I have been asked to reflect upon the fifty years of European integration that have followed the Treaty of Rome. Robert Schumann, as French Foreign Minister, said on the 9th May 1950 that the proposal to recreate the Coal and Steel Community, ‘…would build the first concrete foundation of a European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace.’ What was created was, as William Wallace has written, less than a federation but more than a regime. K C Wheare in his classic work says that a federation is an association of states formed for certain common purposes, but in which the MS retain a large measure of their original independence.

In the case of the C&S Treaty the linkage with war and peace was obvious but could perhaps have been achieved by a means that was less challenging to traditional concepts of national sovereignty than that proposed by Jean Monnet. The high authority he proposed, with its independence was clearly intended as a step on the way to some form of federal union as was the concept of a Court of Justice and a Council of Ministers that was to vote by majority, ‘save in exceptional circumstances’. While the Defence Community of 1954 perished in the French Parliament. Paul Spaak within 24 hours asked Monnet for a new initiative on the basis of concerns about sovereignty. The Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and Euratom were adopted on the model of the ECSC sharing the formers Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice. The reality is that from the very beginning the institutions were not merely innovative they are inexplicable other than in the context of a federalist vision. That is the way it was seen here too at the time. The Mutual Aid Committee was asked to provide a comprehensive assessment of British interests in the negotiations in October 1955 and concluded inter alia that, ‘…participation would in practice lead gradually to further integration and ultimately perhaps to political federation’. Frank Lee of the Board of trade – who favoured membership wrote that, ‘…this could not be done without ultimately paying the price of a common currency and considerable merging of political sovereignty.’ Of course the Establishment didn’t think Messina would succeed (Rab Butler dismissed it as an, ‘archaeological excavation’. He later observed that the whole thing bored him and the only troublesome point was whether to strive to kill it or let it collapse of its own weight. However, then, there was no conflict between political reservations on sharing sovereignty and the federalist aspect and economic interests. In fact British economic interests were strongly against membership. British exports to the continent were only a quarter of those to the Commonwealth. A Treasury report noted, ‘On a longer view the question might become, not whether we should go into Europe to save Europe, but whether we should not have to move closer to Europe in order to save ourselves’.

My view is that the British view though critically examined by pro-Europeans ever since was an entirely logical one at the time. Neither industrial nor agricultural policy could possibly have favoured membership. Now while hostility to the project was also articulated on grounds of objection to Europe in a manner which, ‘…for hundreds of years we have always said we could not see done in safety to our country.’ (David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade in 1957). Of course opposition to the institutions of a federal nature was clear too but as commentators have observed it largely disappeared after 1956. In other words commercial interests prevailed. While the institutional construct contained in the Spaak Report of April 1956 proposed the supranational institutions that were finally approved by the Treaty of Rome I do not believe they would have been rejected had commercial interests dictated a more active consideration of the whole project. But I am under no illusion that the supranational institutional structure that has brought us so far might have been undermined more effectively had Britain joined early and supported De Gaulle in his opposition to them. We must be grateful for small mercies. It has to be said that even though the Treaty of Rome was for me a triumph for the concept of sharing sovereignty many federalists saw it as a failure. Altiero Spinelli was one who did as did Joseph Luno. However, whether the reason for it was federalist thinking or simply the desire to keep others in order the power given to the Commission in competition policy, in setting agricultural prices, in trade negotiation and, above all, in it exclusive power of initiative was a decisive move in the direction of integration that would not be easy to remove or reduce. So too with qualified majority voting. In his masterful analysis Andrew Moravcsik concluded that the pre-eminent motivation for the Treaties of Rome were economic, self-interest rather than grander aspirations. At the least they would never have been ratified unless they were perceived to have more economic advantages than disadvantages for the parties. It seems unlikely that the anti-federalist views in the UK were crucial in the initial opposition to the EEC. In fact a British competing proposal of an FTA contained significant federalist elements including majority voting.

I have reflected on the early days at some length because I believe that the United Kingdom has had a consistent line in its European policy just as others have had also. It has been concerned above all – and to the virtual exclusion of everything else – with commercial interests. The 70’s and early 80’s had been a period of failure in Europe – the era of eurosclerosis but the first Delors Commission in which I served created a new dynamic in the 1992 programme. The Common Market (the Customs Union) had been completed in 1968 now a new impetus was required to provide free movement of goods, services, people and capital. It required institutional change in four areas: more qualified majority voting, mutual recognition of standard and greater powers to the European Parliament and greater resources for transfer to the poorer countries. The UK, while favouring the Internal Market, initially opposed extending QMV and any expansion of the role of the European Parliament or the Commission. What becomes apparent as a question about this time is the apparent contradiction between Britain’s objectives the completion of the Internal Market and its rejection of the means to make it all happen. At the end of the day economic pragmatism was the victor over ideological rejection of sharing sovereignty.

The Maastricht Treaty was, of course, the next démarche and whilst Delors must claim great credit or opprobrium, if one is an anti-European, for it the remaining members of a triumvirate Kohl and Mitterand were decisive. Particularly Kohl because his fundamental belief in European integration compelled him to take great political risks in seeking acceptance in Germany. The UK was opposed fundamentally. Mrs Thatcher, as she then was, said, ‘…the ability to run an independent monetary, economic and fiscal policy lies at the heart of what constitutes a sovereign state.’ As she said in the Bruges speech, ‘In my view we have surrendered enough’.

What we have to ask today is an old question in a new context. Have we all surrendered enough in Europe for today’s world? Is surrender the correct term? I want to look at the other side of European integration and to make a claim that the European Union is not merely vital for our future but that Britain must for once play a constructive role in its development. First of all what has it achieved and why?

It is commonplace today to discount the effect of European integration on the relations between Europeans. We are told that there never could have been hostilities between Western Europeans after the War. We were bound together by the Iron Curtain. Anyone who has spent any time on the continent knows differently. They know in particular in the context of the EU how serious disagreements have been mediated by the EU. They know how our economic and political integration and above all the functioning of our EU institutions have changed perceptions and opened doors. Of course the times of fratricidal conflict are long passed and the context of our present debate is different. Our peoples seem unconcerned, perhaps complacently, about our capacity to fall out. However as Ireland and the Balkans have demonstrated tensions can reignite. But leave that aside or give no credit for European integration to its abatement. What about the more complex though real transformation of our national politics? Not everywhere in Europe has been used to a prolonged period of democracy. Perhaps even more surprisingly we have seen – everywhere in the EU – a gradual but clear growth of tolerance and moderation in public life. When extremism or racism raises their ugly heads they never seem to gather strength. The Le Pens, Haidars and so on are invariably short-lived and minority interests for our electorates. Is it a coincidence that this applies to all our Member States? Look too at the enlargement process. While we gripe internally about our integration externally everyone clamours to join and in doing so they accept the norms and values – the democracy, tolerance and rule of law that governs our internal and external relations within the EU. Is this of no value?

Perhaps a positive attitude towards the EU cannot now be motivated amongst the public by such theories but surely some of our politicians should recognise their validity. However, I fear that no matter how much some of us may argue against negativism towards integration by invoking the memories of the demons lurking in our souls as demonstrated by our histories our plan will fall on deaf ears. We must restate the case for European integration in a different way not looking to the past – even to the internal market or any of our existing policy achievements – but rather by addressing the issues of the nation state and their accommodation in the international order needed to manage increasing interdependence. In doing so we must recognise that virtually all Europeans see themselves as being part of one race or another. Unfortunately, they probably see that race as being “better” in one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and although this nationalism is in many instances an artificial construct of recent times it exists. The most we can do through the European process is to mitigate the excesses of nationalism and to create a recognition that we share more than divides us. Winston Churchill in his famous Zurich speech spoke of Europe being, “…united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He spoke of Judaeo Christian faith and ethics as being, “…at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. One does not have to cite Gandhi’s remark that European culture would be a good idea to recognise that all might not accept Churchill’s view but, on the other hand, much good has come out of Europe and what the EU has achieved to a considerable extent is what John F Kennedy sought as our objective when he said in 1962 that we should create “the rise of a united Europe of equals instead of rivals, instead of the old Europe torn by national and personal animosities.

The argument that must be deployed today is that continuing European integration is required to protect values, political diversity and democracy. Another is that it is required to maintain, regulate and expand economic interdependence and the political ties necessary for Europeans to relate to and contribute to a globalising world. Within the next twenty years Europe will provide less than 6% of the world’s population and it will face enormous problems. We are capable of doing so together. On all the big issues we are essentially in the same place right across the continent. We want the same things. We believe in multilateralism and soft power, we give more to developing countries than, for example, the US. We believe in the welfare state and oppose the death penalty. We share the same opinions, even if our political leaders did not always share them, on the war in Iraq or the Middle East. Our peoples too know that we need a common energy policy, a common migration policy and a common environment policy. It is largely our politicians and civil servants and the vested interests of power that resist them. We can clearly have a greater impact by acting collectively than as a sum of our component parts. We have already provided some leadership on global issues such as Kyoto and the ICC and demonstrate our influence and effectiveness when we are united and speaking with one voice. But despite this in foreign and security policy we are far from punching our weight as we are in developing common policies in the areas I have already mentioned.

Our peoples see this. 54% of the UK population believe in a common foreign policy. In February 2007 a Eurobarometer survey found a majority of people in the UK in favour of more decision making at European level on a range of issues.

59% on control of external borders, 77% on organised crime, 78% in fight against terrorism, 65% in the exchange of police information and promoting and protecting human rights. Even in this hot bed of anti-Europeanism where understandably having regards to the consistent negative diet where only 34% think the EU is a good thing the people know on specifics.

In the various areas that I have touched upon experience has shown us that the only model that works and that will provide results is the supranational one that has delivered so much in the past. Firstly the failure of simple dialogue between capitals – a purely intergovernmental approach – underlines how correct Jean Monnet was in placing an independent executive at the core of the EU. Without the Commission we would never have achieved the Customs Union, the Common Agricultural Policy, the creation of a Single Market or the creation of the WTO. All of these would have failed if policies and legislation were not originally forged by the Commission acting in the common interest. To deny it the full role now needed to face globalisation is absurd and yet, virtually uniquely here, it is the minimal improvement in the functioning of the institutions of the Union that apparently creates difficulties. Anything institutional one almost feels is automatically suspect just as it did in Mrs Thatcher’s time. This is a tragedy for Europe not merely because I fear that we may be again isolated in opposition to minimal change but because it conflicts with Britain’s interests. Take a common energy policy as an example. Do we not want an open market? Do we not want assured supply?

The real issue about the Constitutional Treaty is not that it does too much. It does very little but what it does is absolutely necessary for the functioning of the European Union.