Cameron’s speech was mainly about the fact that there would be renegotiation of the relationship with Europe and that, following this; there would be a referendum on membership.  This served the purpose of temporarily appeasing approximately a hundred and ten Conservative members of parliament who are particularly sceptical about the European project and indeed apparently anxious to leave the European Union.  It also tempered the approach of the overwhelmingly euro sceptical press at least for a time.

However it raised two essential issues neither of which have been answered since by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary.  The first of these relates to the identification of what precisely the United Kingdom wishes to renegotiate and the second to the details of how this renegotiation (apparently to involve treaty changes) is to be conducted.

As to the former the speech itself and subsequent comments by the Prime Minister focussed specifically only on the aspiration in the Treaty of Rome to a “greater union of the Peoples of Europe”.  This aspirational objective would appear to be unacceptable to the United Kingdom.  Its exclusion, if it were to occur, would have no practical effect.  However it would, if the aspiration were deleted generally or even just for the United Kingdom, change the perception of the essence of the project.  This fundamental objective is the essential element of the undefined destination of the European Project.

We still have a tabula rasa on specific and operational changes.   Apart from this intended deletion, for example, is the Common Agricultural Policy to be included in the list of demands for exclusion or the Common Fisheries Policy or just elements of the common Social Policy? Or is it to something else?  One way or another it seems clear that the whole exercise was launched without any clear roadmap as to where it would end up.  One of the effects of this is to create a prolonged period of uncertainty.

Since the speech was made, a number of events have taken place.  For one thing British departments of State have apparently communicated with counterparts in other Member States requesting their views on the repatriation of competences.  If any substantive replies were received we have not heard of them but in the review of competences being conducted by the departments of state here so far the conclusions seem to be that the EU policies are positive for the UK rather than negative.

We do not know either how such renegotiation as may be thought necessary will be conducted in due course but we do know that any treaty change will require an Intergovernmental Conference and all remaining twenty seven members will be required to agree to any treaty changes.  If such changes amount to anything this will not be easily obtained.  The current strategy appears to be premised upon a belief that an IGC will not have to be called by the United Kingdom because one will be required anyway to agree changes to Economic & Monetary Union and this this could be used also to pin on the British changes.  This scenario may or may not actually happen.  I do not think that it will.

However, whatever transpires on this aspect of procedure it is time that the British issue be addressed here and the British people should make their decision without illusions.  Britain is part of, and if it remains will continue to be part of, a unique undertaking but one which, at the least, has some federal characteristics.  This has implications for national sovereignty which cannot be denied or obfuscated any longer.

The history of British engagement in the European integration project so far gives some idea of the challenges in making the case for staying in.  From the outset United Kingdom has been uniquely sceptical about the whole idea.  Winston Churchill’s speech at the University of Zurich on the 19^th September 1946 is often cited by both sides in support of their case regarding British participation.  He said then “we must build a United States of Europe”.  However, he based this United States of Europe on “a partnership between France & Germany”.  The clear implication from his speech was that Britain would remain apart though supportive of the venture.   He made this absolutely clear, in June 1950, in a speech in Westminster.  In addition Britain never really favoured the idea of a federation even for the others although, as an ultimate objective for the main founders this was the clear objective from the outset.  As Adenaur told the Bundestag on the 3^rd May 1950 the purpose of the Schumann Plan (the Coal and Steel Community) proposed by France was “to create a European Federation”.

Going back through the earlier history of the United Kingdom the seeds of an attitude that resisted entanglements with Europe were evident as long ago as the Reformation.  These grew in the “blood enriched soil of numerous conflicts up to and including the two world wars”.  In the 1830 George Canning expressed a view that has some resonance today.  He delighted in the collapse of the Congress of Vienna and applauded the notion of “every nation for itself and God for us all”.

When the seminal conference that was to create the EEC took place in June 1950 in Messina and Britain played no role in it.  When offered the floor in that conference towards its conclusion in November 1955 the relatively junior civil servant representing the UK said of what was to become the Treaty of Rome.  “The future treaty which you are discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed it would have no chance of being ratified; and if it were ratified it would have no chance of being applied.  And if it was applied it would be totally unacceptable to Britain.  You speak of agriculture which we do not like, of powers over customs, which we take exception to, and institutions, which frighten us.  Monsieur Le President, messieurs, au revoir et bonne chance”.  (Charles Grant Delors London Nicolas Brealey pg.62).  He then walked out and did not return.

When Britain did join the EEC and the other European Communities it was in truth a reluctant marriage forced by necessity.  Hugo Young who of course had strong pro-European views has written “Britain has struggled to reconcile the past, she could not forget with the future she cannot avoid”.  This is not an altogether unfair comment.

Having regard to this history it is difficult not to feel a sense of déjà vu today.  We have seen this debate before but in the referendum held on the 5^th June 1975 following another “renegotiation” the result was 67% of those who voted opting for continuing British membership.  Every region except the Western Isles and Orkney and Shetlands decided in favour of British membership (Missed Chances Roy Denman Cassell pg.  250).  This result came notwithstanding the great unpopularity at the time of the EEC which is not a new phenomenon.  So the similarities to the present situation abound.   Then, and now, the Germans tried to be helpful and conciliatory (although nothing substantive was in fact achieved in the renegotiation “that could not have been obtained in the continuous negotiation month by month which is a fact of Community life”) (Denman pg.  249).

However the substantial vote in favour of membership in 1975 did not imply enthusiasm for Europe and therefore did not change Britain’s consistent opposition to and indeed obstruction of a deepening of the Union or the provision of resources to it.  Over the years this has impeded the integration process and, ever since, the United Kingdom has been therefore a thorn in the side of those who believe, as I do, in a greater union of the peoples of Europe.  One can conclude that even Britain’s subsequent positivism to enlargement (sometimes cited as a positive contribution) was in part largely motivated politically by an intention to undermine integration by diluting the core.  So, much though Britain’s attributes have been properly admired (and indeed are deeply needed) by the EU the constant background of obstructionism and negativism has created recurring crises between the majority and the United Kingdom particularly regarding its budget.   The United Kingdom has always argued for the principle of juste retour and rails against the very idea of net transfers between the rich and poorer states.   So the concept of solidarity is rejected.

Federalists are an endangered species here.  They are considered by some to be basically unhinged from reality.  Furthermore the illusion that what the British people voted in 1975 for was “a Common Market” and no more is constantly repeated by sovereign States that they were deceived into joining a supranational enterprise.  This has been fostered constantly by Eurosceptics either as a result of ignorance of history or malign intent.

There is still a frightening degree of ignorance about the reality of the extent of the sharing of sovereignty that has already been agreed by the United Kingdom.   Apart from the Treaty of Rome, and the direct applicability and effect of European law that flows from it, Mrs Thatcher agreed by the Single European Act that far more majority voting would be permitted where, previously, unanimity had been required.   Majority voting is, of course, an expression of the sharing of sovereignty and is at the heart of the project.  So no use of euphemisms about only having agreed to “co-operation between sovereign states” should be allowed to continue to distort the reality of Britain’s agreed position as a member of the EU.  It is no longer the case that the supremacy of parliament is the unadulterated expression of the British constitution as it once was.

The object of the European project as Geoffrey Howe famously said in November 1991, is “the taming of nationalism without suppressing patriotism, sharing sovereignty without destroying nations”.  This is the central political objective of an “ever closer union of the peoples of Europe” the objective expressly now denied by the Prime Minister.   It is an expression of Christian principles in essence related to the concepts of the dignity and equality of man.

Jean Monnet in his Memoirs properly wrote of Britain’s great contribution to civilisation.  He singled out “Respect for freedom and the working of democratic institutions:  habeas corpus and Magna Carta and parliament”.  He was absolutely right then and this is equally true now.  Britain’s contribution to global political developments has been and remains of great importance.  Its standing and influence in the world means that if it were to leave the EU it would be immeasurably diminished.  Unfortunately Monnet wrongly concluded in the early days that, on joining, Britain would become as many hoped the foremost champion of European institutions.  He explained the negative British attitudes then by saying with some truth that Britain suffered, paradoxically, from not having its pride broken as others had done.   Britain today remains justifiably proud of its freedom, its democracy and its independence.   It was and is different because of its island history.  It has not been invaded for over a millennium and is a prime example of respect for the rule of Law.   Who can be surprised at its reluctance to change course so dramatically by joining in what at least is a quasi-federalist project?  I think that there is some understanding of this as there should be.   The dilemma though must be that in an increasingly interdependent world Britain itself cannot rationally wish to stand relatively alone.   More than emotion is needed for a proper analysis.   Surely it has to be part of Europe?  Hugo Young wrote, “It is not possible to be a European in any reasonable sense and to be against the EU”.   This dichotomy has to be recognised but there are very few political voices explaining it.   Suspicion of continental entanglements may be understandable but it is not viable as a national strategy.

The debate which must be had now about Britain’s future in Europe should surely rise above the mundane arguments about the economic pluses and minuses.  These arguments need to be addressed but they are secondary to the real debate.  The purpose of European integration was in its early days and still remains far more fundamental than arguments on international trade or access to services.  The basic purpose of the integration process, memorably put as I said was, to tame nationalism.  Behind this laudable aim was something even more fundamental.  It was to create a political entity that was an expression of the Christian values of the dignity of man and the equality of man.  Even the solidarity demonstrated by the transfer mechanisms of Social fund and the Regional Fund were rare expressions of this.  Nationalism is essentially a denial of these values.  George Orwell said that “nationalism is the worst enemy of peace”.  He also said that “nationalism is a feeling that one’s country is superior to another in all respects”.  I think that there is no better way of putting it.  It is sensible and clear.  He may not have been driven by a Judaeo Christian ethic but he was expressing one.

It is no surprise that UKIP, a party of nationalists, expresses its rationale for its own existence primarily in terms of antipathy to European integration and to immigration.  UKIP itself provides the clearest testimony as to why a constructive engagement with Europe is necessary.

It is worth noting that just as the British in Euro barometer polls have been consistently the most reluctant of the Member States populations about integration more Britains see immigration as a problem than other nationalities.   This has been established by a poll across Europe and the United States published a couple of weeks ago (Transatlantic Trends the Times 19^th September).  The figure was the highest among the people questioned in the US, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and Spain and is not explained by the extent of immigration here.  It must in part be a response to the level of political criticism of migrants which UKIP fosters.   This is also a challenge to Christianity here.

Monnet, Schuman, de Gasperi and Adenaur, the Founding Fathers of the European integration process were all Christian Democrats.  They had witnessed a terrible European conflict that many of us appear to have forgotten.  They all rejected nationalism and had, from the outset, a moral purpose.  (I referred to it some years ago in greater detail the Cardinal Newman Lecture in Oxford University).  In 1951 Adenaur wrote to Monnet about the fact they were all motivated by a desire to provide “a new constitution of Europe on Christian foundations”.  The Catholic Bishops Conference identified the core motivation of the Schuman declaration of the 9^th May 1950 that launched the process as being “essentially an approval for mutual forgiveness and, as such, a profoundly Christian act”.  But in addition to forgiveness the whole exercise was about, and still is about, harnessing national sovereignty and containing it.   This was to be achieved  by a new system that rejected the old concept of the nation state that has been with us at least since Bodin wrote of it in De La Republique in 1583.  It was of course the Treaty of Westphalia that copper fastened the idea in legal terms of separate sovereignty that played such a role in the malign history that followed.  Jacques Maritain, the Catholic philosopher who played a decisive part in advancing the cause of universal human rights following World War II, wrote that “the concept (of sovereignty) is intrinsically wrong”.

While it would be absurd to expect that the tribalism that unfortunately has scarred Europe so badly will disappear we can surely fashion and develop political institutions that will constrain it.  Pure integovernmentalism, as exemplified by the United Nations system or the World Trade Organisation (both of which I have served), are important elements in ethical governance but, as we know, they have their limitations.  The European Union is an unprecedented attempt to go further through supranational law and governance.  Surely this unique experiment can still inspire us? Surely Christians in particular can still see in this experiment not merely an attempt to provide a new political context for the advancement of Christian principles but also the means to enforce them.  There have been for example in recent times some signs of the possible re-emergence of policies in at least one  new member State from Central Europe which seemed to threaten those values.  The European Union has played a crucial role in inhibiting this development.  So also has the European Union played a central role in the Balkan crisis and in Greece where, without it in the background, the trauma of the economic crisis might have led to even worse political consequences that those that we have witnessed.  The poll of attraction provided by the EU to aspirant new members and the desire of the vast bulk of its Member States to remain tells its own story.

If one can conclude that the motivation and purpose of the integration process is admirable then the question as to whether membership works to Britain’s immediate advantage arise.  Pragmatically in other words has it justified itself? There is an overwhelming amount of corroborative evidence to the effect that it has.

Apart from the positive evidence of the importance for Britain to have influence in the European Union as its neighbours and main trading partners, the question might be asked “what would happen if Britain left the EU?” Clearly it would have to renegotiate its relationship with the EU.  It would, no doubt, be in the interests of the other EU Member States to retain access to the British market and vice versa.  However, the result of this common objective would have to be negotiated and this would not be as easy as it might seem.  Britain would either have to join the European Economic Area (with Iceland and Norway) or agree to a free trade arrangement as Switzerland has done.  If Britain followed the Norwegian example it would still have to pay money to Brussels (in fact Norway pays more per capita today than Britain).  Also it would remain bound by EU regulations.  Having rejected the EU the question would surely be asked here as to what advantage was gained by leaving in the first place.  Surely the British people would be unlikely to accept such an arrangement and the fact that it would have no say in the adoption of future EU legislation.

What about the Swiss example? Switzerland under its bilateral arrangement is forced to comply with EU regulations relating to free movement of goods and it is not part of the free market in financial services.   If this were to be the result for the United Kingdom, as it well might, the impact on financial services here and on the economy as a whole would be terrible.

In summary, Britain will have great difficulty in negotiating a Treaty with the EU on the Swiss Model and in my view much of the City will be at risk of leaving the UK then because even the fear of losing the single Banking Licence that permits banks located here to a function throughout the EU will drive the sector to consider other alternatives.

The conclusion of the Economist of Dec 8, 2012 was that, if Britain left, “the most likely outcome would be that Britain would find itself as ascratchy rightoutside with somewhat limited access to the single market almost no influence and few friends.  And one certainty is that having once departed, it would be all but impossible to get back in again”.   Surely this must be an accurate conclusion.

So, everything may rest on a successful and substantive renegotiation.    To obtain this will pose difficult issues not merely for Britain but for other Member States also.  In my opinion, if the United Kingdom achieves anything meaningful in these negotiations, it will probably be at the expense of the integrity of the integration process itself.   Britain is already semi-detached in various respects (in particular from the Euro and Schengen).  It is only a part participant in the Justice and Home Affairs treaty chapter.  So the concept of a single undertaking shared by all has already been undermined substantially and largely by Britain.  Any more derogations would open up the reality of a Europe à la carte becoming the norm as France has, amongst others, already commented.   Others would be likely to have their own list of possible concessions to seek and this would undermine the whole project even more than has already occurred.

The other alternative would be to undertake general treaty revisions reducing the powers of the EU.  These would be applicable to all and therefore might be argued to avoid a Europe à la carte.   This, presumably would entail removing competences from the treaties for everyone or, at least, substantially reducing them.  This might be presented as the application of the subsidiarity principle in repatriating policy areas that, it will be argued, should never have been given to the EU in the first place.  However, I find it hard to imagine what these exclusions might be.  Unwinding treaties already adopted, in some instances by referendum, is not a task lightly undertaken and for some Member States might itself require a referendum.  I doubt that the required unanimity will be forthcoming for any substantive treaty change.  Contrary to some views this is a matter not simply decided by Germany.  And, for myself personally, I think that any substantial changes are not at all desirable.  It has taken a long time and very difficult negotiations to get to where we are.  We should not now attempt to unscramble the egg.

So the best that one can say is that today we are on a road to a very uncertain destination and not one that looks inviting.  This is evident when one looks to the details of possible repatriations.  One attempt to identify such areas for repatriation has identified twelve.  This is in the Civitas Report recently published.  These include the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy (retaking UK fishing waters).   Also it is proposed to install a new voting system creating a double majority voting for all measures affecting the single market so that a qualified majority is needed both from the Eurozone countries and, separately, from the non Eurozones.  Repatriating social regulation to British competence is another idea suggested.  This is the sort of list that many parliamentarians here might seek.  However it is not conceivable that anything approaching these changes will be achieved.

In the light of the foregoing it is clear that we may well be on a collision course.  If the Conservatives are in power on 2017 we will certainly have a referendum on membership, and it will probably be premised upon either a failed negotiation or on one that will have yielded far less than what might be considered acceptable to many Conservative M.Ps.  If Labour wins the next election it is unclear whether they will have committed themselves to hold a referendum but the pressure on them to do so will be great and it is not clear that it will be avoided.

The industry and services sector here should wake up to what is at risk.  Looking at the advantages of membership to be potentially foregone is instructive.  The EU provides about 50% of UK trade.  Far from globalisation reducing this percentage in recent years it has been growing each year for the last decade.  For example since 2004 the annual average growth in this trade has been over 4% (4.46% for exports and 4.32% for imports).  Total trade in goods with the EU has increased from £960 in the first quarter of 2000 to £1756 in the first quarter of 2013.  In addition membership does not interfere with other international trade involving the UK – it helps it.  The financial services sector has an enormous dependence and is the most important contributor to the national economy.  As I said being in the EU is vital for this.

Being within the EU provides a simpler more assured and legally enforceable access internally and externally than could be had outside it.  The strident positions taken by Japanese industry located in Britain has made the point.  (I do not even make the point that Britain exclusion from the proposed transatlantic trade and investment pact with the EU (if it even comes about) would be both ironic and damaging in the extreme).

So I hope that the current debate in Britain rapidly starts to focus on facts rather than emotion.  It should also focus on the broader political issue of the value in principle of the whole experiment.  Other Member States too should put down clear markers that whatever the strength of their wishes to keep Britain in the EU that their own room to manoeuvre is very limited.   For Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden to be sympathetic to keeping Britain in as a part of the family is one thing but for this sympathy to be interpreted as being likely to give rise to substantial concessions would be a mistake.   I am afraid that expectations are already too high here and when and if they are dashed the threats to British membership will be exacerbated.

If there is a moral value in what European integration seeks to achieve as I believe there clearly is then Christians have a part to play in this historic debate.

This article was first delivered as a speech at Heyhrop College, The Specialist Philosophy and Theology College Of the University of London on Thursday 26 September.

The post Britain and Europe : From a Christian Perspective A Public lecture appeared first on Peter Sutherland.

Intellectually his interests and influences were famously diverse.  Although not generally known these included an interest in science but also, particularly, in philosophy and theology.

A friend, who accompanied Garret for many years on his intellectual journey, described Garret to me as a “universalist”.  This description has a particular resonance for this evening’s lecture.  The religious terms that particularly inspired this moral universalism are based on the acceptance of universal values and ethics.  I believe that he had in mind the fact that he did not believe in distinction based on race or national identity.

The Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, whom he met in his childhood, was sometimes mentioned to me by Garret in this context.  A Thomist, Maritain had been a friend of Garret’s father as a result of their joint connection to Notre Dame University in the 1930s.  Maritain was to be extremely influential in the post World War II period particularly in framing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations (surely the apogee of universalism).  So underpinning moral universalism is the concept of the natural law that interested Garret throughout his life.  He always seemed justifiably wary of nationalism and sought to channel it into a path that rather than being divisive had integration as its aim.

So in many ways he measured his political philosophy against moral principles that he believed to be universal.  The practical conclusions that he drew were ones from which he never deviated.  These were expressed in the autumn 1964 edition of the Jesuit journal Studies where he wrote “we have to look to more universal philosophies and wider traditions, first of all to the Christian tradition from which we derive the basic structure of our thought to such traditions as British liberalism whose emphasis on tolerance provides a new insight into the meaning of Christian charity; and to the socialist tradition which has helped to develop the sense of social consciousness inherent in Christian thought..”  As appears from this quotation, while his ultimate political home was to be within the Christian Democrat party grouping, his political inspiration came from the socialist tradition for which he retained an abiding affection.

Garret’s view on interdependence, European integration, sharing sovereignty and even globalisation were influenced by this belief in the oneness of mankind transcending all other divisions.  At a time of recrudescence of extreme nationalism in parts of the EU his views have a particular relevance.

But first a historic vignette:  throughout the 1960s Garret lectured in UCD on the economic aspects of European integration in particular and, in 1964, when I started my university studies in law, I also took economics as an optional subject.  I was prompted to make this choice because he was to be one of my lecturers.  His enthusiasm for Europe was infectious to young people because it was related to more than mere national interest and this was at a time when Ireland was opening up to the world.  His belief in the process of European integration through the sharing of sovereignty was later to be demonstrated by practical leadership when he was both Foreign Minister and Taoiseach.  It was also illustrated in his writings at an early stage in his political career when he advocated the supranationalist development of Europe. [1]

The “universalism” to which I have referred was reflected also in the thinking of the early leaders of the process of European integration.  For example, at an important meeting, when Adenauer and Monnet met in 1950 under the auspices of the Geneva Circle, they spoke of the forthcoming European construction as having a “general moral purpose”.

So Garret’s belief in European integration was driven by a belief in the cause of integrating Ireland in a Europe based upon shared and universal values, particularly associated in his mind with Judeo-Christian thinking.  This moral case for uniting our old continent sang in unison with his humanity and Christian beliefs and heritage.   This was a sentiment that he shared with many of the Founding Fathers of the European project, most of whom were Christian Democrats.  For example it is more or less exactly what Adenauer wrote in a letter to Robert Schuman on the 23 August 1951.  In Adenauer’s view this heritage provides all Europeans with common values based upon the principles of the dignity of man and the equality of man.  Fundamentally, that is why European integration was and remains a truly noble project transcending economic calculations of its value to particular participants.  Others such as the great German humanist philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas have reached similar conclusions about its moral value coming from a different intellectual base.

In a famous speech in November 1981 in the Westminster parliament, Geoffrey Howe said that European integration was essentially about the “taming of nationalism”.  Thus, at its creation in the immediate post World War II period, it was intended to provide a means to foster the reconciliation between former enemies that had been so strikingly absent in the period following the end of the First World War.  This approach particularly appealed to Garret.

His own family background, though intimately connected with republicanism through both his parents, was emphatically not tribal in the sense of being exclusively Catholic.  He not only opposed irredentism throughout his life but he was even uncomfortable for the philosophical reasons already described with distinctions based in any way on race or religion.  He was much more an internationalist than a nationalist.  This antipathy to a tribalist approach to international relations remained constant in his approach to both Irish and European matters.  This did not reduce his sense of his own national identity but was an expression of it.  He was in this conscious of our differences from our large neighbour and in this he approved of Tom Kettle’s counsel to Ireland, though expressed in a different context, that in order to become deeply Irish she must first become European.

George Orwell wrote that a nationalist is essentially someone who thinks that his people are better than others.  It is as good a definition as any and, if one is truthful, a great many of us harbour such delusions from time to time.  Regrettably this delusion appears to be growing again in its appeal around Europe.  That kind of nationalist however thinks on lines with which a supremely rational liberal like Garret could never agree.  Like Jean Monnet (whom he greatly admired), he saw European integration as a step on the road not merely towards more global governance but also to the defeat of what Jacques Delors described, in an important speech in the European University in October 1989 in Bruges, as “triumphant nationalism”.  Garret did not agree essentially with the Hegelian view that, in principle, sovereignty must be preserved by traditional States.  He saw a brave new world of interdependence partially based on international institutions that had a real role in governance. He did not see such institutions as a threat.  He believed that a small country like Ireland in particular expanded its influence over its own destiny by sharing sovereignty and, by doing so, could also contribute a positive influence in international affairs.  For example, he never accepted the proposition that we had a sacrosanct “neutrality” that inhibited our engagement in European integration in defence or foreign affairs matters in principle.  In the context of Northern Ireland too he looked for institutional means to involve the different communities in sharing influence in which he was ultimately to succeed with the Anglo Irish agreement.  I even remember too advocating with him the concept of all Ireland courts to overcome difficulties regarding extradition in the early 1980s (as recent documentary releases in Britain testify).

As he wrote in Towards a New Ireland in 1972, European integration had for him an additional value and relevance as a means that might help to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland by bringing both communities together.  The essentially tribalist nature of the divisions there are based of course on perspectives on history and perceptions of identity intimately connected with race and religion.  They are manifestations of forms of nationalism.  Garret believed that just as the sharing of sovereignty, promised at the foundation of the European project by the Schuman Declaration, would help to remove the hatred demonstrated over centuries by wars between Germany and France so too the joint membership of Ireland and Northern Ireland of the then EEC would help to dissipate our differences and transform our relationship on this island over time.  Regrettably in this he was to be proved too optimistic.  It is not irrelevant to this relative failure that both Unionists and Sinn Fein appear to be adamantly and consistently opposed to European integration (albeit for different reasons).  They cleave to their separateness even in the context of Europe.

As it did in the 1930s, the economic turmoil of recent times has provided fertile ground in many parts of Europe for the growth of extremism based on racism.  It is increasingly evident that this has assisted the rise of parties propagating an angry, xenophobic and anti-immigrant message.  No doubt this will be evident in the results of the forthcoming European elections and seasoned observers suggest that over 25% of the vote across Europe may go to such parties.  In the United Kingdom and France UKIP and the Front National both oppose the EU and are finding support in surprising quarters.  (55% of students in France, for example, say that they are considering voting for the Front National).  This rise in support is associated with two interlinking trends:  these are increasing Euro scepticism and anti-immigrant nationalism.   Each feeds off the other.  Recent polling evidence shows the strength of both the EU issue and migration on the rise of extremist parties.  In the Netherlands Geert Wilders the leader of the Freedom Party describes the Koran as “a fascist book”.  In Hungary the emergence of fascism has even given rise to some debate about how its membership of the EU may be at risk.  The True Finns party on the extreme right are gaining significant support in Finland.  Denmark too has its issues with extremism.  On the left the Syriza Party in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy are separatist insurgency parties presenting very anti-EU policies.

To its credit Ireland has not yet evidenced any marked degree of similar xenophobic reactions.  Nor have the considerable number of immigrants that have come to Ireland in recent years given rise to significant organised racist reactions.

Even though Ireland has not yet shown opinion poll evidence of tendencies of rising substantial support for anti-European views, it may be said that, over the years, our role in the political process of developing European integration has been curious in its occasional ambivalence on some issues of sharing sovereignty.  Indeed, as a result, our engagement with the constitutional development of the process has not always been a happy one.  We have had nine referenda since 1972 in order to ratify the Treaty of Rome and six subsequent treaties.  Garret FitzGerald fought all of them.  Having failed on two occasions (namely the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty) to pass referenda on treaties that most others found inoffensive (thereby necessitating a second plebiscite) fundamental questions have been raised across Europe from time to time about our real commitment to European integration.  After all when we joined the European Communities, the preamble to the Treaty of Rome stated its intention to lay “the foundation of an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe”.  It sometimes remains unclear as to whether we believe it.

Indeed we have not often been in the forefront of a debate advocating greater integration.  In the case of the Euro we were in the avant garde however in other cases to which I shall refer we were not.  But briefly in Garret’s time we were.  His appointment of Jim Dooge in 1985, and the report of the Dooge Intergovernmental Committee on Institutional Affairs which he influenced, led to the negotiation of the Single European Act (as Brendan Halligan set out in his excellent FitzGerald lecture in May 2013).  This Treaty was to enact some of the most important constitutional changes in the history of the European project.  Amongst its provisions, which Garret actively advocated, was the introduction of greater majority voting in the Council of Ministers for the passage of important European legislation relating to the Single Market.  This was therefore a significant practical expression of the sharing of sovereignty.  It caused some traditional nationalists, such as Mrs Thatcher, some grief at the time and indeed later.  Importantly the Single European Act also led, as part of a political process that it provoked, to significant increases in the structural funds.  This example of a “transfer union” of funds from richer to poorer states also challenged traditional nationalists elsewhere as it still does.  In particular, it challenges those who see the European Union as being no more than a market.  No doubt the recognition of how much we have gained from the structural funds, and indeed from the CAP, has influenced Irish public opinion positively.  It is worth mentioning also that during his period as Foreign Minister Garret had played a significant role in developing the Regional Fund that came into existence earlier in 1975.

According to Euro barometer surveys over the years, since the late 1980s the Irish people have remained extremely positive in their general views on the European Union and even on economic and monetary union in particular.  (On EMU, 70% are in favour of EMU in Ireland with only 19% in favour in the United Kingdom according to the most recent Euro barometer poll).

On the other hand, attitudes in the United Kingdom have been consistently almost the polar opposite to those in Ireland.  There, the electorate remain the most consistently sceptical of the EU and this is, as we shall see, relevant to our position in the British renegotiation talks.  The genesis of British negativism can be ascribed to various causes.  Hugo Young, the late author, has written that “Britain struggles to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she cannot avoid.”  The United Kingdom is not alone in this.

I believe that where we have voted against European treaties this it has largely been the result of misinformation and confusion about their effects rather than deep-seated opposition to the whole project.  Who can even remember today the apocalyptic arguments of opponents to treaties on issues like neutrality?  We were told that we were going to have European armed forces conscription for example.  These often grossly distorted interpretations of complicated treaties contributed greatly at the time to people voting “no” in referenda.  Those who advanced some absurd arguments were never held to account afterwards.  Erroneous assessments of the possible effects of a new treaty are sometimes delivered from unlikely and apparently authoritative quarters.  For example, the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in the Crotty Case on Part III of the SEA relating to foreign policy (which, in turn, wrongly led, in my opinion, to a belief that some other referenda were required when they were not) presented a picture of the meaning and effect of that part of the treaty that was quite wrong.  It postulated damage potentially being caused to national sovereignty in foreign policy matters that had no substance.

It is clear yet again that the EU as a whole and Ireland now face serious challenges to the process of European integration.  These include:  firstly, the imminent likelihood of significant votes for extremist anti-European parties in the forthcoming European elections.  This may result in a powerful disruptive and anti-European force in the European Parliament and later in national parliaments.  Secondly, the continuing crisis of the Euro and, thirdly, the attempted renegotiation of the British bargain with the EU to be followed perhaps by its withdrawal and the negotiation of a new relationship.  All of these challenges are connected and are linked by the rise of nationalism.

I will discuss the Euro crisis first because it is the backdrop to and influences public reaction to the other issues.  This crisis has been correctly characterised by Mrs Merkel as an existential threat to the Union (and therefore by definition a major threat to Irish interests).  The crisis is not over.  A number of States, including Ireland, notwithstanding its considerable success in dealing with the crisis, still face formidable challenges.  The debt to GDP ratio of Greece is 182% with that of Portugal, Ireland and Italy between 120 and 130%.  New shocks are not to be discounted in handling these massive overhangs.  Taken in conjunction with the continuing difficulties with the reduction of budget deficits much remains to be done.  Greece is currently a case apart with Ireland already accessing the markets.  Portugal too is proceeding towards the exit from the bailout.   But all three are small economies.  Spain, Italy and even France are dimensionally much larger and more difficult issues to handle should political problems become manifest.  Then market reactions could be considerable to any serious political turbulence.  In this context Italy and France still have to make the necessary structural adjustments to increase competitiveness and these, such as freeing up labour markets, may meet with resistance.  The internal devaluations have been largely made both here and in Spain, and Ireland in particular has been justly applauded by the markets for what it has achieved.  We are undoubtedly the current success story of the EU even though we have some distance still to travel.

Of course the consequences of a failure of the currency would be so terrible that many analysts conclude that it would not at any price be permitted to happen.  A recognition of these catastrophic consequences has been reflected in comments by Mrs Merkel and Mr Draghi in particular.  A failure of the currency would almost inevitably destroy the Internal Market because of the rapid devaluation and revaluations that would occur with the national currency to follow.  But dreadful consequences do not always deter accidents occurring particularly in politics.  The means at our disposal to deal with such events are limited notwithstanding Mario Draghi’s undertaking to “do whatever it takes” to save the Euro.

The fundamental problem is that virtually the only route to the massive debt reductions required appears to be paying them off.  I say virtually because it is worth mentioning that the Programme countries have benefited from a material reprofiling of their central government liabilities that amounts to a present value restructuring through the replacement of maturing debt with long term loans.  I do not believe that this provides an adequate policy without other alternatives.  But the general and simultaneous rejection of inflation, default or debt forgiveness (combined with the impossibility of devaluation) as a means to achieve the necessary debt reduction leaves the highly indebted Eurozone countries with the prospect of years of potential difficulty.  The limited ECB mechanisms now put in place to maintain market stability though vital, have not been truly tested.  I refer to the Outright Monetary Transactions and the European Stability Mechanism.  Reliance on debt reduction alone combined with these instruments is not enough.  Germany (and the Troika) have of course been correct in principle in requiring the national administrations in the Programme countries to take measures to recalibrate their economies both through restructuring to increase competitiveness and deficit reduction.  Countries within a single currency area simply cannot live beyond their means without damaging others in the area.  However both pragmatism and the understanding of history that should influence it, should now prompt the Member States in general, that solidarity must also play an increasing role in solving the crisis.  The use of the balance sheet of the ECB and the systematic intervention that it has provided is only one part of the solution.  More active steps can and should also be taken to expand spending in the stronger economies through the expansion of domestic demand there.  In Germany now the minimum wage and proposed pension increases should raise consumption but perhaps too modestly to have a substantial effect.  Furthermore more fundamentally President Barroso has spoken of the need for “genuine mutualisation of debt redemption and debt issuance” and he was correct to do so.  Of course any such mutualisation may well be subject to conditionality but refusing to even contemplate the issue seems quite wrong.  Full banking union also needs to be concluded rapidly involving not merely a unified regulatory and oversight mechanism but a resolution capacity also.  In this we are moving however slowly in the correct direction but it will require an acceptance of an ultimate funding capacity that is dependent on mutual assistance and not merely national resources.  However this is the adhesive that investors were looking for to become more comfortable with the notion of EMU holding together.

However even though more needs to be done it is clear that we have moved a considerable distance to put in place a system that increases the federal aspects of the EU.  This was absent from the Maastricht Treaty, and should ensure that what happened in the past does not happen again in the future.  As a result the European Commission can now monitor and eventually veto national budgets before they are approved by national parliaments.  If this power were not given, the currency could not be sustained simply on the basis of trust.  We also have new commitments by the Member States relating to the implementation of national policies such as labour markets, pensions and taxation.  We have too the Fiscal Compact with its monitoring and sanction powers.  These various steps and others included in the so called “six pack” and the “two pack” have taken a major step towards an economic union.

An economic union to be sustained also however requires a political union and part of that is a functioning democratic system trusted by the people.  This will entail greater engagement by national parliaments.  Otherwise the resurgent nationalism that we now see will fatally undermine the whole project over time.

The conclusion that one can draw from this is that Ireland’s interests and role in policy formulation in future can best be advanced from the position of being a Member State unambiguously committed to further integration of the EU.  Ireland should maintain the intention of being in the leading group of countries committed to political union.  We have not always done so.  This will require us to argue for more not less Europe in different areas and not just debt mutualisation or other relief to our advantage.  We have to be seen to protect what has already been achieved not merely in this area of economic and monetary policy but more generally across the different policy areas.

Solidarity is of course, as I have said, a key element in a more united Europe but, in order to successfully develop the concept we have to simultaneously advance integration more or less across the board in other areas including foreign policy.  Opt-outs should not be seen as a desirable option.

In this context Ireland’s attitude to developing competences within the EU in the areas of foreign policy, defence and in justice and home affairs has been, to put it mildly, reticent and tentative.  The inclusion of a sub-article in the Constitution prohibiting the State from adopting a decision taken at the European Council to establish common defence including Ireland, in my view contradicts a true belief in political union.  This is now effectively irreversible and I for one regret it.  Ireland’s reluctance on this subject seems to me to result in part from ill-informed debates in the past.  We have been reluctant Europeans it seems even in an intergovernmental process.

In the area of foreign policy and defence the spectre of neutrality as some kind of immutable but ill-defined aspect of our political identity has, I believe, inhibited our legitimate support for cooperation on military matters although efforts have been made successfully from time to time to engage.  When questioned on this before we joined the EEC the government of the day made it clear that, when the time came, we would not be reticent about being part of a European defence project.  But we certainly have been.  In the past an important element of this reluctance was linked to a binary analysis of world affairs.  That world is no longer with us and the very concepts of non-alignment or military neutrality no longer have the meaning they once had.  With whom are we non-aligned?  Between whom are we militarily neutral?  Events over recent years in the Balkans have demonstrated how a united European response as the European Union may be required to avoid terrible events taking place.  The White Paper to be issued on defence is to be welcomed as a basis for informed discussion.

The policy response in Ireland to the area of EU Justice and Home Affairs policy when introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (and developed by the Amsterdam Treaty) was also tentative and reticent.  This exclusion provides another reason for Ireland not being considered in the avant garde or inner core of Member States committed to integration.  Ireland’s special position here (shared by two often reluctant Europeans, Denmark and the UK) has detached Ireland from the main group of countries.  The fact that we have a common travel area with the UK does not provide a complete answer as to why we have opted out from much that others have agreed.  Ireland’s position is described by Laffan and O’Mahony in their excellent book on Ireland and the EU as “detached and conditional” with a complex list of opt-outs in place.  Until Minister Shatter (who has been very constructively engaged) took office moves toward further integration in the fields of internal security and harmonisation of legal systems were “viewed with extreme caution” by Ireland.  [2].  Some other members of our legal confraternity seem predisposed to believe (like their counterparts in Britain) that there is something inferior in the Continental position although this may be based more on prejudice than actual knowledge.  We must not allow this policy to provide another signal to other Member States of a reluctance about integration that undermines our protestations of support for the process or indeed our demands for greater federalisation in other areas.  Hopefully the current policy review in this area of Justice and Home Affairs will be positive in its outcome.

The gradually unfolding drama of the British demand for “renegotiation” of its relationship with the EU is a further threat that we now face.  In policy terms this question may raise a conflict between two national objectives namely, keeping the United Kingdom in the EU on the one hand, and avoiding any steps that might be taken that would damage the character, essential competences or rights and obligations of membership of the EU on the other.  One such is the free movement of people or rights enjoyed by EU migrants but no doubt there may be others that will only become apparent when we have a fuller disclosure of the British position.

To amend any element of the treaties will require unanimity.  This in turn may necessitate a referendum in some countries including Ireland because taking something out from an adopted treaty may be as problematic as putting something in.

I do not believe that any further treaty change is desirable at this time but clearly, from what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said two weeks ago the British most definitely do.  He said then that the treaties were “not fit for purpose”.  But only the United Kingdom knows what treaty change in its opinion is necessary to make the EU “fit for purpose”.  In principle, there is unlikely to be much support for any treaty change but in this the Germans have been unclear.  The new Coalition agreement there does state “we will adapt the Treaty bases of the Economic and Monetary Union” but of course this, whatever it means, is related only for the Eurozone.  In any event Germany is not Europe.  All twenty eight Member States will have to agree.  Also even if treaty change is agreed by the twenty eight Member States to British demands it is hard to believe that whatever is agreed will be enough to resolve the British problem.  For one thing whatever happens is unlikely to assuage the 95 declared Eurosceptic Tory MPs.  Their objective clearly is to either so change the character of the EU as to destroy its essence and legal authority or to leave it altogether.

As to Ireland’s position on this as yet unclear situation, on the 16^th January the Minister of European Affairs, Paschal Donohoe, in an excellent speech delivered in London to a eurosceptical audience, put down a clear marker.  He referred to the Irish view of the great value of the Union as it is.  He said that it offers “the best chance for us to create a more prosperous, secure and open Europe”.  He also said that our desire to improve the Union is “explicitly based within existing treaties”.  The message was clear.  The United Kingdom is our friend and we share a great deal of common interests with it but there is a fundamental difference in our position on the EU.

Consistent with this position I believe that our national policy should compel us to oppose treaty changes which weaken the European project or undermine its core competences, its institutional prerogatives (such as the power of initiative of the Commission) or the values reflected in the rights that are central to its character.  We must however seek to constructively engage where possible with proposals intended to improve the efficiency of the institutions or European competitiveness.  One change that some argue for in Britain is the reduction in the size of the Commission that we opposed at an earlier time.  Then others including Germany were prepared to accept rotating membership.  I think that we were wrong in our position then.  The Commission is now too large to function as a College as it should.  In any event it should not be comprised of individuals who see themselves as national representatives as our earlier position implied.

Unfortunately my fear is that the United Kingdom has an unchanging and unchangeable perspective on sovereignty and that this may precipitate a crisis.  Its prevailing political position has constantly been to reduce the EU to little more than a free trade area and, even then, one with an essentially intergovernmental character.  By this I mean specifically an entity that merely entails cooperation between sovereign nation states.  For example the competences and authority of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice which are supranational are now being put in question by many parliamentarians even more vociferously than ever before.  This is particularly clear from the position of the 95 Tory rebels but it is more general than that and there are few voices expressing a different view.  In addition, and consistent with this, the United Kingdom has generally sought to diminish the budget of the EU and attack the Common Agricultural Policy.

I regret therefore that it has a radically different position to Ireland’s on the EU and its development.  While Europe badly needs all the qualities that the United Kingdom brings to the table such as its profound democratic credentials, its devotion to the rule of law and to an open market trading position, the price for its retention should not be the undermining of the very essence of the EU as it is.  We have to be clear on this.  One aspect of this relates to the concept of free movement of people that is particularly in the sights of eurosceptics.

The basic silence of other Member States regarding this British debate is being interpreted by some in the United Kingdom– wrongly in my view – as a willingness to move further by way of accommodation than will prove to be  the case.  The relative silence is because there is as yet nothing to debate.

If the British fail in the negotiation then it is hard to see any referendum on membership being passed.  Nor should anyone take consolation from the assumption that Labour, if elected, will not hold a referendum.  They have been studiously silent on the matter.

This is not the place to consider how matters will develop if Britain decides to leave the EU.  Suffice it to say that in such an eventuality negotiations under Article 50 will be conducted regarding the post membership situation.  It seems inevitable that Britain will adopt a model on Swiss or Norwegian lines that will retain market access to the British market and vice versa.  I feel sure that the mutual interest of keeping this access to markets reciprocally would mean that our export markets would not be damaged by a withdrawal.  It is less clear that the financial services in the City would emerge unscathed as they certainly have not in Switzerland.

In conclusion let me say that this uncertain future now demands approaches that go beyond short term self-interest.  The Irish Commissioner, Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, has accurately described Ireland as being “conditionally integrationist”.  We need less of the “conditionally” and more of the “integrationist”.  We cannot simply pick and choose the bits of the EU that we like and discard others.  If we can do so, then others can do the same.  Ireland should be part of the group that sees Europe as the answer rather than the problem.

[1] On which he commented in his autobiography

[2] Laffan and O’Mahony

This article was first delivered as The Garrett Fitzgerald Memorial Lecture at The National University of Island Galway on 31 January 2014.

The post European Integration and the Taming of Nationalism: The Garrett Fitzgerald Memorial Lecture appeared first on Peter Sutherland.

I am particularly honoured to have been invited to give this Inaugural Lecture. The Erasmus Programme is a source of great personal satisfaction to me. There is nothing that I have done in public life that has been a cause of greater pride for me. I think that it has had practical value for the well over 2 million students who have participated. It hopefully has fostered a sense of European identity too. Ireland’s universities and students have already benefited greatly from the Erasmus Programme. Some 25,000 Irish students have spent time on the programme in other countries and 50,000 foreign students have spent time here. The potential for the further development of this programme is clear. Ireland, as an English speaking country with a well developed third level educational system, is clearly a justifiably popular destination for European students. The Sorbonne Declaration of 1988, followed by the Bologna Declaration of 1999, had the aim of convergence of Higher Education structures leading to the achievement of a European Higher Education Area by 2010. It needs to be seen in a wider context. It foresees lifelong learning as the bigger message linked to the Lisbon Strategy and the intention of providing comparable degrees based on the adoption of “common three cycles” is already the agent for massive changes (especially the rationalisation of the length of undergraduate degrees). This should greatly facilitate increasing participation in the programme. Ireland has made moves towards the three cycle structure over the past five years and is ahead of the United Kingdom, for example, in the adoption of the ECTS (European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System) credit scheme and use of the Diploma Supplement.

The future agenda of the Bologna process has interesting prospects with IT development as the basis for distance learning being of particular importance. The potential is significant and I think that there will be a successor to Bologna. Clearly there is a challenge ahead both for Ireland and Europe as a whole. It is to Ireland that I now will turn.

The Irish educational system has been a justifiable source of great pride for Irish people everywhere for a very long time. In many respects this justification has been the direct consequence of the dedication and ability of teachers through the ages combined with the commitment and enthusiasm of generations of parents who recognised the power of education to “open doors” for their children. Indeed apart from our lay teachers, our religious teaching orders not merely provided an often superior education at little or no cost at home but did so abroad also. Without any effort it is possible to find in Asia, Africa and America, both North and South, numerous public figures today who accurately attribute their success to learning from Irish priests, brothers or nuns. More recently too the relative success of our graduates in making their way in the world has reinforced our self image as being a well educated people, able to debate any issue, and able to compete anywhere.

However, we are part of a rapidly changing world where others are not standing still and emerging countries, like China and India, are entering quickly into areas which were the historic preserves of the OECD countries. I have the impression that in some quarters we have not fully embraced the comparative analysis of education standards either internally or with the external world. I must say from my preparation for this lecture, it became apparent that it would be good to have more research done to inform policy. While we have much to feel positive about, it is also clear that the reality of Irish education is perhaps less positive than many believe. I believe that it is no exaggeration to say that we are now at an inflection point in terms of deciding on future policy.

Although my presentation this evening is focussed on third level education I would like to spend some time on the system that feeds it – in other words, our second-level schools. Higher education builds on earlier levels of education, and if there is a quality problem at second level, then it places a limit on what we can achieve at the third and fourth levels.

Schooling in Ireland is under funded – as all indicators show. Perhaps even more important, it is mired in a system that has failed to challenge some obvious flaws. Our school teachers are amongst the best paid anywhere. I for one believe this to be a good thing. It should go without saying that teaching should attract and retain the right people and teachers should be held in the highest regard. The overwhelming majority of our teachers deserve this respect. However not all do. Keeping on those who are unable to adequately discharge their duties is completely unfair to the pupils. It is also unfair to their colleagues, who are damaged by their underperforming colleagues and who often have to deal with making up the ground lost by the students who have had poor teaching. It is absolutely necessary to challenge poor performance and acknowledge and deal with these problems rather than by sweeping them under the carpet. Since I last spoke on this subject there has been some debate on it and the last Minister for Education expressly recognised that there was an issue to be addressed. On the 27th March she said “is it too much to ask the (teaching) profession to put in place a mechanism to get rid of people who are under performing. The unions are the key to finding an effective way forward but clarifying that there is an issue here is not fair to all the good teachers that there are or, more importantly, to the school children”.

Many teachers recognize that more can be done and point out, with justification, that we have a high relative pupil to teacher ratio (especially in primary schools), albeit that they have dropped in recent years. But however important ratios are, teacher quality is the key determinant – improving the ratios is simply not enough. Teacher quality should be subject to assessment and currently it really is not.

But there are other problems too. For example, we have serious issues regarding teaching methods and syllabi at the secondary level. And we can have confidence that change is possible – as we have achieved significant improvements in our primary school system. We have reduced numbers studying mathematics to higher levels, limiting not only the higher education choices of the students but damaging their intellectual development along the way. Part of our problem is the failure to provide for continuing education for teachers, which is key to improving their ability to be enthusiastic and inspiring teachers. It seems to me to be bizarre that a society which sees education as key to its future success and prosperity should have an educational system where teachers receive annual increments of fixed amounts independently of the quality of the work they do. It is hardly motivating to the young, enthusiastic and committed teacher.

The Department of Education and Science is now publishing Whole School Evaluation Reports which is a valuable advance. It will of course be essential to put in place an effective follow up mechanism. We will know that the evaluation system is working when it becomes the case that parents and pupils believe that bad teachers are no longer untouchable, and that head masters and mistresses no longer throw up their hands in despair and say that they can do nothing when parents complain. Unless this change happens, it can legitimately be said that society as a whole and not just the teachers’ unions simply did not have the courage to take on the issue. This is an acid test of our resolution to actually take on difficult issues and deal with them.

The Department of Education does not permit entrance assessment of pupils. The argument presumably is that such assessments will result in those from more advantaged families being more likely to succeed in passing into certain schools whereas children from poorer families will be denied the opportunity because they are less likely to be properly prepared for the entrance examination. Although the objective may be laudable, in terms of its equality objectives, the policy is not without genuine costs. In the first instance, school children of great academic potential will not be able to receive education with their academic peers at a level appropriate to challenging them, so that many of their formative years may be wasted. Secondly, this policy may result in the growth of more schools educating the rich who can afford fees in independent schools – and we see evidence of this in the over subscription to private schools while there are empty places in non-fee-paying schools. It seems that we are confusing intellectual and social elitism. Our present system sets out to destroy any possibility of intellectual elitism, whereas we should support it while resisting absolutely the denial of participation for social reasons. In other words, if intellectual elitism is to be valued and cherished, then it should be made clear that social elitism has no place in our educational system. Would it not be much better if we had a system that would allow some schools to provide education for those particularly gifted students with inbuilt mechanisms in the selection process and scholarships that will promote opportunities for the disadvantaged?

Finally on this subject let me refer to a development in the United Kingdom that is worth serious consideration in the Irish context. This is the Academies experiment that was devised eight years ago and which focussed on areas of underperformance and disadvantage. The idea really came from the earlier experiment of 15 City Technology Colleges run on independent lines with support from business and other voluntary sector sponsors, based on an example drawn from Sweden. In addition, this experiment did require substantial state funding. 83 academies are now open with a further 160 on the way. The results last year in GCSE examinations were double those for exactly the same schools in 2001. Both PriceWaterhouse Coopers and the State Audit Office have verified the startling improvements in performance, showing that this was an experiment which really worked.

What I find incredible about looking at the British situation is that, for all its manifest problems, they have masses of comparative information on the education system which does not appear readily available here. Take the information available on St Bonaventures for example: a Catholic School in the bottom 5% of schools in terms of social deprivation of intake. In the early 1990’s 20% of its pupils achieved 5 or more good GCSE’s in any subject. By summer 2000 the figure was 62% and by 2007 that figure stood at 81%, and at 64% including English and maths. Even allowing for some grade inflation which characterises education systems today, this performance is remarkable. According to Lord Adonis, the primary author of the academy idea, the changes came from “ethos, leadership, teaching and talent”. I would also suggest that public assessment and comparison has been essential in driving the success of this model.

Coming to third level education, the government has explicitly recognized how essential this area is in its Programme for Government. Also, the National Development Plan 2007-2013 states, “that the quality of Ireland’s higher education system is vital to our social, cultural and economic wellbeing”. This is self evident but it is worth repeating. The competitiveness of the Irish economy and the employment of our people will be essentially determined by their relative capacities in a global economy. But this is about more than economic advantage. It is fundamentally about providing an adequate means to develop individual potential – with a good education system, there is no trade-off between what is in the interests of society and in the interests of the individual. And I should state unambiguously here that this recognition was not just paying lip-service to the issue. Concrete and important steps have been taken.

So where do we stand? Firstly I should recognize that we have done extremely well in achieving the numbers that are now availing of third level education. Ireland is one of the highest performers in the OECD in terms of graduate output in the higher certificate and ordinary degree level and this is no small achievement. Many others would love to boast similar statistics. Some 57% of the age cohort of school leavers go on to third level. The latest figures show that the universities, teacher training colleges, NCAD and other institutions had over 68,000 fulltime undergraduates and 16,000 graduates in 2006/7, while the IOT institutions had over 51,800 undergraduates and 1,500 postgraduates in the same year. Successive governments deserve great credit for this state of affairs as indeed does the Department of Education. The fact that I will not focus here on the successes but on the challenges does not, I hope, imply an imbalance in this lecture.

However, numbers are not everything. Looking beyond these figures we do not do so well in honours degree and post graduate numbers although this may not compare like with like. In terms of Ph.D graduation output we are ranked only 15th out of 27 OECD countries. I should however acknowledge that substantial progress has been and is being made also in this area – we have increased our PhD graduate numbers considerably in recent years but so have others so that our relative position has hardly changed at all!. There is a strategy to double Ph.D numbers and very considerable investments in R & D in the universities and institutes of technology are now being made particularly through Science Foundation Ireland. We must take care however that PhD degrees have quality controls. While many departments can deliver high-quality undergraduate programmes, not all are able to deliver high quality PhD programmes – nor should they. As we move further into this area, it is essential that we have a clear accreditation programme. In this regard I would like to welcome the progress signalled this week by the Irish Universities Quality Board. A devalued PhD would be destructive – damaging personally to individuals who have earned a genuinely high quality degree and ultimately damaging to Ireland Inc if people were not to regard our PhD standard as being of high standing.

Our low expenditure on the tertiary educational institutions is troubling as is the fact that there appears to be limited effort to devise and implement a strategy to identify and reward those colleges, faculties and individuals that are doing best. We are below the OECD average in spending and that average already reflects some very low figures elsewhere. Investment at the top level in the OECD would require us to increase our spending by 47%. To achieve parity with Finland – which has a widely admired knowledge based economy but which is only ranked number nine – would require a 23% increase in spending. So the problem is clear and the means to address it are not evident. We spend less, our academic staff-student ratios are worse than average, our facilities, though improving steadily are still well below par, and our support staff levels are much less than in competitor countries. We have increased the numbers in third level so dramatically over a short period, but without a commensurate increase in resources so that it is not surprising if we find that we cannot produce superior graduates without adequate resources.

The ranking of our universities in global tables whilst is improving reflects this situation. The Irish universities improved their relative positions in the Times Higher Rankings this year, but it is still the case that we have only one university in the top 100. Trinity College Dublin moved into the top 50 at number 49 and University College Dublin from 177 to 108. University College Cork and Dublin City University have also improved. Important though these rankings are as marketing tools both for universities themselves and graduates they do not provide decisive measurement. Indeed, one might argue that classifying complex educational institutions by a single number borders on the absurd, but nonetheless, these metrics do give us a starting point for discussion as to where we stand internationally. Behind these numbers lies the academic staff/student ratio again – our ratios are much less favourable than those pertaining in, for example, Edinburgh University or Copenhagen University – a fact recently cited by the Heads of UCD and TCD.

I should say here that the universities too have work to do – as always it is not just a matter of funding. They have to deliver top quality teaching and research and that is not always the case. Their Heads admit that the problem here is often the same as in the secondary schools – they cannot dismiss those who do not perform and all universities need to mainstream assessment of teaching quality (including by student feedback and peer review) in the open and transparent manner adopted for decades in the United States. While the US is not perfect, its standards in many of these areas are the more challenging reference point for Ireland rather than the European reference points. Supporting the anecdotal evidence cited above, a recent report by the Expert Skills Group concluded that, while on average Irish graduates are perceived by employers to compare well with their Northern and Eastern European counterparts, they are not perceived as well on maths and accounting skills.

Most importantly, those universities that are far ahead of us today in Europe are not standing still – we are in fact not chasing a fixed target, but rather a moving target that is racing ahead with great speed. Third-level institutions all over Europe are developing strategies to access even more resources and to improve their performance, although no European university can expect to come anywhere near the resource allocation available to US universities through their vast endowment funds and complex fee structures. So it is clear that this is an urgent issue. It requires courage to address it. And this in particular raises the thorny issue of fees for those that can afford them, and for other means of increasing resources, such as through higher fees being paid by non-European students who have to be attracted to come here. Ultimately the point is a simple one: either we increase spending as well as increasing efficiency or our Universities will not be able to produce the best no matter how hard they try. If the Government cannot allocate additional resources then we will have to get funding elsewhere. If you deny this – and we would all love to avoid the issue – you are forced to admit that our system will not remain fit for purpose.

The issue of fees is sometimes discussed as a matter of social equality. In fact university fees far from damaging social equality can be argued to have the opposite effect. Low income families were always exempt from fees in Ireland and should remain so but there is good reason to look at this issue not least because of the advantages that university education brings to those who avail of it. These advantages are clear. There is a much lower unemployment rate amongst graduates and the earnings premium for 30-44 year olds with tertiary level education relative to upper secondary education is 59% in Ireland. Also there is no evidence that this premium is declining with the larger numbers of Irish graduates that we are seeing in recent years. All over the world governments are recognizing this reality by devising schemes for fee paying often through the use of loan systems that ensure no reduction in the access to third level for those who come from disadvantaged parts of our society. Here, on the other hand, we appeared, until recently, paralysed in confronting the issue even though every independent analysis from the OECD, the Royal Irish Academy, the Higher Education Authority and the university heads who wrote in the Irish Times a couple of months ago have underlined that we must do so. The National Competitiveness Council too has, in a number of its annual reports suggested the introduction of graduated fees within the undergraduate cycle. I must say that I admire the current Minister for Education and Science for having the courage to raise this issue for debate but I wonder whether the person giving this lecture in one or two years’ time will be able to point to change. This is one acid test of whether we are up to the challenge of our time and we have never been great at grasping the nettle with difficult issues.

Because of our history, we need a non-party political approach to dealing with the fees questions – a type of Tallaght strategy. And there are models for this elsewhere. The US Ambassador to Ireland at a Higher Education Authority sponsored conference some years ago, addressed the question of how politicians, subject to the vagaries of an irrational electorate, can rise above the immediacy or re-election concerns to bring about radical, if unpopular, change. He provided the example of where, some years ago, politicians from all parties in the State of Virginia, grappling with the need for reform of the State educational system, agreed to set up a broadly representative body to examine the issues and make recommendations for change. All parties agreed to be bound by these recommendations. The State of Virginia was able to introduce far-reaching reforms into its educational system that would not have been possible had the proposals come from the party in power.

More generally, the fact is that we spend less than others, as a percentage of GDP, on education than the OECD average and the same applies to higher education. We also spend less per student at all levels of education and whilst GDP may be questioned as a measurement of national capacities it gives, I believe, a reasonable picture of our relative position. It is also clear that in many OECD countries, as its recent Education at a Glance report has pointed out, private spending on education increased more rapidly than public spending between 1995 and 2005. For example, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the UK and the US have expanded higher education by shifting some of the financial burden to students and their families. The same is not the case in many European states and the quality of their degrees is suffering as a result. Just count their references in league tables and if this does not convince get some details of the academic staff-student ratios in some of the oldest universities in the world. They are not good and we in Ireland should not head in the same direction.

Let me refer now to the issue of what kind of third level system we need, we currently have a binary system, with the universities and the institutes of technology, and I believe that this is a great strength. The disastrous experience of many converted polytechnics in the UK establishes the perils surrounding this matter. This should not be seen as a question of status. There should be a parity of esteem in Ireland for essentially different types of institution doing different things. A problem arises when every institution is trying to do the same thing and inevitably will be judged on the same institutional basis. They should not be and again excellence should be rewarded in specific areas and should be publicly evaluated. This is how to bring recognition and esteem, not through name changes. Since they are two separate groups each needs its own reference criteria for judging excellence. If there is a single set of criteria then you engender inappropriate homogeneity.

But even within that binary system I believe that we need greater variety in the types of institutions we have – in other words a more heterogeneous system. The problem is that our current system creates incentives to homogeneity through its centralisation and funding mechanisms. We should actively avoid creating homogeneity in Irish universities with everyone doing the same thing and getting the same resources based on the numbers of undergraduates. The reality must surely be that everyone should not do everything and diversity based on excellence should be promoted and rewarded. (The Scots are working on this at the moment, with the universities collectively working to prioritise their focus.) For example perhaps we should seek directly to have just one centre or two that specialises in new key areas, for example, in say Mandarin or Oriental Studies. It is good for students to have choice of where to study, but they do not need the same menu at every institution in the country! If we go that route, we will have a limited national menu and reduce our chance of having high quality in any one area in the country.

We need to continue to develop our capacity to take decisions on issues like this and the decision to have a strategic review of higher education led by the HEA and the Department of Education and Science is very timely. This review must take a long term view – what kind of system do we want to have in twenty years? If we know what we want, then we can work incrementally to achieve that. In the process of this review, which should lead to a new White Paper, we need to refine our goals more precisely within an integrated framework. For this process to succeed, we need to get comfortable about how our education system develops excellence. Fairness is all very well, but it is nonsense to think that all universities and institutes can be world class in everything. We need to have a rational, objective basis for funding higher education, and not one based solely on numbers or geography. We have begun this process, through the Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions, but it has a long way to go, and we need to monitor its success and failure and to respond to them in the future. The standards set by Science Foundation Ireland need to be emulated across the system – it has gained enormous success and respect precisely because of its clear rigorous processes, modelled in the US National Science Foundation. In general therefore we absolutely must, at all levels build in performance and track record as key components in funding and at the same time advance diversity remembering always that things measured always improve.

Another aspect of diversity has to be creating greater flexibility to institutions in fixing individual rewards. If salaries are automatically incremented, independently of performance and salaries are rigidly kept within standard scales, then we may have problems in recruiting and retaining the academic stars who contribute to building excellence in our institutions – not just by being there but by the way in which they interact with their academic colleagues. The cost of housing in Ireland has created problems for Irish academic institutions in recruiting staff – as it has in other areas, though the private sector is better placed to deal with this challenge. The recent drop in housing costs will hopefully reduce that problem. Turning to recent announcements, it must also be said that detailed investigation, auditing and command and control by government departments, thereby reducing autonomy, may seem like a good idea at a time of budgetary crisis but it is not. It is widely acknowledged that the greater the autonomy, within generally agreed confines, of the universities the better their performance will be. This of course must be subject to the institutions meeting the standards of good governance and transparency in their use of public funds.

So, in conclusion, it seems clear to me that many parts of the educational establishment at government, agency and university levels are genuinely and courageously trying to address clear problems. The most important of these however requires government intervention. I refer again to the question of resources. Everyone knows universities are under resourced. The OECD review in 2004 told us that we need a “quantum increase”. The HEA has drawn the same conclusion. So did the Farrell Grant Sparks Consulting Group Report and the recent OECD Education at a Glance survey. So the deficiency is staring us in the face. Top up fees and loans have to be part of the answer. So too does the facilitation and advance of philanthropic funding where alumni in particular must become more engaged. The HEA report of the Working Group on Supporting Investment in Higher Education sets out the steps required in a very clear manner. But this is only a part of the solution. It must be combined with fees, efficiency, and fostering excellence through diversity. This latter point is inextricably linked to creating greater autonomy combined with greater transparency and decision making in individual institutions. As the Breugal Report on European universities clearly established giving responsibility and power to universities is clearly the better way to go.

This speech was delivered by Peter Sutherland as the Erasmus Inaugural Lecture, in City Hall Dublin

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My purpose today is to link Ireland’s strategic interests to our engagement with the European Union and the current turmoil in markets surrounding the Euro.

The Euro itself is in many respects a great success. Even in recent times it has increased in value against the dollar. It has helped to deliver growth in the Euro area in its first decade at a rate per person that is more or less equal to that of the US. Within the Euro area there has been an increase of 50% in trade volumes over the first years of the Euro and Ireland has been a great beneficiary of this. Average inflation for the first 12 years was 1.97% which is far better than any Euro member had achieved over preceding years (including Germany). Also looked at collectively, the budget deficit of the Eurozone is 6% as against over 10% in the US. The success of the EU itself and the Euro in particular is vital to our national interest because we are a small open economy depending overwhelmingly on free access to European markets.

Ireland therefore has a vital interest not merely in managing our own affairs properly but also in contributing as best we can to sustaining the European project as a whole and sustaining the Euro in particular.

The successful conclusion of the European Summit on the 21st July last underlined the reality that, as Angela Merkel put it; a break-up of the Euro is for her and many others “unthinkable”. She has used other words such as “inconceivable” in the past but this constant expression of confidence in the durability of the common currency has not inhibited many familiar critics particularly in the United Kingdom and the US from voicing again their conclusions that the Euro is doomed. Indeed the risk of political accidents is very evident whatever Mrs. Merkel may say. The next period of weeks will be of great importance and potentially dangerous not least because many countries including Germany still have to adopt the legislation necessary to give effect to the agreement of the 21st July increasing the funds of the European Financial Stability Facility to €440 billion. Greece is of course another reason for concern.

If Greece were to default on its obligations, other than through an agreed restructuring programme, the likely effect in my opinion will be contagion not merely to the other “programme” such as Ireland but possibly even to Spain and Italy as well. This would threaten the whole edifice. So also would what Philip Rosler the German Economics Minister and Leader of the Free Democrats has described as an option (which certainly should not be one) namely – “an orderly bankruptcy of Greece”.

We in Ireland have a brief opportunity now to put clear blue water between ourselves and others and perhaps to surprise the markets with the demonstration of our resolve. In fact I agree with Jurgen Starks conclusion that the Government should capitalize on improving market sentiment towards Ireland by front loading cuts outlined in the bail out plan although I recognize how politically difficult this would be. But the prize would be great indeed if we did so because it would indirectly help to open up credit again in the economy through the funding opportunities that would result.

The improvement in the way we are viewed is the result of our economic and political responses to the demands of the EU institutions and the IMF. These have properly been considered exemplary to date and the external perception of our position has stabilized as a result. Part of the reason may be that Ireland’s global companies are better placed to by-pass the difficulties in the banking sector than elsewhere in Europe. The spread between German and Irish bond yields have reduced significantly. They can invest as a result. However, we continue to maintain a substantial and unsustainable budget deficit. In 2010 the deficit was 12% of GDP which is equivalent to €11,164 per head of population. The public debt to GDP ratio was 96.2% (equivalent to €33,121 per person). Two days ago the IMF projected a fiscal deficit for Ireland of 10.3% for 2011 and 8.6% for 2012. (With Greece running at 8.2% for 2011). The bottom line is that our deficit is the highest in the EU (the third programme country Portugal was at 9.1% last year). So the basis for the trust that is developing is fragile and it is the key responsibility of the government to increase this trust if it can. I recognize that this is not an easy task because global growth – and European growth forecasts are being reduced. But there is no avoiding what we must do. We must deliver a budget deficit reduction of €3.6 billion at the very least and preferably more. In this context it is worth noting too that since January of this year our international funders have agreed to release to Ireland €30.5 bn. This is a startling demonstration of the current dependence that we must reduce and deserves to be recognized in internal debate.

I do not want to recite verbatim what Professor Philip Lane amongst others has written recently but his logic is unimpeachable. The bottom line is that taking account of various factors not recognized in our programme we must look again at the €3.6 billion to establish if it is enough. The factors included the following:

Our GDP growth forecast for 2012 will be reduced. On the other hand we have the advantage of improvements in the interest rate on European official funds so our debt servicing costs will be significantly reduced. But the really important conclusion is that the external environment is much worse and the government should seriously consider what additional measures could be taken to bring our spending into line with the revenues it can now expect. The confidence that this will evoke in those who may lend to us (and indeed in those domestic consumers and investors) will be considerable. Lane has correctly concluded, “The next few weeks should be pivotal for Ireland’s economic prospects”.

Let me turn to another point. Some commentators have been particularly critical about the Eurozone Member States response to Ireland’s case. Much of this criticism has been unfair although some aspects of the behaviour of our partners has left much to be desired. However, on the other hand, it should be underscored that the interest payable to the ECB for the €89 billion currently advanced to our banks has been incredibly low at 1.5%. Also the core countries which maintained reasonable discipline over their own finances have their own political problems about what are easily (if inaccurately) described to their electorates as handouts to countries which have lived and still live beyond their means. The question is legitimately asked why countries with large fiscal deficits continue to maintain costs in their economies that are far higher than in the donor countries who are bailing them out? President Van Rompuy said in the London School of Economics last week ‘Without the fiscal irresponsibility of some countries we would have no crisis.’ It is impossible to dispute this and we are one of them.

Some here have also been highly critical of the negative comments made by people like Jurgen Stark. It would be better to answer his points of criticism (if we can) than in railing against them. Most of what he said was fair.

So, assuming the eurozone passes through the next weeks relatively unscathed and the system holds together what is required to sustain the future of the Euro in the medium-term? It is clear that the Maastricht Treaty failed to protect the currency because it did not go far enough. It created, in the Growth and Stability Pact, limits on budget deficits and debt but it did not provide the means to keep under surveillance, and ultimately control national budget policy (or even to really influence it). As a result The Growth and Stability Pact was first breached by Germany and France with apparent impunity and then, we and others breached it much more seriously. The Euro Plus pact has already been effectively agreed. To provide for future discipline correctly its adoption will be necessary to maintain the continued support of Germany and indeed others, such as The Netherlands, for the whole project. It is clear that the European currency requires substantial powers of oversight and influence over, national economies and their budgets to ensure that national policies conform to European obligations. Without this the Euro cannot survive. This should include the power to fine recalcitrant States on the initiative of the European Commission. The final adoption of the so-called “six pack” of measures for the future is, as Commissioner Olli Rehn has put it “a fundamental element” in Europe’s response to the debt crisis. The core countries not merely can but should insist on it. So should we. None of this requires tax harmonisation but it does demand the means to ensure national fiscal prudence. In recent days the Dutch Premier and his Finance Minister have spoken about the need to anchor what has been agreed more firmly and to take tougher action to enforce discipline in the future. This must include gradually increasing sanctions against those who breach agreed obligations and less freedom of action at domestic level to transgress agreed parameters. This may involve requiring of us more tax or less expenditure (But not by defining precisely where or how. That is for national parliaments). I believe too that Member States should be required to include a balanced budget provision in their constitutions or in a superior form of national law that cannot simply be overridden at will. We should be absolutely firm in our support for the increases in integration required by these moves.

So, we have no alternative but to pursue difficult policy options and the commendable resolve of the government should not be undermined by those who apparently fail to recognise how serious our position remains.

This is the text of speech Peter Sutherland delivered to the Institite for International and European Affairs, Dublin on 22nd September 2011

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The “European Union” was first mooted in 1972 by the Heads of State and Government in Paris. Its stuttering progress thereafter variously through the Stuttgart Declaration in 1983 then the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to the failed Constitutional Treaty and finally the Lisbon Treaty has lead us to a position which is less than clear. Nor is it clear whether we proceed further and in which direction, towards integration or disintegration. Whilst there have been some advances for federalists there have also been some aspects which are essentially moving in the opposite direction. Examples can be found through the powers given to national parliaments to intervene, the underlining of the fact that the Member States are in control and so on.

One author has said “the Lisbon Treaty is a different political animal as compared with the Constitutional Treaty; while that Treaty was an attempt to mark a historic step in a federalist direction this ambition has been abandoned with the Lisbon Treaty” (Jean Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty, Cambridge University Press, pg 327). Perhaps this however goes a little too far.

For one thing there have been advances too. These can be found in the changed circumstances of the former third Pillar – the fact that the possibility of decision by Qualified Majority Voting in the Council has been introduced in this area and in others is of importance. So also is the increase in powers of the European Parliament. This too moves in a federalist direction. Also the emphasis placed on values is important. Rifkin (The European Dream, Penguin, pg 212) has said that “much of the Constitution is given over to the issue of fundamental human rights. It might be said that human rights are at the very heart and soul of the document”. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union reads as follows “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in the society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.

There have been other advances. The European Union has a significantly enhanced role in regard to physical safety and the civil liberties of its citizens. We have too the beginnings of a more effective external representation through the External Action Service, combined with the reinforced powers of the Union’s High Representative. There is some hope, although I am not too optimistic about it, that this may help the Union to present a more cohesive external position through speaking with one voice.

However, we are now in the position where, as many contributors have pointed out in recent times, that apparently there is no appetite for further constitutional change in Europe. But it is also true to say that we today face a truly existential debate that may demand advances. This relates to the survival of the Euro following the debt crisis. This has the potential to either push towards further integration through the imposition of new disciplines (following the report of the Task Force under President Von Rompuy) or, alternatively, a more bleak scenario may ensue. Mrs. Merkel has already trenchantly said that this issue of the Euro ultimately is an issue relating to the very survival of the Union itself.

I have not read the history of the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty but I suspect that the rather inadequate mechanism for discipline on economic matters relating to members of the Euro zone was itself the subject matter of some prolonged debate. The Lisbon Treaty has little to say on this topic and the failure to say anything was caused by the fact that there was no agreement to any change in the Euro’s governance. This probably resulted from the fact that the Euro had worked apparently reasonably well during the first decade of its existence but now events have transpired that show that this is no longer the case. It is in a perilous position. It is far from clear as to how the various debt crises around the peripheral states in the Union will unfold. It is also unclear as to whether there will be an agreement for the necessary reforms of economic governance at national level. Indeed there is a question as to whether any conclusions on this governance can be adequate if such reforms must be capable of implementation without Treaty change. Certainly a large number of member states are very fearful about having to submit to a new Treaty which, in some cases, would necessitate yet another referendum. If anything were to happen to the Euro in my view the whole edifice is threatened.

We should not fail to recall, on this the 60^th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration that Europe was to be built “through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”. Now is the opportunity to demonstrate the solidarity that is required and whilst some preliminary demonstration has already taken place through inter alia the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility, more will be required. Since the creation of the Euro the institutional mechanism to support it has really only been the European Central Bank. This has, of course, been a genuine and real European institution at the level of the Euro zone. But when it was created some Member States (and notably Germany) demanded the retention of the greatest possible freedom of macro economic decision making. The Growth and Stability Pact provided them very bare minimum of governance for the Euro zone and that is all we got. There was no real economic policy making mechanism. Partially as a result of this we have seen a proliferation of States simply ignoring the requirements of the Growth & Stability Pact. The first to do so ironically were Germany and France. Another element of the institutional failure was the immediate uncertain response of the Euro zone to the sovereign debt crisis.

It is far from clear whether any greater support for the principle of solidarity will be available in the event of the crisis continuing or becoming exacerbated as likely will be the case. Germany’s leadership in these areas has been less than one would have wished for. Even in the context of the disciplines for the future, Germany appears to be reluctant to go beyond the essential framework originally agreed.

Germany has gone through a lot of belt tightening over the last few years. It spent €1.6 trillion on the integration of East Germany and through sacrifice and clear thinking recalibrated its economy more generally. Its people have shown little interest in financially supporting other Euro zone countries.

So, clearly, we have much further to go than where we are at present if we are to demonstrate “de facto solidarity”. The future of the Euro ultimately requires supreme acts of leadership particularly I would say in Germany.

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The more that I have reflected on this lecture the more I have been struck by how alien and even destructive it may sound in Britain. Religion and values have not formed part of the narrative here of the troubled relationship between Britain and the process of European integration. But if the EU is no more than a Common Market as many here believe why should they be part of the story? In fact these subjects may be seen rather as added complications to a debate by those who seek a more constructive dialogue on European issues. The result of this is they are not much spoken of particularly within and by the Churches. While this lecture is not intended to be exclusively focused on Britain in the European Union (which is not in any sense “Europe”), I will initially look at this issue.

Perhaps, there is an unspoken suspicion that the whole business of European integration is a little too Catholic for British tastes. Even though the religious influence of the Reformed Churches particularly in Germany was profound in its creation and development, this would not be at all visible here whereas the Founding Fathers, as they are perhaps annoyingly described by Europhiles like me, were to a man Catholic. Monnet, Schuman, de Gasperi and Adenauer were all Christian Democrats too and only Paul Henri Spaak in the early European pantheon was a socialist. But others from the reformed tradition such as the Danes, Swedes, and Finns, however reluctant initially, have begun to put suspicions of this kind behind them. Increasingly they demonstrate a real belief in the integration process. This is particularly true of Finland.

It is indisputable that the United Kingdom has a fundamental problem with European integration. The evidence of polls suggests that the negativism here is qualitatively different from all other cases not merely in its consistency but in its depth. Thus it remains at the lowest position in Euro barometer polls in its positivism towards the European Union. Indeed it is far from clear what the result of a referendum on membership would be today.

This ambivalence has been evident from the earliest days. In the lead up to the Treaty of Paris that created the Coal and Steel Community and started the whole process, Dean Acheson counselled the French not to inform London because he foresaw its potential for destructive opposition.

The reasons for this antipathy are many, varied and in part understandable. It is apparent that history plays a substantial part in this not merely through the memory of terrible continental wars but also in the sense of distinctiveness borne out of the inviolability of Britain itself, an island that has not been invaded for a thousand years. Britain had pragmatic economic grounds, too, for its initial opposition to European integration. Its loyalty to and connection with an empire, already disintegrating but still connected in the 40s and 50s, and “the English speaking peoples”, was an essential element in such limited profound political debate as took place during the 1950s on the whole subject of Europe.

Winston Churchill of course, in his famous speech in the University of Zurich on the 16^th September 1946, though extolling the common inheritance of Christian faith and ethics and the prospect of a united Europe, saw Britain standing apart. So the Commonwealth and the United States form part of the backdrop to this but so does simple nationalism. It is not hard to recall George Canning’s remark in 1826, following the collapse of the Congress of Vienna system that, ‘things are getting back to a wholesome state, every nation for itself, and God for us all’. It still has a resonance here even in this era of interdependence.

In the end of the day it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Britain essentially dislikes, in principle, the sharing of sovereignty and, indeed, any interference with the constitutional principle of the supremacy of Parliament. So even the supremacy of European law, established beyond doubt in Britain by the Factotame case in 1989, has been erroneously characterised by many establishment figures as an unwarranted and unjustified intrusion of their basic understanding of what they joined in 1973.

In Britain there has never been sympathy for, or even a comprehension of, the political and indeed moral purpose of the project to pursue “an ever greater Union” of the peoples of Europe. It has had few true advocates in the political world or even academia and the Conservative party in the current government is to the most Euro sceptic in the last twenty years. At every revision of the Treaties since accession Britain has been the most reluctant Member State to move forward and has always pressed for “co-operation by sovereign states” rather than integration. In other words it has pressed for intergovernmentalism rather than supranationalism. This has been a tragedy for many of us who had hoped for constructive leadership in another direction from Britain. It seems tragic because Britain has so much to give to the process. Its tolerance, long-standing democracy and commitment to the rule of law being particularly noteworthy and generally respected.

The real tragedy, however, may be that a debate on the substance of the issues has never truly taken place. In particular the overwhelmingly Christian intellectual foundations for European integration have not been explored in any substantive manner in political circles and academia has not been much better.

The question may be asked whether the issue is relevant following the delayed conclusion of the agonizing debate on the Lisbon Treaty and the general agreement on its adoption that further constitutional change was not on the agenda. Many contributions in recent times have pointed to the fact that there is no appetite for further constitutional change in Europe generally and this is clearly true for the majority for the moment. However, the debate is only in temporary abeyance. For one thing it is increasingly obvious that the dynamics of globalization will demand a more united Europe if we are to play a real role in determining our own destiny. Furthermore the issues surrounding the survival of the Euro following the debt crisis will, in the view of many observers, probably result in a new drive for economic governance at European level. Mrs Merkel has already trenchantly said this and last week linked this issue to the survival of the Union itself. This argument about the future will undoubtedly be essentially about federalism, and Britain, though not in the Euro zone, will have to be part of it.

The word federal has taken on such pejorative connotations here that it can scarcely be mentioned in public company and this notwithstanding the fact that for many continentals it is at the heart of the process and is inextricably linked to maintaining the admirable vision of its founders.

I intend now to look for a moment at the history of European integration from a moral or ethical point of view. Of course I do not seek to argue that European values and their survival depend upon the survival of the European Union. I merely say that in this context it is important.

Amongst the key figures in the early days were, as I have said, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi. These threewere ardent Catholics and came from the borders of their respective countries, Lorraine, Rhineland and Trentino, in which nationalisms are often tempered by the needs and the virtues of living together. All three spoke German: Schuman was born in the German Empire and de Gasperi sat as a parliamentarian in the Austrian Parliament in Vienna witnessing considerable forces laboring to make a multi-ethnic empire function. All three had witnessed a 20th century where God had been declared “dead” leading to the most horrific extinction of the European ideal of tolerance with totalitarism bringing death and destruction to the continent.

From the beginning the European project was about far more than economic advantage. Indeed the Common Market came late in the day. When Adenauer and Monnet met in 1950, under the auspices of the Geneva Circle, they spoke of a “moral purpose”. In a letter to Schuman on 23 August 1951, Adenauer expressed his thoughts as follows: “I hold for a very favourable and particular sign – even providential – that all the weight of the tasks yet to accomplish rest on the shoulders of men who, like you, and as our common friend President de Gasperi and myself, are penetrated by the will to develop and realise the new construction of Europe on Christian foundations…”

The Catholic Bishops Conference recently identified the core motivation of the Schuman Declaration of the 9^th May 1950 that launched the process as being “essentially an appeal for mutual forgiveness and, as such, a profoundly Christian act”. But, however much forgiveness played a central role in motivating the founders in launching the process of integration, the real purpose looked to the future and was to provide a means to protect Christian values from suffering ever again from the destruction wrought upon them by the Godless acts that constantly recurred in European history. It was fundamentally about creating a new attitude to the concept of national sovereignty that was first articulated by Bodin’s De La Republique in 1583. It constituted a largely Christian normative reflection on the whole concept of the nation state so beloved by many of our politicians and the limits of its power. One cannot but be surprised that such a noble purpose has given rise to such vituperation in Britain.

Rab Butler dismissed the seminal Messina Conference that preceded the Treaty of Rome as “an archaeological excavation” and for fear that you may accuse me of similar current irrelevance here, let me point out that the issues surrounding the project then are, in many ways, the same today. They are all about values and a moral purpose at the heart of which was an openly expressed federal project based upon supranational institutions. The arguments for these institutions are as valid now as they were on 8^th August 1950, when Monnet wrote to Harold MacMillan making clear that this was the case and that it was the reason that he could not accept his alternative intergovernmentalist proposal. This intergovernmental approach was to be the precursor of a multitude of later initiatives from London along the same lines. But European integrationalists are firmly opposed to intergovernmentalism still and they are justified in this for it is where we have had supranational institutions that we have succeeded and where we have relied on intergovernmentalism we have mostly failed.

The federalism of the Founding Fathers was founded upon the belief that national sovereignty, constrained only from within, was not merely dangerous but essentially evil because it postulated a greater power than man alone can possess. Jacques Maritain, the Catholic philosopher who most influenced the process in its conception wrote “God alone is sovereign ….this concept (of sovereignty) is intrinsically wrong” (Maritain 1951:24). In 1940 Maritain published, while in exile in the US, an article denouncing nationalism. Even parliamentary democracy was considered inadequate.

The experiences of the first half of the 20^th century had created, and not by any means exclusively within the Christian Democratic party, a number of responses to the issue of national sovereignty. All of these were intended to limit its exercise. One such was the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – expressing rights that were superior and antecedent to positive law. Another was the institutional structure of federalism with supranational institutions supported by the application in politics of the concepts of personalism and subsidiarity. Personalism sought to place man in a context of personal relations and connection with society as opposed to the atomising effects of individualism. It was, in other words, a means to contest the excessive individualism of liberalism and the excessive collectivism of communism. It sought to recognize the dignity of the human person created by God and to present the person as having an obligation to foster the values associated with his nature including solidarity with others and community involvement. Subsidiarity completed a pincer movement with supranationalism on national sovereignty by seeking to oblige national governments to structure decision making as close to the people as possible. (Boris Pasternak in Dr Zhivago put it this way. What the Gospels tell us is that in the Kingdom of God there are no nations but only persons. Christianity is the mystery of personality)

All of this thinking contributed to the objective of creating the “social market economy” and indeed to a concept of solidarity both within the State and outside it. Solidarity is, of course, directly linked to the Christian belief that all mankind is one’s neighbour and in the EU context community solidarity has led to the creation of various vehicles for the redistribution of wealth between States rich and poor. The Structural Funds represent a means to transfer resources to the poorest people and countries within the EU. Gradually these Funds have seen their resources diminished through arguments of “juste retour” and budgetary restrictions and it is hard to believe that Britain would resist if they were abolished completely because, again, they imply a union that is more than a Common Market.

How have these original concepts and ideas fared? Well, the original ideas of the philosophers who influenced the Founding Fathers have remained relevant. Jacques Delors – who with Walter Hallstein (another Christian) was one of the two great Presidents of the European Commission – maintains that the greatest influences on him was that of the Christian Socialist Emanuel Mounier. (Charles Grant’s biography). In 1992 Delors as the president of the European Commission called for “a soul for Europe,” arguing that if Brussels was not able to inject a spiritual dimension into the EU, it would fail to command the allegiance of its citizens: “If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a Soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up.” (Speech to the churches, Brussels, 4/2/1992).

The Christian Democrats remain the largest party in the European Parliament and are still openly committed to the Federalist idea. In its position at the Convention that preceded the Lisbon Treaty the Party made the following statements “the Peoples joined the integration process based on their free decision to declare their intention to create a close and federal European Union… already the States have individually lost their ability to secure peace, external or internal security, prosperity and growth in a globalised world by acting alone. Sovereignty can only be exercised on a larger scale”. Here the Christian Democrats assert indirectly that if European values are to inform and influence international debate, for example in relation to climate change, poverty, world peace and so on, federalism is the only way to do it. At a European level too, the old ideas still drive policy. For example in 2001 the Peoples Party (the Christian Democrats) submission on the CAP and the WTO made explicit reference to the implications of personalism, subsidiarity and solidarity on this policy.

For these reasons I believe that the European integration process remains inextricably linked to promoting values that Christians hold dear and that it is far more than a commercial exercise or an intergovernmental mechanism to simply advance national interests. However, it is a long way from an effective federal union. The most that can be said is that it is sui generis and partly federal. That the Conservative Party has withdrawn from the Christian Democratic group in the European Parliament may be inconvenient for both but surely it is hard for the Conservatives to be part of a party whose core policies are federalist in intention? The Conservative Party in particular is resolutely opposed to them.

Let me turn to another point, whether one sees Europe as a potentially federal entity or not – and I concede that we are still on a journey to an undefined destination – we live on a continent where many believe that although we do share values they come to us from the Enlightenment and not from Religion. Secularism has a number of definitions. Generally, in Western Europe, it means that religion and its institutions are to be separated from political authority. Bernard Lewis in “What Went Wrong?” (Phoenix History ch. 5) makes the point that the very idea of secularism and the separation of Church and State is in fact “in a profound sense, Christian”. He goes on to explain this drawing on the authoritative Christian text of Matthew 22.21 in which Christ is quoted as saying “render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s”. Lewis then traces the history of this Christian position back to Rome and draws significant distinctions with the history of Islam. Christians generally had a parallel institution in the Church to the subsisting political power whereas Muslims did not. However, some liberal secularists in Europe and elsewhere believe not merely “that the State should not enforce, institutionalize or formally endorse a religion”, but that “it should not be guided by religious considerations in its policies and treatment of citizens and should in general retain an attitude of strict indifference to religion”. Political debate should be conducted in terms of secular reasons alone. (Rethinking Multiculturalism. Palgrove Macmillan p. 322 – Biktur Parekh).

In national parliaments and the European parliament the differences on secularism and religion in politics are manifested regularly. One such debate took place in regard to excluding references to God in the European Constitution.

The core liberal position is that in some way politicians should leave their religious convictions at the door of Parliament and agree that they will be influenced solely by reason. As Charles Taylor puts it, their view is that the public world should “be emptied of God” (A Secular Age). This extreme secularist case makes no sense and the value system that we generally have in Europe makes the point clearly because Christians have in fact influenced it. It is not mere calculation that ultimately determines right or wrong or the fundamental concepts of the Dignity of Man or the Equality of Man but the basic doctrines of Christianity which, however much abused by Christians, have endured paradoxically in Europe because of Christianity. Indeed they influenced profoundly the Enlightenment which brought a necessary reflection and reform to Christianity itself. The Christian input has remained influential.

One way or the other, the peoples of Europe, collectively and separately, have in fact come to the same place in regard to values because of their shared cultural heritage, experience and religion. This is evident in their general agreement on the type of societies in which they want to live. All are supportive of the welfare state and the broad responsibilities of society for the weak and needy. We are all believers in multilateralism and the international treaties provide a rule based international society. We are distinguished from the United States not merely in both these respects but in our attitudes to a diverse range of issues from the death penalty to the length of terms of imprisonment, to gun controls and to individualism generally. Even on the Iraq war, where our governments split, our peoples did not and, everywhere, they opposed the war.

I believe Christian thinking influenced these positions but, notwithstanding a shared Christian heritage, a distinction can be drawn between Europe and the United States. Even the definitions on either side of the Atlantic of a ‘liberal’ are radically different. In Continental Europe a liberal is defined in terms of the freedom of the individual. A continental European liberal is therefore a believer in individual freedom and, for example, in low taxation and the minimum regulation of the market. On the other hand in the United States a liberal is one who is broadly of the left who supports redistributive policies and greater regulation. In fact the individualism of the United States against the personalism of Europe is a defining difference between the two. Whether this is due to the enduring effects of the pioneer spirit, or even the attitude to political authority of the Pilgrim Fathers or other reasons, is in a sense irrelevant. Europe basically has its position and it is shared by most Europeans. It is a position that accepts the separation of Church and politics and is broadly concerned with the creation of a fair society. The United States would claim a similar position but it clearly believes in different ways to achieve a fair society to those generally approved by Europeans.

Let me say a word here about rights which are in a way a justiciable embodiment of values. Looking to the World War II development of fundamental human rights it is striking how some of the same Christian actors who pressed for European integration, played an important role. In particular Jacques Maritain did. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was significantly the creation of the Human Rights Commission chaired for that purpose by Eleanor Roosevelt. Whilst it contained, as Professor Chris Brown has written “representatives from many cultures and dutifully tried to draw on as many sources as possible the resulting document is clearly inspired by the political thought of the West” (Practical Judgement in International Political Theory, Routledge). He also points out that many of these rights and those in subsequent covenants and conventions are claimed by “cosmopolitan liberals” as the product of liberalism. But many of us would claim this original provenance as Judeo – Christian. The Jewish French legal scholar and later Nobel Laureate, René Cassin was one of the Human Rights Commission charged in 1945 with drafting the Universal Declaration. He later wrote that the first article of the Declaration, by proclaiming that all human beings “should act towards each other in a spirit of brotherhood” corresponded to the injunction in Leviticus to “love thy neighbour as thyself”. He also noted that “thou shalt not kill” and “thou shalt not steal” in the Commandments are merely a different way of expressing the right to life and the right to property. Furthermore it seems to me that the very concept of fundamental laws antecedent and superior to positive law demands an acceptance of a concept of Natural Law. This in turn leads inevitably to God. The Fundamental Human Rights have been given additional substance in Europe through the European Convention of Human Rights and this most recently has been formally made part of EU law by the Lisbon Treaty.

Both the interpretation of human rights and the fact that Europe in general accepts the separation of the State from religion leads to some necessary reflection on the 20 million or so Muslims who live in Europe and there is a deep need to reassess how we apply our obligation for tolerance in the light of the rise of racism, aggravated by unemployment and economic dislocation, in these recessionary times. There is also a need for clarity in our thinking in regard to what is appropriate to demand from migrants of a different religious background in terms of the protection of Europe’s shared values.

Many Muslims coming to Europe have no experience of the separation of Church and State. Bernard Lewis in “What Went Wrong?” explains that “only in Christendom did God and Caesar coexist in the State, albeit with considerable development, variety and sometimes conflict in the relations between them”. The essential point is that there is “no human legislative power”. Another aspect of the Islamic religion that is different is the fact that identity is linked inextricably to religion and, while there is some sense of national identity, the Nation State does not generally have the same meaning in North Africa or parts of Asia as in Europe.

Recognising these differences and addressing the issues of multiculturalism, on the 7 February 2008 at the Royal Courts of Justice, Dr Rowan Williams made the point that through time the Muslim generally has assumed something of a dual identity “as citizen and as believer within the community of the faithful”. Therefore there is an acceptance of plurality and the existence of State laws but some find this more difficult than others. He then argues that our laws should take account of a religious rationale for behaviours and suggests the examination of the provision of a supplementary jurisdiction but that could not in any way impair “the rights given to other citizens or to punish its members for claiming those rights”. Even allowing for this qualification it seems to me that the idea of a “supplementary jurisdiction”, which permits of its recognition in areas of communal religious discipline, is not a good one. It is fraught with the danger of exacerbating difference or tension between those who come from the embedded culture of Europe and particularly Muslim migrants.

Surely what we must do in our laws is to provide the maximum freedom for people to express themselves whether in speech, dress or otherwise in a manner consistent with our core values. These values in justiciable areas are generally embodied in the European Convention of Human Rights and their interpretation must be in the context of European perceptions. More fundamentally they emanate from our belief in the Dignity of Man and the Equality of Man. Equality of the sexes for example must be assured. On the other hand in my opinion the banning of a head scarf that does not cover the face is not justified as some extension of the application of this equality between sexes either. Nor should the wearing of a cross or crescent cause offence. We must not pragmatically seek to force conformity with our society’s practices except where that conformity is a necessary expression of our fundamental beliefs.

Just as Christianity has stood up for freedom rather better than civic or political institutions in the past (for example in Nazi Germany), it is now obliged to stand up for the freedom of other religions against an increasingly intolerant tendency. The claim that Christianity continues to have a legitimate voice in the continuing construction of Europe is not an assertion that Christianity should be treated more favourably than other religions in terms of its observance or practices. Religions are protected equally under the treaties.

Let me summarise my case. Europe has given a great deal to the world in the provision of values but it has also permitted appalling injustice and heinous acts such as the holocaust. Christianity however remains the key repository of our values and it has largely inspired the most noble political initiative that we have known. This is the process of integrating the peoples of Europe in peace and harmony which is a process that attacks nationalism. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was a European invention only some two hundred years ago and has been sustained more by myth than history and has led to untold suffering. It may be a futile exercise to seek to remove nationalistic feelings but we can mitigate their worst effects. Apart from this political initiative, with its moral and religious undertones, European countries collectively and separately all adhere to the same set of values and I believe these to be largely inspired by Christianity whether this is recognised or not. We have created instruments and institutions to foster what we believe in and Christians should be inspired by them and participate in them more actively as Christians.

The process of integration probably now faces an existential moment. It is challenged to integrate further or to disintegrate. There is no middle course or minimalist solution that I can find and there will be no place for fudging the issue. This will require statesmanship and vision. Although semi detached by being outside the Euro zone, Britain should play a positive role in this because, ultimately, what is at stake is the future of our Continent and the values it proclaims.

Let me conclude with the following: John Paul II on the fourth Sunday of Easter on 2 May 2004 welcomed the enlargement of the EU to Central-Eastern Europe as follows:

“In these days, Europe is reaching another important landmark in its history: 10 new countries are entering the European Union. Ten nations, which by culture and tradition were and felt European, now belong to this Union of States. However, if the unity of the European peoples is to endure, it cannot be merely economic and political. As I had the opportunity to recall during my pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in November 1982, if the soul of Europe is still united today, the reason is that it refers to common human and Christian values…….. Only a Europe that does not eliminate but rediscovers its Christian roots, will be able to take up the challenges of the third millennium: peace, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, the safeguarding of creation. All believers in Christ of the European West and East are required to make their own contribution through open and sincere ecumenical cooperation”. So, Europe must have more than a market it must have a soul.T

This is the text of The Annual Cardinal Newman Lecture, which was delivered at St John’s College, Oxford by Peter Sutherland

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There is ample evidence of the serious negative effects of the Referendum held on the Lisbon Treaty on the perception of Ireland abroad. Few could understand what we had done and who could blame them. These likely negative consequences were identified clearly before the vote even took place and it is hardly surprising that the result was incomprehensible to many Europeans. After all even on the most self-centred non-idealistic basis Ireland has gained a great deal. In economic terms on a per capita basis, the Irish people gained far more in direct financial benefits from the European Union than those from any other State. Furthermore we provided ourselves with a seat on a table where we could exert some influence regarding the great issues of our time.

And this was a Treaty that appeared devoid of issues likely to raise controversy at least to the minds of nearly everyone else. For me and for many Europeans, far from going too far, the Treaty did not go far enough. Apart from this our entire economic strategy was predicated upon European integration and breaking loose from our prior economic dependence on Great Britain. Without the completion of the Internal Market providing for free movement of goods, services, capital and people we would never have created the 80% of additional jobs in the last fifteen years that were created. These were largely the result of inward investment in industry. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently pointed out the stock of foreign investment in Ireland has increased by 400% since 1993. This clearly could not have happened if we were not in good standing in the EU and will not happen in the future if we are seen to be negative to the whole project.

So the objective reasons for supporting a project overwhelmingly adopted by the parliaments representing 99% of the EU population of about 500 million appeared obvious. No doubt many foreigners asked themselves the question: was Ireland’s choice an extension of the type of euro scepticism so evident in Britain? Had we been persuaded to join those who simply do not wish to share sovereignty and indeed rejected sharing of sovereignty in principle? This does not appear likely. For one thing any examination of Europoll data over the last ten years establishes quite clearly that the Irish people express themselves to be fervent believers in European integration. This is in direct dramatic and consistent contrast to opinion in the United Kingdom. In fact, on most counts, we are the most pro European of all the Member States of the EU whereas the British are the least in favour of European integration.

So if generalised opposition to the European project did not drive the dramatic vote against the Treaty what did? After all the Irish people not merely rejected the Lisbon Treaty they did so in the teeth of the strong advice of all the political parties other than the tiny rump provided by Sinn Fein and Libertas. They rejected too the overwhelming support of business and largely that of the trade union and agricultural lobbies also. Before going further perhaps we should attempt to answer why.

First of all it must be recognised that a Treaty of this complexity is not easily put to the people. It is complex of necessity because if it did not seek to cover everything in detail even more absurd interpretations than those to which we have been subjected would be advanced by opponents. So this complexity paradoxically is the result of attempts to be clear and unambiguous. If it were a document containing simple statements it would undoubtedly be attacked as a Trojan Horse through which all sorts of alleged mischief could be introduced. It would be argued that the document would permit interpretation by the European Court of Justice that would greatly enlarge the competences of the EU institutions beyond those ostensibly intended. The complexity too is inherent in a project that contains elements of Federal and elements of the Confederal. It is in part supranational and in part intergovernmental and will remain so.

Recognising the difficulty of having a referendum on such a text, every other Member State wisely decided that parliamentary democracy should provide the ratification method. All the other 26 Member States foresaw the mischief that could be made in a popular debate about a Treaty that, in reality, did very little more than increase the efficiency of a Union that needed reform (particularly because of enlargement to twenty-seven members). However the Treaty was subject to rigorous debate in all the parliaments of Europe and, at the end of the day, the opposition was generally paltry. For example, in that most fractious and divided of parliaments of Italy there was not one vote against and only six against in the Spanish Cortes. One of the great arrogances of some of our commentators has been to suggest that we alone should take this as an opportunity to “represent the people of Europe who might otherwise have voted ‘no’”. What arrogant nonsense that is. Others have chosen their constitutional methodology and I have seen no riots on the streets of Europe about a Treaty that governments and indeed oppositions almost everywhere overwhelmingly supported. The only headlines were about us and, as has been made clear in numerous articles and commentaries, there was very little sympathy for our position anywhere other than in some predictable quarters in the United Kingdom. We had a referendum because of the Crotty judgment of the Supreme Court.

It seems clear that the Treaty would have been passed in the first referendum if the issues of corporate taxation, neutrality and abortion had not been introduced as substantive matters. The fact that ridiculous arguments without real substance could gain such traction is an indictment of the level of public debate here. The arguments were repeated ad nauseam during the campaign that threats were posed in these areas. These were fully answered. The answers were clearly viewed as being less than adequate or, alternatively, were not adequately explained although this is very hard to fathom. For one thing the fact that there was no threat was fully answered by the main political parties and, finally, by the independent Referendum Commission under a High Court judge who clearly and unambiguously dealt with the matters that I have identified. Of course there was one other big issue namely the rotational membership of the European Commission which has now been changed at our request. The basis for that request was questionable for some (certainly for me) but it has now been achieved and everybody else has altered their position because of Ireland’s intervention.

In my opinion one reason for the public’s confusion was the result of the fact that the national broadcaster RTE treated the arguments as if equal credibility attached to each side whereas virtually no respected and knowledgeable academic or political analyst would have recognised as real the threats that were so stridently proclaimed during the campaign.

In addition practically all of the political parties in the State were crammed into 50% of the air time thereby opening up a void of 50% of the time to go to, largely, Sinn Fein and Libertas. It was the interpretation of judgments of the Supreme Court that led to this situation.

Section 18 (1) of the Broadcasting Act 1960, as amended, requires all news broadcasts by RTE to be “reported and presented in an objective and impartial manner”. Everyone would surely agree with this requirement (which also applies to current affairs broadcasts). I certainly do not disagree with it. The Coughlan judgment condemned an 80%-20% division of airtime for uncontested party political broadcasts on the divorce referendum as being unfair and unlawful. However more generally whilst ‘equity’ is required Justice Denham actually made it clear that equality is not. The Chief Justice made reference to “holding the scales equally” but in current affairs programmes all that is required surely is to be fair having regard to the merits of the case. This might dictate that each side be given the chance to have its say or that its position not be mis-represented. This should not mean however that every time one side expresses a view the other is to be given an opportunity to provide a riposte even though that riposte is principally without foundation as was the case with the issues I identified earlier. In the event that one side (or part of one side) of a referendum campaign is making claims that cannot be substantiated in fact or in law it is not unfair to that side, nor is it partial, to conclude that the claim in question is unsubstantiated and to act accordingly by not giving it equal air time. That is what editorial responsibility is all about. The fact is that by adopting a policy of deference to unjustified arguments just because they were made in a referendum campaign there would necessarily be a failure to be fair to the side not making unsubstantiated claims. Coughlan was concerned with a particularly blatant case of lack of balance. Nothing in the judgment requires what happened during the last referendum campaign in the provision of uncritical coverage to arguments that in some cases were without any substance. In addition there was a trawling of the high-ways and bye-ways of Ireland and Europe to find spokesmen for the ‘no’ side. Those, in some cases, have been presented here as if they are significant and authoritative political figures or economic actors but they were anything but. They were in some instances marginal figures in their own countries and yet were presented here as being authoritative. They were put forward simply as part of a balancing act that appeared to require a strict compliance with some 50/50 criterion that neither demanded nor received any editorial judgment.

Of course none of this issue of balance applies to the print media. Many British titles with wide circulation in Ireland have run deliberate, consistent and massive campaigns for the no side. Their editorial policy in the United Kingdom has been the same over the years. They are vehemently Euro sceptic and nobody denies their right to be so however much more balance might be desirable but they also make ridiculous arguments about the creation of a super state without any substance. This too provides some explanation for the result of the last referendum.

Another judgment that has not helped is that by the Supreme Court in McKenna v An Taoiseach (no.2). In this case the majority held that expenditure of public funds on one side of a referendum campaign breached the constitutional right to equality. This judgment has not merely been interpreted as inhibiting but actually as precluding the government from spending any state funding advocating a yes vote in a referendum proposed by the government elected by the People. This seems to be an unwarranted interference with the government of the country. As Justice Barrington said in Hanafin v the Minister for the Environment, “The Government is (not) merely the Chairman of the debating society”. He also said “Politicians who think that the Constitution should be amended have the right and duty to attempt to persuade their fellow citizens to adopt the proposed amendment. It appears to me that they are entitled to do this individually as private citizens or collectively as members of a political party or of the government.” I do not think that a government in a democratic state should be as restricted as it is in Ireland and an opportunity should be found to review this situation in the future.

It is worth bearing in mind that we have had numerous referenda on EU Treaties. In recent years the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Nice Treaty provide examples of strident opposition from tiny minorities in Ireland creating great confusion. Who now even remembers the points on which this opposition was based? What were the apocalyptic visions that they shared with our citizens and how is it that none of their dire forecasts came to pass which created anxiety for many of them?

This time the government has done an excellent job in persuading our partners to agree to a lucid and clear protocol that finally, one might hope, lays to rest most of the debate. However, incredibly some of the older arguments are surfacing again. For example, the argument that the Foreign Direct Investment Strategy of the State will be interfered with by the Treaty which is simply untrue.

It is good to record that this time round we will have an organised group of lawyers engaged in the debate and Donal Barrington and Bill Shipsey are to be commended for their initiative.

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In his seminal speech on European integration in the University of Zurich on September 19^th 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of the old continent as being, “united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He portrayed the base of Greco-Roman culture and the Christian faith and ethics as “being at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. He returned to the theme of shared roots at the Congress of The Hague on 7^th May 1948. There he spoke of European integration founded upon that “glorious treasure of literature, of romance, of ethics, of thought and toleration belonging to us all, which is the inheritance of us all”. Indeed it was the agonies of divisive histories, rather than any sense of a shared European identity, that drove the Founding Fathers, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenaur and de Gasperi, to propose a new institutional structure to help reconciliation and future peace. However it is clear that they were all conscious too of that shared inheritance. It is worth remembering that there were other reasons also that motivated them, such as the rejection of what one observer has described as, “The false universalism of communism and the false particularism of fascism, one of which sought to make everyone the same and the other of which refused any sense of common humanity”.

Those times are now long past and the context of our present debate is different. The threat of fratricidal conflict in Europe has receded and our peoples sometimes seem unconcerned by it. Also, apart from the faltering memories of past conflicts, we no longer have the need to be cemented together in mutual protection from the USSR. However I believe that our shared values have endured. They remain as a base for a project that is, in my opinion, the most noble political project in European history. There is a moral basis for the project of European integration, which I regard as being every bit as important as its economic rationale.

It is inevitable that attitudes to European integration today, particularly amongst the young, have changed. They are challenged by new realities such as the enlargement of the European Union. Their motivation for a belief in the process of integration can no longer simply be promoted by the recollections of terrible events now only within the living memory of a small and diminishing minority. Nor do they appear conscious that the great success of European integration was a significant causative factor in the collapse of the oppressive, immoral and irrational Communist system of the Soviet Union and its satellites. I believe that there is a moral and cultural case for the European Union which goes beyond the specific and contemporary concerns of any individual generation. But this long-term case needs to be recast and restated in terms comprehensible to today’s Europeans. This will be assisted by an understanding of two essential points that are the subject of this lecture: the first of these is that we are building on a foundation of shared values. The second is that the fundamental relationship between the nation state and the citizen has been radically changed by the globalising and increasingly interdependent world of today and this change demands responses that can only be provided by a truly European policy.

It is worth remembering that it had been the nation state that created many of the problems integration was intended to address. In 1826 the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, pronounced following the collapse of the Congress of Vienna system, “Things are getting back to a wholesome state, every nation for itself, and God for us all”. (He might have said “God help us all”). His world was that which many of us hope that we have escaped, fearing as President Mitterrand said in his farewell speech to the European Parliament, “Le nationalisme, c’est la guerre”. So let me say something about nationalism and the nation state. What is this concept of a nation state? It means different things to different people. Jeremy Rifkin (The European Dream p. 166) has written, “The popular conception of the Nation State…is rooted in common culture, language and customs. (But) in reality is more of … an artificial construct…”. Often, in order to create it, he wrote it was necessary to, “…create a compelling story about a common past, one convincing enough to capture the imagination of the people and convince them of their shared identity and common destiny.” The reality however is of course more complex. There are indeed shared histories and values and the binding together of communities has many valid and positive aspects that are not contrived. It has to be admitted however that in many cases the alleged unity of peoples has been a recent phenomenon and is less than fully convincing historically. National languages have been important in this but, for example, in 1789 only a small percentage of the French people spoke French and in 1861 only 2% of Italians spoke Italian. Castilian too was long a minority language in Spain. After the Reformation religion also had an effect in creating a sense of shared identity with some and division from others. Sometimes this created majorities in a nation state and had the divisive effect of creating a question mark over the nationality of minorities. But that too is a matter that has passed into history except in tiny pockets like Northern Ireland and the Balkans where it has helped to define tribal loyalty. However, the fact is that many people in Europe feel an intense and often passionate sense of belonging to a nation state. The Danish intellectual Toger Seidenfaden wrote, “There is no European people, no European ethnicity, no European demos …. as a consequence the EU is notoriously incapable of generating popular enthusiasm on any major scale. This is, of course, one of its most attractive features”. Whilst this comment goes a little too far for my taste one can see what he meant.

Ernest Revan has written that the nation is a spiritual principle consisting of two things, ”A common legacy of rich memories from the past and a consensus to forget the oppressions and injustices that once divided the members of the nation”. We have all seen this in action. If one looked into the heart of most Europeans today they would see themselves as part of one nation or another although their DNA may well provide evidence of a more complex reality. Unfortunately very many probably essentially see their race as being “better” in one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and perhaps the price for the cohesion of a community. Of course, too, there are confusing overlaps between nations within nations. Examples proliferate around Europe. The British are comprised by a group of perceived nationalities as are the Spanish and many others. The question as to where their ultimate loyalty lies would be hard to answer for many a Scot, a Walloon, a Bavarian or a Catalan.

In his History of Europe, Norman Davies draws a distinction between civilisation and culture. The former is defined as, “the sum total of ideas and traditions which had been inherited from the ancient world and from Christianity”. In other words it constitutes what binds us together. Culture, on the other hand is seen by him as growing “from the every day life of the people……In earlier times civilisation was extolled and culture despised. Nationalism did the opposite.” In other words in modern times our focus has been excessively directed towards our differences rather than that which binds us together.

 It would be a distortion of history to argue that the whole endeavour of European integration became a reality just because of the idealism of the Founding Fathers in their belief that nationalism had to be defeated. Many of them were indeed driven by a fundamental motivation based on a belief in the dignity of man. They believed that federalism would provide an answer to the contradictions of that Christian message all too evident in the recent history of the first half of the twentieth century. However, it must also be accepted that the project would never have been launched without economic logic and perceptions of self interest. Andrew Moravcsik in his important work was probably correct in pointing out that if European integration was not seen as being economically beneficial it would not have happened. (Indeed it may even be the case that Britain’s clear anti-federalism from the outset would not have been crucial in determining its opposition if, at the time its trade was four times greater with Europe than with the Commonwealth rather than the converse as it actually was.)

 So, if nationalism has divided us in history what identity do we share that permits some of us to dream of further integration? In answering that question let me turn to values. I believe that what was perceived by those visionary men in the early days was both a potential to reject the tribalism of the past and to build a new Europe on the foundations of shared values. They were all Christian Democrats and shared a common view of the world. On the 24^th March this year in the Vatican, speaking at an event marking the 50^th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Pope Benedict made the point that an authentic ‘common home’ cannot be built without considering the identity of the people of the continent of ours. He went on “it is a question of a historical, cultural and moral identity before being a geographic, economic or political one; an identity comprised of a set of universal values that Christianity helped forge, thus giving Christianity not only a historical but a foundational role vis-à-vis Europe”. The Founding Fathers would have agreed with him.

 Much of the debate about the ill-fated, and now we are told doomed, Constitutional Treaty regarding references to God and Christianity revolved around this claim of a foundational role. In “Ecclesia in Europa” John Paul II appealed on behalf of the Church to those drawing up the Constitutional Treaty. He called for a reference to the religious, and in particular Christian, heritage of Europe. Shortly before his election to the Papacy Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger addressed this issue also in his book, “Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures”. He concluded that the motivations for the double refusal to refer to God and Christianity were based upon the presupposition that “only the radical culture, born of the Enlightenment, which has attained its full development in our own age, can be constitutive of European identity”. As he pointed out this Enlightenment culture is substantially defined by the rights to liberty. But that concept of “liberty” is not in itself enough because he believed it has to be rooted in more fundamental beliefs.

 The final text of the Constitutional Treaty did however contain recognition that human beings are more than citizens of a state or of a union. In this sense it confirmed that neither human laws nor policies are absolute. Furthermore freedom of religion, the right to education in conformity with religious convictions, respecting the status of churches and recognising their identity and specific contributions were included. It was also declared, in the preamble, that the European Union springs, amongst other things, from a religious inheritance. These provisions went some way to meet the objections raised by the Pope and others. I believe that, irrespective of the words used, the reality of the EU, as it has evolved is that it has at its core, the enduring principles of Christianity. Furthermore they remain the basis for going further. Of course, this is not to deny Christianity’s past and terrible failures to protect and vindicate the values it proclaims. Nor is it to suggest that Christians’ belief in those values is in some sense exclusive and not shared by many others.

What Europeans share above all, and have reflected in the construction of the EU, is a belief in the rights and the obligations of the individual. This belief in the Rights of Man had its genesis in Europe long before the Enlightenment or the French Revolution. They are, above all, the product of Christian thinking from the earliest times. As Siedentop has put it “Christian ontology provided the foundation for what are usually described as liberal values in the West – for the commitment to equality and reciprocity, as well as the postulate of individual freedom. These commitments are primary and foundational whereas Western tolerance, pluralism and even scepticism are derivative and secondary. Western culture is founded on shared beliefs and when it fails to acknowledge and defend such beliefs its identity is eroded”. The Greeks and the secular liberals of recent centuries have had a real role in propagating the principle of equality. The Greek concept of moral equality was not universal – some being recognised as more equal than others. The secular liberals do not subscribe to the fact that there is a transcendent moral order beyond rationality on its own within which “liberty” must be placed. The right to liberty – moral equality – does not exist in a vacuum. Secular liberalism has emanated from the basic Christian principle of the equality of mankind and the unity of the human race. This is the key to our shared identity and the foundation of our integration. As Pope Benedict XVI (Cardinal Ratzinger as he then was) has said in his dialogue with Juergen Habermas the Christian view is that a proper appreciation and understanding of rights is inextricably linked to a belief in God.

 My conclusion is that a European identity exists because of the shared belief in a universal equality that is not defined by race, gender or religion. In particular it is one that provides equal freedom under a shared moral code. It is grounded in the Christian teaching on the brotherhood of man. Siedentop has written that “invoking conscience and choice against involuntary forms of association can plausibly be described as the genius of European civilization”. A genius that should be particularly appreciated by those who lived behind the Iron Curtain.

However, the concept of freedom of conscience and the nature of the rights resulting from a concept of “moral equality” has to recognise that the mere statement of general rights cannot always define their full meaning. Nor does it provide for the reconciliation sometimes required between apparently conflicting rights. I do not believe that a Kantian approach is sufficient to deal with the definition of rights or their reconciliation. To define the meaning of rights or to reconcile them requires something more than a utilitarian analysis. It is interesting to see how the Supreme Court of the United States and indeed the Irish Supreme Court have tried to grapple with the definition of the nature and extent of unspecified human rights in their respective written Constitutions. They seem to me to have had ultimate recourse to a conception of rights that are “antecedent” to positive law. Justice cannot be defined as being morally arbitrary and it has been said that, in the end of the day, the power of judicial review of rights in Western democracies depends upon “the judges own moral vision”. (Michael Perry in his authoritative book on the US system, ‘The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights’, Yale University Press Page 123). That moral vision is in turn predicated upon a conception of fundamental values that Christianity, notwithstanding all its bad moments, has articulated and developed. Indeed Pope John Paul made the point clearly to the European Parliament on 11^th October 1988.

 Apart from human rights as usually defined, Europeans generally also share a conception of solidarity reflected in a commitment to what Ludwig Erhart described as the “social market economy”. This is not merely consistent with Christian principles but reflective of them. Shirley Williams has defined this as “a free market curbed and regulated to conform to social goals”. These social goals have led to an EU society which is “more egalitarian and inclusive” than that of the US. Guillermo de la Dehesa in his book Europe at the Crossroads points to some of the differences. For example, the income ratio between the 10% richest and 10% poorest individuals in society was 5.6 times larger in the US and only 3.5 times larger between the upper and lower deciles in the EU. The percentage of population in relative poverty is almost the double in the US of that in the EU and the percentage of children in relative poverty more than double. But our social model is different in other respects too. For example in the level of prison population, where there are 2 million in US jails but only 900,000 in the EU (notwithstanding a much bigger population in Europe). The death penalty too is effectively outlawed throughout Europe whereas in the US it is widely used.

In international relations also the European position has increasingly converged to its own particular place. This is demonstrated by recent Euro barometer surveys that show that more than 50% of Europeans in every Member State (including the United Kingdom) favour a “European Foreign Policy”. No doubt it is expressed in these terms to distinguish it from current US policy. However, whilst Robert Kagan’s description of Europe as Venus and the US as Mars will be an enduring image it is a somewhat simplistic one. But while the Europe of Kant’s Perpetual Peace or, alternatively the Hobbesian America defending and promoting the liberal order by force, are caricatures they do contain an element of truth. In particular, it is clear that the EU believes far more in the use of “soft power” than the United States. Also it is more willing to accept limitations on its sovereignty. The EU too is the largest donor to the developing world on any statistical analysis. Apart from these matters, and no doubt as a result of its own experience in the integration process, the EU is far more multilateralist in its approach to finding solutions to global problems. This is demonstrated by the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other international treaties all ratified by Europe but declined by the US. Again this is distinctive for Europe and its values.

 So “identity” is often defined by difference from others and even though the US and its values were born out of Europe, European and American paths have diverged. One significant element of difference is the far greater individualism of the US. Jeremy Rifkin, in “the European Dream” says that this divergence about individualism sets the American Dream apart from its European antecedents. Whether in gun control, attitudes to wealth or the consequence of criminal culpability the US applies values and judgements in a different way to us. So while the Western mind (influenced by Christianity) may put a premium on the individual some Christian traditions are more individualist than others.

One of the reasons why we need more of Europe rather than less in developing our policies for the future is to deal with a new aspect of moral choice. This relates to what Rifkin calls “cold evil”. In this he refers to “actions whose effects are so far removed from the behaviour that caused them that no causal relationship is suspected, no sense of guilt or wrongdoing is felt and no collective responsibility is exercised to punish the errant behaviour”. Climate change is a classic example.

The issue of climate change presents one of the greatest moral challenges in human history. To accept painful measures with substantial costs today, to avert a catastrophe that will occur some time into the future, is difficult enough. To combine with that the need to synchronise the appropriate responses around the globe because we all must do it together will demand a multilateral response that has no historical precedent.

We are currently at a stage where there is emerging clarity on the necessary targets for the reduction of carbon emissions and there is an emerging desire to act. This is hardly surprising as we know, for example, from the Assessment Report of the IFCC that 11 of the last 12 years rank among the 12 warmest years on record and this is no coincidence. This clarity is evident not merely in the circles of environmental pressure groups but also from diverse groups of legislators, academia, industry and investors. We can also be encouraged by changes in public opinion reflected by so many politicians jumping on a band wagon until recently only occupied by Al Gore and a relatively few others. The International Herald Tribune recently carried out a survey in six countries including the US and it found that about 75% or more of people thought their country was not doing enough. Sir Nicholas Stern’s report last year made it clear that we must act now or the financial and human costs later will be enormous. We know that there is no silver bullet or soft options and the only way we can handle the issue effectively is through governments and a combination of actions requiring taxation, regulation and incentives. We know too that carbon emission trading schemes are probably part of the answer. It is abundantly clear that the EU will have to lead. In my opinion it can only do so through the tried and tested mechanism of using the Commission to propose solutions. If it is simply left to capitals they will probably fail as they have done in so many cases of simple intergovernmentalism in the past. The example of the Single Market (or “1992” initiative) only worked because of the use of the Community method. By this I mean the development of policies by an executive working in the common interest and, where possible, majority voting by the Member States for their adoption. It needs to be used here again. The “common good” has to be seen in the universalist context here more than in most areas and this, as I have said, is a particular inheritance from Christian principles.

The failure of Europe to develop an effective common foreign policy too is in significant measure the result of the failure of the institutionalised intergovernmental structure created by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Whilst it has had some successes this structure has failed to create common positions on all issues not because of fundamental disagreements but because it has permitted independent initiatives from Member States without prior consultation or attempts to reach consensus. Iraq is the obvious example. On the other hand the Lebanese intervention, nominally a European one, is a partly positive development but one nonetheless that also demonstrated the weakness of our existing mechanisms rather than their strength. As one diplomat put it “The EU played only a symbolic role”.

Clearly however the massive divisions over Iraq demonstrated the real weaknesses in this structure. The Maastricht Treaty had proclaimed “A common foreign and security policy is hereby established”. Like so many other grand statements of intent this was not given the institutional or financial backup to make it a reality. One of the alleged objectives of CFSP was to “safeguard common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union.” Yet its budget is 1/1000^th part of the EU budget (which itself is about 1% of the total GDP of the Member States). The Foreign Offices of the EU never wanted CSFP to work. The aspirations for European defence, namely “the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” is risible as a contribution to real progress. Complete national freedom of action was in reality ensured by the Maastricht Treaty and what followed it. The whole business was a victory for those who wanted nothing to be done. The wholly foreseeable result was the division about Iraq, not least because the issue was never truly debated at EU level. This was a division that could have been avoided and has left scars not merely with the French and British but also with some new Member States. And disagreements have become evident too in respect of relations with Russia. However I believe that this sorry history is still remediable because it is so obvious that our individual and collective weakness will ultimately permit threats to develop which we will be unable to contain. In the end of the day we cannot simply rely on the US. Nor can we in Europe deny our moral obligation to play a role in advancing the values that we claim are central to our conception of civilisation.

So the examples of climate change and foreign policy are two areas where I believe that the values that we share have a part to play in making the world a better place and which can best be advanced through the European construction. But they are not the only ones. For one thing we should surely develop a framework and policy for humanitarian intervention. In this context Kosovo and Sierra Leone provide positive examples but the global community has failed to act in respect of others such as Rwanda and Darfur to name but two.

Migration policies too can only be properly developed through European policies and again these should be influenced by the concept of the equality of man. Without arguing that it is possible to have unrestricted migration we should surely recognise that there is a contradiction between our former condemnation (on grounds of human rights) of the Soviet Union in its refusal to permit people to leave and the case made by some that we have no obligation at all to permit migrants to enter Europe. Globalisation is not just about trade, it is above all about people and our policies should start from a multilateral dialogue that links development with migration and an understanding that migrants have rights including to the maximum extent possible the right to legally enter host countries. On the other hand we must unequivocally also uphold the rights we believe in within our own societies and not permit a mistaken concept of multiculturalism to require us to derogate from them.

Where does the United Kingdom fit into this business of the European Union and its values? The United Kingdom has consistently viewed European integration through a unique prism. It has sought, from the very beginning, to reduce the ambitions of the EU to being a largely intergovernmental institution providing a market. It has resisted the enlargement of competences into non-economic areas and has consistently advocated widening rather than deepening. Also it has sought to reduce its budget (and not just in respect of the CAP). This now stands at approximately only 1% of EU GDP. Public opinion in the United Kingdom has been consistently more negative towards the whole project than elsewhere. In the last Euro barometer polling only 34% of the United Kingdom thought the EU to be ‘a good thing’ – the lowest figure in Europe. A new poll conducted by ICM research and quoted in the Sunday Telegraph of 29^th April apparently established that an overwhelming majority of people (69%) want a referendum on Britain’s relationship with Europe and the possibility of “loosening” ties. This would entail “opting out of political, and economic integration”. Only 27% wanted to stay as members on current terms and 36% said they preferred a looser relationship. 29% said that the UK should withdraw completely. This finding, if correct, is a tragedy for the UK and for the rest of Europe. I believe that it is probably accurate – and is an unsustainable position for the future. Now we are probably heading in the direction of substantial opposition from the United Kingdom with regard to the reduced proposals that will be proposed in the place of the Constitutional Treaty. It is worth noting here that the overwhelming majority of other countries within EU either already have or could readily adopt this treaty in its entirety. When France and The Netherlands rejected the Treaty much of the British media thought this to be cause for celebration. Since then these rejections have been sold as a rejection by both countries of “Brussels”. Of course this is not anything like the full story. The votes were against everything from Chirac, to migration, to Turkey’s accession and the “Anglo-Saxon” economic model. In fact the EU is markedly more popular in both France and The Netherlands than in Britain (and in fact over 80% in The Netherlands think it to be a good thing). This negativity in the United Kingdom has to change or else the EU will never be able to play the role in the world that it should. But nor will the United Kingdom. The great contributions Great Britain can make in the areas of democracy, tolerance and respect for the rule of law will be far less than they should be in shaping the future. The EU badly needs the United Kingdom as a constructive participant in the shaping and leadership of the Union.

 So, to conclude, I would argue that the integration of Europe has been a remarkably good thing. The evidence of its success is there to see. Not merely have we had peace, we have had reconciliation. Not merely have we had democracy we have seen the consistent defeat and marginalisation of extremism in every country in the Union. This is no coincidence. It is clearly linked to the EU itself and is in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. Furthermore the EU’s economic policies have themselves been based on a concept of freedom for the individual to compete tempered by a need to help the disadvantaged through a welfare state. There has been some evidence too of solidarity within the EU through the structural funds and even the Common Agricultural Policy. The funding for this has come largely from the richer countries. (Few will fail to recall the generosity of Chancellor Kohl in doubling the structural funds at the time of the passage of the Single European Act.) Our basic principles regarding our external responsibilities have been evident also in the development aid provided from the EU and its constituency Member States to the developing world. So, the EU has not merely succeeded in the obvious way of providing free movement of goods, of services, of people and of capital and by developing a common currency. It has core values evident in its policies. The fact that many of its achievements have been claimed to be the product of a secularised, indeed often anti-religious, world cannot in fact obscure the reality that Christianity has been at the foundations of those achievements.

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Introduction

One word, globalisation, has come to stand as shorthand for the whole range of rapid and radical changes taking place in all aspects of life – economic, political, cultural. This means there are many possible perspectives on globalisation, but it’s important to keep them meaningfully distinct in order to consider policy realities and priorities.

What’s common to all facets of globalisation is that the same underlying forces are driving change:

The pervasive spread of information and communications technologies enabling economic actors to operate more speedily on a truly global scale;

The adoption of policies everywhere broadly oriented towards market forces and open borders;

And, to a lesser extent, demographic and social change.

To state these trends is to make it plain that failure to respond is not a viable option. The focus must be on how to adapt.

Not surprisingly, given its extensive nature, globalisation poses a variety of specific policy challenges to all governments at every level, from local & regional to national & supra-national, and in industrialised and developing countries. In Europe, it also presents the European Union with some specific institutional challenges.

I want to offer some thoughts and raise some questions about two areas, namely the impact of policy reactions to globalisation at every level of government in Europe on the business environment; and what institutional responses to globalisation might be needed at the EU level.

My underlying message is that the EU has every reason to feel confident about the implications of globalisation. European integration has been the key trigger for the growth in international trade and direct investment for at least 20 years. That other nations are now joining us in taking to heart the mutual advantages of economic integration should be a cause for celebration, not for concern.

First, a few reflections on the political and economic context.

What do Europeans think about globalisation?

Business executives are not so naïve as to believe it is possible or sensible to ignore public concerns about aspects of globalisation. Big companies have obviously been subject to tremendous scrutiny in recent years and vehemently anti-business sentiments have been voiced by activists in a manner unparalleled since the 1960s.

Nor do I dismiss these as fringe views even though some of the groups expressing them are clearly extremist. Everyone should take corporate responsibility, climate change, fair trade and related issues very seriously, and that includes business leaders.

Public concern about such issues is part of the reaction to globalisation – to the growth in trade and foreign investment, to energy and environmental challenges which cross borders, to the sheer flow of information about what is happening in the rest of the world. Whether asked about the phenomenon of globalisation in general or specific aspects of it such as migration, or foreign investment, European citizens express concerns, to varying degrees.

Globalisation has become the scapegoat for all kinds of troubling developments. For a sense of increased job insecurity. For greater income inequality. For the ‘dumbing down’ of European culture by American influences, or, more generally, the homogenisation of culture. For decreasing civility in urban life. For poverty, debt and disease in developing countries. Not to mention the illegal drugs trade, people trafficking and international terrorism, the dark side of globalisation.

What’s more, public perceptions are becoming increasingly negative, according to some surveys.

The polling evidence needs to be interpreted with a little care. According to the Euro barometer surveys, majorities in most EU countries have said the economy was too closed rather than too open; and said they were in favour of globalisation rather than opposed.

However, the more specific the questions, the more negative the replies. On trade liberalisation versus protectionism, or the positive versus negative contributions of immigrants, for example, there are majorities on the ‘anti-globalisation’ side.

Recent surveys also express an extraordinary degree of pessimism in general. Asked whether things are going in the right direction in their country, those saying no outweigh those saying yes in all but six member countries, with Ireland the only one of the pre-enlargement member states with a positive majority. In France and the UK, pessimists outnumber optimists by two to one.

Most tellingly, almost two thirds of Europeans think life will be harder for the next generation.

In short, there is a sentiment of fearfulness present to some extent in every member nation.

This at a time when we should have so much to celebrate:

the accession of formerly communist countries to a peaceful and united European polity;

the success of the Euro and the ECB – and to have created a new currency of global status, and a respected central bank delivering low inflation and a stable economy is a huge success;

a growing Euro zone economy, albeit with long-term structural challenges which we still tackle too slowly.

Looking at the evidence, many Europeans clearly don’t appreciate these achievements. There is a dispiriting sense of a need to turn away from the rest of the world, to safeguard what we have in a walled garden, sheltered from the forces of change ‘out there’.

This is one of the possible, plausible reactions to globalisation identified by the scholar Philip Bobbitt in his magisterial study of the evolution of the nation state (The Shield of Achilles), and it is not a scenario for which he could predict a very positive outlook in his analysis of the market states of the future. Bobbitt labels this alternative ‘The Garden’, which rather brings to mind the formal garden of a Loire chateau, orderly behind its walls yet ultimately vulnerable to the chaos of the wider world.

Even if this sense of a desire to retreat is a media construct not firmly based on how citizens actually feel, there is certainly no spirit of European optimism or engagement, still less leadership, in the world.

Why is this a problem? For at least three reasons:

Staying aloof does not evade having to make choices. Change does not stop when you close your eyes. India and China will continue to grow, with repercussions for European economies, whatever we do.

Secondly, in practice it would mean a failure to respond to pressing European challenges such as the ageing and in some cases shrinking population, or the slow rate of productivity growth. Hostility to globalisation to which some politicians have resorted only cements into place the sclerosis which unfortunately does characterise some EU economies.

Thirdly, the linkages between Europe and the world are so extensive that it wouldn’t be desirable to disengage given the extremely serious repercussions that would have.

To understand the potential damage, even of a failure to participate wholeheartedly in current trends, let me turn to what globalisation means in practice to European businesses.

The globalisation of EU businesses

To understand the global context for businesses, let us cast our minds back to the mid-1980s. Work on building the Single Market was getting under way, to the great benefit of the European economy. With strong growth and tumbling internal barriers to trade, American and Japanese companies invested heavily in the EU from the mid-80s.

Amongst those seeking a firm foothold in the flourishing EU market were the major Japanese car manufacturers, who built plants and established relationships with European partners.

It is hard to remember now just how contentious this inward investment was at the time, with frequent rows about whether there was enough local content and controversy about new employment practices. Now, global partnership is the norm for European, Japanese and US car makers: Nissan and Renault have merged; Suzuki is partnered with GM and Mazda with Ford. Behind each of these global automotive partnerships lies an extensive web of alliances and joint ventures between suppliers all the way upstream to the initial research and design.

So a product could not be more transnational than today’s automobile. Car manufacture is increasingly clustered in a few countries but auto components are produced all over the world. The engine might come from Hungary, the transmission from Poland, the fabrics, fittings and electronic components from a variety of sources in Asia. The metals will probably have been processed in East or South Asia too. Meanwhile in their home bases, the western European or Japanese parent companies have specialised in research, and in design and marketing, the higher value activities in the production chain.

What’s true of cars is true of many manufactured products. Virtually any finished consumer good is no longer really ‘made in’ anywhere, as its components will typically have been designed, manufactured, processed, assembled and distributed in numerous countries. Take aircraft production, for an example, each Airbus or Boeing aircraft have such an extensive amount of both US and European content with many suppliers providing components to both.

Even simple products like a shirt: the design, fabric, thread and trims almost certainly have different national origins, even if the label says ‘Made in Italy’ or ‘Made in China’ for that matter. And most of the value added comes in the distribution and marketing stages anyway.

The combined expansion of both trade and FDI reflects the process of splitting up production chains and the global re-location of the individual links in the production process.

This has been under way in manufacturing for at least 20 years, and manufacturing output is therefore radically globalised compared with the early 1980s. A third of merchandise trade now consists of trade in components, rather than finished goods, with the proportion still rising.

This process of international specialisation is driven by multinationals which are making use of new technologies and taking advantage of policy liberalisation. And it has become increasingly fine-grained.

Individual countries possess a range of sometimes surprisingly narrow specialisations. The statistics cover very broad categories of goods, and don’t give a clear impression of the extraordinary extent of this specialisation, down to individual components out of the thousands or tens of thousands that make up the finished products. The fabric of the world economy truly has an extremely fine weave.

And the benefits are clear in the lower prices and vastly increased quality of the goods we use. Whether it is clothes or high-end cars and computers, consumers have very clearly benefited enormously from the global re-ordering of manufacturing production. Globalisation has both made it possible for multinationals to operate much more efficiently and also provided the more intense competition which ensures those efficiencies have been passed on to consumers.

The idea of cross-border operations is familiar but few people fully appreciate the scale of the switch from national to multinational production. Even fewer are aware of the extent to which this is largely an EU phenomenon.

Investment into and within the EU due to the Single Market programme was the most significant driver of the substantial cross-border investment growth we have seen since the late 1980s. Cross-border direct investment has been growing even faster than world trade – it was up by an annual average of 22% from the mid 80s to the mid 90s, and by nearly 40% a year since 1996.

In the latest year for which we have the figures, the EU accounted for nearly half of FDI inflows and nearly three quarters of outflows. Of that EU portion, 72% consisted of intra-EU investment. In earlier years the intra-EU element was even more dominant. The vast majority of inward investment in European economies comes from other EU member countries; it is more than a half of the total even in the UK, with its extensive links with the United States.

To an enormous degree, globalisation in terms of the trading and investment links between national economies has been and remains a process of European integration.

Of course, foreign direct investment overall has expanded substantially since 1985. Developing countries have been the destination for a rising share of total FDI: the developing country share of FDI inflows has risen to over a third in recent years and so the share of the OECD economies in the global stock of FDI declined from 75% in 1980. But the OECD share was still 70% in 2005, and the European share 51%.

The same process of switching from a national to a multinational form of business is starting to get under way in services too. Exports and imports of commercial services have been growing at 10% a year since 2000 and accounted for just under a fifth of total world trade in 2005.

This is a highly contentious area. Many services are politically sensitive, those in areas such as healthcare or utilities. However, the advantages of specialisation will prove just as compelling in services as in manufacturing, and after all services account for at least two-thirds of the developed economies so the potential welfare gains are enormous. I predict there will be controversy now, just as there was about FDI in the car industry in the 1980s, but the likelihood is that the benefits will steadily ease people’s concerns.

The key point is that as globalisation gets into gear in services, intra-EU and intra-OECD activity will be key drivers of the process. For all the hype about off shoring in India, Ireland is just as significant a destination for outsourced services. Developing country workforces even in India and China are some way from having the capacity to undertake the full range of activities which OECD countries can supply.

Already the great majority of intra-EU investment flows consist of service activities – hardly surprising when services form more than two-thirds of our economies. When we talk about completing the single market, cross-border delivery of services is what it will mean.

I do not believe we have anything to fear from this continuing process of cross-border investment and trade. This is our mutual investment in our joint future.

Europe has been at the forefront of globalisation, with tremendous success for EU companies and benefits for European consumers.

Many European companies are amongst the most successful multinationals in the world. Of the top 100 multinationals ranked by Unctad, 12 are EU-based, five American and two Japanese.

I would go further and say internationalisation is coded in the DNA of the European Union. The essence of George Marshall’s plan for the post-war reconstruction of Europe was that American aid should depend on Europeans’ willingness to co-operate with each other in the project. In his Harvard speech Marshall said: “The remedy seems to lie in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the people of Europe in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole.”

My fear is that European hesitancy about the merits of a continuing process of weaving the fabric of the economy through removing barriers to trade and investment would undermine the moral and philosophical foundations of the EU’s institutions, even if that hesitancy is only supposed to apply outside the boundaries of the Union.

Challenges and questions

Either one believes in the merits of openness and the mutual advantage of trade – or not. It is essential for the health of the Union that we have clarity and commitment to the continuing process of economic integration.

The European Union is by construction internationalist. It offers the prime example of how international governance arrangements can manage the sometimes conflicting interests of individual states. The members of the EU have a head start in managing effectively the processes of globalisation, as so much of it has consisted in fact of Europeanisation.

But we have a growing credibility gap. Our own governing institutions are not currently held in high esteem by the European public, and according to Euro barometer surveys trust in the institutions has been diminishing.

Although history bears witness to the extraordinary economic success of the EU project, Europe is still constrained by an absence of European ambition and vision. Too often we debate issues and interests from a prism of economic nationalism that bears no relationship either to European and global realities. Is it surprising that public scepticism begins to take root when member state representatives do not make the positive case for European decisions and instead present Europe as the negative originator of actions which all have agreed to in the common interest? Moreover, the EU’s leaders have failed to update the principal institutions in the face of eroding legitimacy.

The institutions of the EU, like all other institutions of governance today, need to learn the virtues of transparency and engagement with a wider range of audiences than in the past.

Clearly, the debate about institutional reform is an active one and goes well beyond the issues I am raising here. However, the question of governance is important in developing a coherent policy response to globalisation not least, for an example, in international relations with, for example, Russia.

The purpose of economic integration is ultimately to deliver improvements in well-being to European citizens and ensure the benefits and costs are shared in a way which commands consent. If people do not trust their governing institutions, it cannot come as a great surprise that they are also turning away from further global integration. Having effective EU institutions is a key part of developing effective mechanisms of global governance.

This is an important time to see some decisive political leadership in shaping governance for a globalised world economy. The failure to achieve a breakthrough in the Doha Round, the lack of effective political support for the WTO, and an increase in bilateralism as a substitute does not augur well for the capacity of the international community to manage globalisation.

We should not for a moment forget the huge institutional achievement embodied in the WTO, a rules-based system for economic co-existence in which the powerful are significantly constrained. It is not an unrestrained charter for free trade, but an institution which, to the mutual benefit of its members, offers a structured way to expand trade predictably and fairly. It embodies what Keynes called the “healthy rules of mutual advantage and equal treatment”, principles he regarded as fundamental to the system of international economic management being built after the war.

The same principles remain fundamental, inside and outside the EU, and it is to affirm our commitment to them in future that we must as a matter of urgency press ahead both with reforms of the WTO and also with the ambitious global trade agenda.

I would also like to see a clear commitment to extending the single market and ensuring a healthy business environment in the EU. This will require us to address the disconnect in public opinion between the economic success story and the creeping pessimism about the future. What will this take?

Europeans must recognise that in globalisation we see our own reflection. I would hope responsible politicians can manage to resist the temptation to demonise multinationals or whatever aspect of business or financial markets happen to be catching the headlines.

The future of the single market will also require a firm commitment to integration in services. The path so far has not been an easy one. Many areas of services are highly sensitive. They are close to people’s hearts. They’re often in the public sector, although with different configurations in different countries. Most EU citizens work in services so the employment implications will be a major concern.

This means we will need to accommodate more diversity of approach within the EU – something desirable anyway in a larger Union. What needs to be uniform for the single market to operate effectively, what can vary?

Getting to grips with limits beyond which national choices undermine European markets will require some careful, detailed work. The broader point, though, is that we will have to accept there isn’t a single right way to arrange markets, or a single, European Social Model, but a plurality.

The final point I would like to make concerns the issue with which I started, the climate of opinion. The political debate sets the tone for how optimistic or pessimistic people feel about the future. I don’t want to fall into the trap of being too pessimistic in my accusations of pessimism on the part of others.

But sentiment matters. It affects decisions.

In particular, people who have no confidence in their economic future are unlikely to invest or make plans to expand, making pessimism a self-fulfilling prophesy. There is an important strategic role in expressing confidence about Europe’s capability not only to react to global economic trends but also to shape them.

This is not just management-speak. Modern growth theory in economics recognises that one of the key roles of policy lies in determining through its impact on expectations whether an economy is on a virtuous circle or a vicious spiral. The future, as well as the past, determines our capabilities today.

What is more, I think a failure by the EU to step up positively to the challenge of globalisation would be an abdication of leadership by the world’s largest economic power. While some certainly recognise this, it is rather shocking to see how little part these towering moral and political challenges play in many EU countries. They are hardly on the radar in the French election debate, for example.

We have benefitted tremendously from globalisation. It has been shaped on our terms. Europeans do have a responsibility to take a lead in addressing global issues such as climate change and poverty. The message we in business have been getting from our customers and employees is that they take this responsibility very seriously, and just as we must respond, so too must the policy process.

This is still in effect a post-Cold War challenge. Globalisation was in part a result of the end of the Cold War, the unfreezing of international barriers, the general acceptance of the mixed market economy.

The benefits have been extraordinary. The world economy has experienced its longest sustained period of growth since the early 1970s. Hundreds of millions of people in China and India have left absolute poverty behind them. Trade and investment have grown. Nor is it just a question of economic gains. On one count the number of democracies has quintupled in recent decades.

But that is the past. Now is the time to invest for future dividends. We – by which I mean European political and business leaders – have still to demonstrate that in our different spheres of action we will govern globalisation properly. Europe has essentially shaped globalisation so far, and it is our responsibility to manage it in future.

This is the text of a speech first delivered by Peter Sutherland at the Informal Council on Competitiveness, Würzburg

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I have been asked to reflect upon the fifty years of European integration that have followed the Treaty of Rome. Robert Schumann, as French Foreign Minister, said on the 9th May 1950 that the proposal to recreate the Coal and Steel Community, ‘…would build the first concrete foundation of a European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace.’ What was created was, as William Wallace has written, less than a federation but more than a regime. K C Wheare in his classic work says that a federation is an association of states formed for certain common purposes, but in which the MS retain a large measure of their original independence.

In the case of the C&S Treaty the linkage with war and peace was obvious but could perhaps have been achieved by a means that was less challenging to traditional concepts of national sovereignty than that proposed by Jean Monnet. The high authority he proposed, with its independence was clearly intended as a step on the way to some form of federal union as was the concept of a Court of Justice and a Council of Ministers that was to vote by majority, ‘save in exceptional circumstances’. While the Defence Community of 1954 perished in the French Parliament. Paul Spaak within 24 hours asked Monnet for a new initiative on the basis of concerns about sovereignty. The Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and Euratom were adopted on the model of the ECSC sharing the formers Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice. The reality is that from the very beginning the institutions were not merely innovative they are inexplicable other than in the context of a federalist vision. That is the way it was seen here too at the time. The Mutual Aid Committee was asked to provide a comprehensive assessment of British interests in the negotiations in October 1955 and concluded inter alia that, ‘…participation would in practice lead gradually to further integration and ultimately perhaps to political federation’. Frank Lee of the Board of trade – who favoured membership wrote that, ‘…this could not be done without ultimately paying the price of a common currency and considerable merging of political sovereignty.’ Of course the Establishment didn’t think Messina would succeed (Rab Butler dismissed it as an, ‘archaeological excavation’. He later observed that the whole thing bored him and the only troublesome point was whether to strive to kill it or let it collapse of its own weight. However, then, there was no conflict between political reservations on sharing sovereignty and the federalist aspect and economic interests. In fact British economic interests were strongly against membership. British exports to the continent were only a quarter of those to the Commonwealth. A Treasury report noted, ‘On a longer view the question might become, not whether we should go into Europe to save Europe, but whether we should not have to move closer to Europe in order to save ourselves’.

My view is that the British view though critically examined by pro-Europeans ever since was an entirely logical one at the time. Neither industrial nor agricultural policy could possibly have favoured membership. Now while hostility to the project was also articulated on grounds of objection to Europe in a manner which, ‘…for hundreds of years we have always said we could not see done in safety to our country.’ (David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade in 1957). Of course opposition to the institutions of a federal nature was clear too but as commentators have observed it largely disappeared after 1956. In other words commercial interests prevailed. While the institutional construct contained in the Spaak Report of April 1956 proposed the supranational institutions that were finally approved by the Treaty of Rome I do not believe they would have been rejected had commercial interests dictated a more active consideration of the whole project. But I am under no illusion that the supranational institutional structure that has brought us so far might have been undermined more effectively had Britain joined early and supported De Gaulle in his opposition to them. We must be grateful for small mercies. It has to be said that even though the Treaty of Rome was for me a triumph for the concept of sharing sovereignty many federalists saw it as a failure. Altiero Spinelli was one who did as did Joseph Luno. However, whether the reason for it was federalist thinking or simply the desire to keep others in order the power given to the Commission in competition policy, in setting agricultural prices, in trade negotiation and, above all, in it exclusive power of initiative was a decisive move in the direction of integration that would not be easy to remove or reduce. So too with qualified majority voting. In his masterful analysis Andrew Moravcsik concluded that the pre-eminent motivation for the Treaties of Rome were economic, self-interest rather than grander aspirations. At the least they would never have been ratified unless they were perceived to have more economic advantages than disadvantages for the parties. It seems unlikely that the anti-federalist views in the UK were crucial in the initial opposition to the EEC. In fact a British competing proposal of an FTA contained significant federalist elements including majority voting.

I have reflected on the early days at some length because I believe that the United Kingdom has had a consistent line in its European policy just as others have had also. It has been concerned above all – and to the virtual exclusion of everything else – with commercial interests. The 70’s and early 80’s had been a period of failure in Europe – the era of eurosclerosis but the first Delors Commission in which I served created a new dynamic in the 1992 programme. The Common Market (the Customs Union) had been completed in 1968 now a new impetus was required to provide free movement of goods, services, people and capital. It required institutional change in four areas: more qualified majority voting, mutual recognition of standard and greater powers to the European Parliament and greater resources for transfer to the poorer countries. The UK, while favouring the Internal Market, initially opposed extending QMV and any expansion of the role of the European Parliament or the Commission. What becomes apparent as a question about this time is the apparent contradiction between Britain’s objectives the completion of the Internal Market and its rejection of the means to make it all happen. At the end of the day economic pragmatism was the victor over ideological rejection of sharing sovereignty.

The Maastricht Treaty was, of course, the next démarche and whilst Delors must claim great credit or opprobrium, if one is an anti-European, for it the remaining members of a triumvirate Kohl and Mitterand were decisive. Particularly Kohl because his fundamental belief in European integration compelled him to take great political risks in seeking acceptance in Germany. The UK was opposed fundamentally. Mrs Thatcher, as she then was, said, ‘…the ability to run an independent monetary, economic and fiscal policy lies at the heart of what constitutes a sovereign state.’ As she said in the Bruges speech, ‘In my view we have surrendered enough’.

What we have to ask today is an old question in a new context. Have we all surrendered enough in Europe for today’s world? Is surrender the correct term? I want to look at the other side of European integration and to make a claim that the European Union is not merely vital for our future but that Britain must for once play a constructive role in its development. First of all what has it achieved and why?

It is commonplace today to discount the effect of European integration on the relations between Europeans. We are told that there never could have been hostilities between Western Europeans after the War. We were bound together by the Iron Curtain. Anyone who has spent any time on the continent knows differently. They know in particular in the context of the EU how serious disagreements have been mediated by the EU. They know how our economic and political integration and above all the functioning of our EU institutions have changed perceptions and opened doors. Of course the times of fratricidal conflict are long passed and the context of our present debate is different. Our peoples seem unconcerned, perhaps complacently, about our capacity to fall out. However as Ireland and the Balkans have demonstrated tensions can reignite. But leave that aside or give no credit for European integration to its abatement. What about the more complex though real transformation of our national politics? Not everywhere in Europe has been used to a prolonged period of democracy. Perhaps even more surprisingly we have seen – everywhere in the EU – a gradual but clear growth of tolerance and moderation in public life. When extremism or racism raises their ugly heads they never seem to gather strength. The Le Pens, Haidars and so on are invariably short-lived and minority interests for our electorates. Is it a coincidence that this applies to all our Member States? Look too at the enlargement process. While we gripe internally about our integration externally everyone clamours to join and in doing so they accept the norms and values – the democracy, tolerance and rule of law that governs our internal and external relations within the EU. Is this of no value?

Perhaps a positive attitude towards the EU cannot now be motivated amongst the public by such theories but surely some of our politicians should recognise their validity. However, I fear that no matter how much some of us may argue against negativism towards integration by invoking the memories of the demons lurking in our souls as demonstrated by our histories our plan will fall on deaf ears. We must restate the case for European integration in a different way not looking to the past – even to the internal market or any of our existing policy achievements – but rather by addressing the issues of the nation state and their accommodation in the international order needed to manage increasing interdependence. In doing so we must recognise that virtually all Europeans see themselves as being part of one race or another. Unfortunately, they probably see that race as being “better” in one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and although this nationalism is in many instances an artificial construct of recent times it exists. The most we can do through the European process is to mitigate the excesses of nationalism and to create a recognition that we share more than divides us. Winston Churchill in his famous Zurich speech spoke of Europe being, “…united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He spoke of Judaeo Christian faith and ethics as being, “…at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. One does not have to cite Gandhi’s remark that European culture would be a good idea to recognise that all might not accept Churchill’s view but, on the other hand, much good has come out of Europe and what the EU has achieved to a considerable extent is what John F Kennedy sought as our objective when he said in 1962 that we should create “the rise of a united Europe of equals instead of rivals, instead of the old Europe torn by national and personal animosities.

The argument that must be deployed today is that continuing European integration is required to protect values, political diversity and democracy. Another is that it is required to maintain, regulate and expand economic interdependence and the political ties necessary for Europeans to relate to and contribute to a globalising world. Within the next twenty years Europe will provide less than 6% of the world’s population and it will face enormous problems. We are capable of doing so together. On all the big issues we are essentially in the same place right across the continent. We want the same things. We believe in multilateralism and soft power, we give more to developing countries than, for example, the US. We believe in the welfare state and oppose the death penalty. We share the same opinions, even if our political leaders did not always share them, on the war in Iraq or the Middle East. Our peoples too know that we need a common energy policy, a common migration policy and a common environment policy. It is largely our politicians and civil servants and the vested interests of power that resist them. We can clearly have a greater impact by acting collectively than as a sum of our component parts. We have already provided some leadership on global issues such as Kyoto and the ICC and demonstrate our influence and effectiveness when we are united and speaking with one voice. But despite this in foreign and security policy we are far from punching our weight as we are in developing common policies in the areas I have already mentioned.

Our peoples see this. 54% of the UK population believe in a common foreign policy. In February 2007 a Eurobarometer survey found a majority of people in the UK in favour of more decision making at European level on a range of issues.

59% on control of external borders, 77% on organised crime, 78% in fight against terrorism, 65% in the exchange of police information and promoting and protecting human rights. Even in this hot bed of anti-Europeanism where understandably having regards to the consistent negative diet where only 34% think the EU is a good thing the people know on specifics.

In the various areas that I have touched upon experience has shown us that the only model that works and that will provide results is the supranational one that has delivered so much in the past. Firstly the failure of simple dialogue between capitals – a purely intergovernmental approach – underlines how correct Jean Monnet was in placing an independent executive at the core of the EU. Without the Commission we would never have achieved the Customs Union, the Common Agricultural Policy, the creation of a Single Market or the creation of the WTO. All of these would have failed if policies and legislation were not originally forged by the Commission acting in the common interest. To deny it the full role now needed to face globalisation is absurd and yet, virtually uniquely here, it is the minimal improvement in the functioning of the institutions of the Union that apparently creates difficulties. Anything institutional one almost feels is automatically suspect just as it did in Mrs Thatcher’s time. This is a tragedy for Europe not merely because I fear that we may be again isolated in opposition to minimal change but because it conflicts with Britain’s interests. Take a common energy policy as an example. Do we not want an open market? Do we not want assured supply?

The real issue about the Constitutional Treaty is not that it does too much. It does very little but what it does is absolutely necessary for the functioning of the European Union.

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