responded quickly and well to the floods of refugees across the conflict borders, sending sufficient funds to IOM, UNHCR, and other relief agencies to provide food, shelter, and repatriation. Border agency Frontex, within its limited abilities, also mobilized quickly to help patrol the Mediterranean.

A vacillating, underwhelming political response: Despite scattered calls for a new Marshall Plan, the European political response to the Arab Spring (as opposed to the military response in Libya) was largely lacking leadership and conviction. An inherent scepticism about whether the revolutions would spawn democracies (rather than Islamic strongholds) fuelled calls for substantial aid to be conditional on democratic progress; conditionality also applied to proposals for any migration openings (in exchange for strong border controls and potent re-admission agreements). In sum, what is proposed is “conditionality” instead of “incentives”, hardly a saleable political product to Arab countries wary of the West!

A predictably energetic bureaucratic response, lacking focus and political will: In March and May, the European Commission produced a pair of communications on the Southern Mediterranean, with a significant emphasis on migration-related issues; the relevant Commissioners also visited Egypt and Tunisia in the late spring. In practical terms, this activity has led to the creation of a new platform—the so-called “dialogues for migration, mobility, and security”—that aims at preparing the conditions for the establishment of Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries. In addition, Frontex increased its assets in the South Mediterranean. All this, however, failed to signal to Europe’s partners in North Africa that a new framework of cooperation on migration and mobility was being conceived.

What is lacking is a holistic policy system with regards to migration. This was due to the simple fact that North Africa governments are primarily interested in creating greater opportunities for legal migration to the EU, and in expanding trade—neither of which have figured persuasively in EU plans.

In sum, the time has come to seriously advance the idea of a Single EuroMed Market and to start work on a Customs Union with Egypt and Tunisia (refer to the success of the CU with Turkey) adopting the common external tariff. The volume of trade between the EU and MENA could be 3.5 to four times larger if both regions were to reach the EU’s level of integration! (See TWQ article)

Political tension over the suspension of Schengen rules by France and Denmark: Italy’s decision to issue temporary residence permits to North African migrants prompted France to suspend Schengen regulations and impose inspections on the border with Italy; Denmark then followed suit. This triggered intense political debate and an eventual proposal from the Commission on the conditions under which Member States could suspend Schengen. It has not yet led to any significant momentum toward a unified European Border Guard initiative—perhaps building on Frontex—which would be a reasonable response to the challenges Europe now faces.

IV. Recommendations for the EU on Migration in the Southern Mediterranean

The window has not closed for Europe to regroup and propose a robust vision on migration and mobility to the emerging governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (and eventually beyond). Engagement on this front is a long-term game.

In moving forward, Europe could adapt the kind of “mini-lateralist” approach that eased the way for military action in Libya. Migration is too controversial an issue to generate EU-wide consensus. So “coalitions of the willing” will have to be at the vanguard, devising novel migration policies that could lead to a race to the top. The Lisbon Treaty allows for these “enhanced cooperation” (a procedure whereby a minimum of nine EU member states are allowed to establish advanced integration or cooperation in an area within EU structures but without the other members being involved). This could be done in the context of the Mobility Partnerships organized by the European Commission, the essentially defunct Union for the Mediterranean (replacing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), the recently announced “Dialogues for Migration, Mobility, and Security,” or in other formats. For instance: Willing groups of countries that want to tap North Africa’s labour supply could offer work visas to migrants from the region, working in collaboration with local educational institutions and European companies to train them. If they do so successfully, other countries might well be willing to follow.

The sense of purpose in all of the EU’s platforms and processes is often lost under the weight of bureaucratic tedium. By contrast, Europe’s approach to Mediterranean mobility could be animated by a vision of constructive engagement.

The essential aspects of this approach would include:

Developing partnerships between European and North African educational institutions, opportunities for vocational skills development, and workforce preparation programs. An intensive focus on developing North Africa’s human potential by investing to make workers useful for their own countries (first and foremost) as well as the EU is critical.

Significant job creation will require internal labour market reforms in the Southern Mediterranean in order to make it safe, predictable, and profitable for European companies to open up/expand operations in the region.

Establishing capacity to more accurately forecast the needs of Europe’s labour markets in the short-, mid-, and long-terms; using these forecasts to guide investments in education and workforce training, both in Europe and North Africa (and to Europe’s East), thus matching up African demographic, skill, and educational forecasts with European labour market needs. The demographic issue is broadly that within ten years, 80 people will join the workforce for 100 people who will leave it in Europe, and in the developing countries 342 people will join the workforce for every 100 who leave it! In France, for example, in order to maintain the same ratio in 2050, it would need 1.7 million immigrants to enter each year!

Sharp improvement in the means by which skills recognition, both formal and informal, takes place in Europe.

Providing substantial support to design, build, train, and staff migration and regional protection systems in the emerging democracies of North Africa. Also includes assistance in drafting constitutions and relevant legislation, building border management systems, and establishing institutions to manage migration, regional protection, and diasporas.

A vital role given to the private sector: “co-development” cannot be simply decreed by the top – the true actors on the ground are those companies which invest (FDI) and produce growth in the area.

In the medium-term, once transitional arrangements have been completed, the EU could consider citizens of North African partner countries as a new tier in the preferential treatment of mobile workers, particularly with respect to seasonal and less skilled work.

Establishing legal channels for expanded mobility. In the short term, promoting mechanisms for greater inter-regional exchanges, including new avenues for students and entrepreneurs; facilitating mobility, including avenues for temporary and full-time workers.

Intra-regional Arab countries exchanges need to boosted and nurtured as an essential part of the strategy.

Entering into a dialogue with actors beyond state governments in both sending and receiving countries—such as regional and local governments, as well as civil society groups—will be essential, especially in a world where migrants increasingly consider their movements to be city-to-city, rather than country-to-country. Understanding the different pressures faced by municipal authorities in sending countries will help the EU ensure that their partnership addresses the realities of emigration, not just the policy approaches.

The EU should mainstream these efforts across Directorate Generals, since implementing these strategies requires coordination across a number of different portfolios. Currently, the cluster of small-scale responses from various Commissioners, and the failure to inspire strong Member State support, has given partner governments a confusing set of mixed messages, and potentially sets the Commission up to promise something it cannot deliver. As a reminder, Egypt and Tunisia have Association Agreements with the EU!

Finally, in envisioning a new era of greater opportunity and mobility in the southern Mediterranean, the EU must fully consider its approach to the entire African continent—both for reasons of equity and also to anticipate the knock-on effects of migration and labour openings in North Africa.

V. Governance Gaps Revealed by the North Africa Crisis

The Arab Spring catalysed a series of crises—related to humanitarian relief, migration, and public opinion—that have tested the limits of international cooperation on migration and exposed major holes in existing systems to manage human mobility, especially in a crisis.

At the May 2011 G8 Deauville Summit, $ 20 billion in assistance was pledged to Egypt and then to Tunisia from multilateral development banks in addition to bilateral help but “is both the wrong sort of help – stressing aid, not trade –and of entirely wrong scale (see TWQ article). The EBRD too has declared its “intention” to invest $3.5 billion annually in the region “when and if” opportunities arise.

Among the governance gaps are the following:

The management of migration flows

Refugee flows: Although the refugee regime is the only area of migration with formal multilateral governance, the crisis exposed huge gaps in existing mechanisms to grant temporary protection and asylum to persons in genuine need of protection. The current regime is designed for individuals fleeing persecution from their own governments, and does not have the tools to manage migrants “trapped” in a third country (as happened in Libya). There is little clarity as to the roles of national governments and international organizations in this situation. How should the burden be shared? How and where should asylum camps be established?

Labour migration flows: The migration crisis exposed by “boat migrants” (mostly from Tunisia, but also from sub-Saharan Africa transiting through Libya) striving to reach European shores exposes the lack of legitimate legal avenues for economic migrants fleeing instability and unemployment in the region.

Mixed flows: Faced with both kinds of movement described above, governing bodies need to improve their ability to differentiate between genuine refugees and economic migrants, who are often travelling together. While the distinction is clear in international humanitarian law, this is rendered meaningless if the distinction cannot be made on the ground.

Protecting vulnerable migrants

Trapped migrants: In the absence of a global migration organization, there is no governing entity with a mandate to ensure that migrant workers are treated humanely and fairly in the country of destination, especially when their country of origin is unwilling or unable to help (for example, Bangladeshi workers trapped in Libya whose government did not have the funds to repatriate them, thus forcing them to rely on the goodwill of organizations like UNHCR and IOM). The Filipino government faced the converse challenge of having the resources to retrieve its nationals, but most of them being unwilling to return home. These people, similarly, are left in a governance gap.

The events in Libya also placed a spotlight on actions by states that contravene international law and norms: For example, the Gaddafi regime used migration, and the threat of “demographic bombs” (unleashing waves of irregular migrants onto European shores) for political leverage and was shown to be complicit in human smuggling to southern Europe. This has grave implications for rights as well as international mobility. However, should be recalled the unworthy relationship between Libya and a few EU Member States where agreements were set up with the Libyan government to forestall further emigration (notably from sub-Sahara) to European shores!

Technology has helped smugglers to be more efficient in their work, and smuggling fees have been increasing; yet international regimes have not enjoyed a similar entrepreneurial ability to harness technology in their efforts to prevent organized crime.

The examples above point to a dire need for coordination among disparate actors on shared challenges. While in some cases this may mean actual collaboration (for example the joint UNHCR/IOM Humanitarian Evacuation Cell established in Geneva on 1 March 2011 to respond to flows out of Libya), that kind of collective action may not be feasible (or appropriate) in every situation. However, it is critical to designate specific roles for each lead actor, and in this way coordinate (if not cooperate).

The following forms of cooperation could be considered:

Cooperation among international agencies (UNHCR, IOM, ILO, etc.). Formal collaboration may not always be feasible; each organization has such a specific mandate that codifying this kind of cooperation (which would look like they were broadening their mission) might be rejected by their funders and stakeholders. An informal, network-based cooperation, based on trust and shared objectives that unfolds in practical terms on the ground may be more effective than any formal arrangement.

Cooperation among receiving states: As the problem of irregular migration is spread unevenly across regions (some states are the primary “first stop” for irregular migrants based on their geography, and some are the primary “end goal” for where migrants want to end up) the issue of how to “fairly” share responsibilities and burdens is the main barrier to cooperation. Médecins sans Frontières recently criticized the EU for shirking its “responsibility” to allow victims of war into Europe. An effort needs to be made to define who is in charge of setting the norms—let alone principles of engagement—for burden-sharing among states.

VI. Conclusion

With or without the revolutions in North Africa, migration from and through the region into Europe would have grown gradually greater over the coming decades.

This is because the MENA region, with its legions of young workers, is an ideal demographic match for Europe, with its shortage of the youthful labour it needs to remain competitive. MENA is the source of 20 million first-generation migrants, half of them now living in another MENA country and most of the rest in Europe.

The size of MENA’s working-age population will continue to rise sharply in the next two decades: a “youth bulge” of 96 million people between 20-29 in 2010 will reach 104 million in 2030. Europe will be subject to the opposite trend, as its total working-age population began shrinking in 2010 and the number of new entrants into the labour market will steadily decline over the next 20 years. The tables that follow tell the tale well.

The Working-Age Population in the MENA* Region and the EU-27

2000 to 2030

*MENA (currently) predominantly sending countries: all MENA countries except Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya.

Source: United Nations Population Division (UNPD), “World Population Prospects: the 2006 Revision Population Database” (online database, September 2007), http://esa.un.org/unpp/.

Yet the Arab Spring offers an unexpected and precious opportunity to Europe: it provides a catalyst to fundamentally reshape its relationship with the region, focusing on creating a functioning even if imperfect labour market, deep security cooperation, and fostering enduring development opportunities—and doing so in tandem and as equals with the region’s emerging democracies.

Identifying key immigration partner countries for the future—whether due to political ties, demographic growth, democratic change, economic dynamism, or skill base—and forging stronger partnerships based on genuinely collaborative goals will be the key to ensuring that innovation remains central to the external relations of EU migration. Beyond mobility partnerships, these strategic engagements should bring together trade, development and political objectives, and design the right “blend” of policies to ensure the most beneficial cooperation.

The first step on both sides is thus bolstering internal cooperation. In the European Union, there is a mismatch between the rhetoric of “solidarity and partnership” and the reality of Europe’s efforts to manage the crisis in its Southern neighbourhood. There is a need for much greater internal coherence, as thus far there have been stark discrepancies among Member States’ approaches. Europeans need to define a clear, common, coherent policy to send clear messages to North African partners. In the words of one European official, “we can’t have individual responses in a common space.” And this need extends to the African side as well; the lack of cooperation among North African countries incurs a high cost to their own populations.

Annex

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Europe’s reaction to the historic revolutions in North Africa has vacillated between exhilaration and fear. The natural instinct to celebrate and support democratization across the Mediterranean has been tempered by concerns that the crisis will spill onto European shores.

A few leaders have invoked the post-World War II Marshall Plan as a model for large-scale European development assistance for the region, the aim being to ensure the sustainability of a democratic transformation and generate long-term political and economic benefits for Europe. But the mainstream reaction has been much more fearful: media and politicians throughout the European Union are obsessing about the threat of waves of migrants reaching their borders.

Such a threat should not be taken lightly. Already, the controversy over Tunisian migrants in Italy has started to fray the political underpinnings that allow free movement in the Schengen area. The war in Libya, meanwhile, could lead to many more thousands of civilians fleeing the violence and needing international protection.

So far, nearly 400,000 people have filled refugee camps in Tunisia and Egypt, and an estimated 20,000 have reached Italy’s shores. Dealing with any surge of asylum seekers will require the EU to strengthen its capacity to offer temporary protection and possibly to reconsider how its overall asylum system works. That the Union has been moving towards a common approach to border security, most visibly with the expansion of the Frontex border agency, will be of help here.

But if Europe allows itself to be consumed by the short-term crisis, it risks squandering an extraordinary long-term opportunity. By using this moment strategically and wisely, the EU would have a chance to reframe its relationship with the southern Mediterranean (as it is being redubbed) to promote generational development and growth in ways that can address Europe’s interests, too.

The best way to allay European fears and prevent uncontrolled migration is to establish positive incentives, and the practical means, for potential migrants to stay home most significantly by creating jobs in the southern Mediterranean. After all, the vast majority of migrants leave home reluctantly.

Yet, at the same time, as its baby boomers retire en masse in the coming decade, Europe will need workers at all skill levels. The southern Mediterranean can be the source of this labor, given its huge youth bulge. The trick will be to ensure that migrants are given the chance to acquire the skills that European employers need, and that they have the chance to move in a safe, legal, and orderly fashion.

Policies that help train the next generation of North Africans, and allow them to circulate more freely between Europe and their home countries, are a much smarter solution than the current approach, which sustains illegal migration without meeting Europe’s labor needs. This is an argument not for more migration, but for better migration well thought out and planned.

Of course, if Europe helps North Africa build sustainable, prosperous democracies, this would be the greatest long-term deterrent to illegal migration of all. It is worth recalling that 50 years ago, the largest immigrant populations in northern Europe hailed from Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. As those countries prospered, the migrants returned home: their countries eventually became engines of European growth, and major export markets for Germany, France, and other EU member states. The same arc of development can and should be limned for the southern Mediterranean.

Fortunately, research on migration and development in recent years has helped foster a range of policy tools that Europe should be considering. Experts and policymakers have been devising many innovative programs, including low-cost remittances from migrants to their home countries, efforts to strengthen ties between diasporas and their homelands, and initiatives that help skilled migrants find proper employment, so that qualified surgeons are not driving taxis.

In thinking about how to reframe the EUs relationship with the southern Mediterranean, we should draw on these ideas as expansively as possible. In order to connect our societies in positive ways, we should seriously consider liberalizing trade regimes, opening new avenues for legal migration, and vastly expanding the number of students from the region who come to Europe for education and professional training. After all, it was the youth of North Africa, both at home and abroad, whose notions of freedom helped bring down dictators in Egypt and Tunisia. Their talents and energy should now be cultivated and harnessed to help rebuild their societies.

Responding to the challenges and opportunities of this moment demands the creation of strong partnerships among states, international institutions, and non-governmental actors. Since its inception in 2006, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) has provided a much-needed platform for dialogue among states and other stakeholders on issues related to migration and development. Its annual plenary sessions facilitate the exchange of experiences and good practices in a way that transcends traditional North-South conflicts.

Among other changes that it has spurred, the GFMD has compelled governments to understand migration more holistically, and to develop a whole of government approach to addressing the opportunities and challenges that it poses. It also has highlighted the importance to development of protecting migrant rights and of fighting illegal migration.

The Global Forum has done its job by generating and fostering ideas that can make migration benefit the development of countries of origin and destination. It is high time that these ideas are implemented. There could be no greater opportunity for doing so than this strategically crucial window in the history of Europe and the southern Mediterranean. If we do not seize this moment for action, history could well pass us by.

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