There are plenty of analysts of the current condition of European Union/United States relations. One of the most thought provoking of these has been that of Robert Kagan. His view of Europe as Venus, and the United States as Mars, will be an enduring, although I believe an ultimately, misleading one. Many of the simplicities to which it has given rise are much more distortive than helpful in examining transatlantic relations. The Europe of Kant’s Perpetual Peace or, alternatively, the Hobbesian American defending and promoting the liberal order through force, are really caricatures. In fact we share on both sides of the Atlantic far more than divides us and, in addition, where our opinions diverge the differences may be often temporary. The constant state of flux of public opinion on matters of international relations are amply demonstrated by a consideration of opinion polls over a period of time, the most recent of which was that commissioned by the German Marshall Fund. In addition there are substantial minority views on both sides of the Atlantic on almost any international issue. However it is true to say that, for the moment at least, European opinion is much more united than one might have expected and it appears is tending towards a significantly more sceptical approach to the United States.

The tragedy of recent transatlantic divisions on Iraq is the clear fact that they were greatly contributed to by the abject failure of basic diplomacy. One would not have thought that it was necessary to find a latter-day Metternich or Talleyrand to achieve reasonable consensus. After all we ostensibly agreed on a great deal about the regime and had decades of working together on other issues that should have helped us. But too often we talked past each other and not to each other. For long-term allies, whose peoples share essential values, to divide so publicly will be viewed by future historians with incredulity. It is vitally important that we should examine the causes of our failures now or we may be condemned to repeat them in the not too distant future.

When the Western democracies present a divided aspect to the world, the consequences are bound to be potentially very dangerous. Indeed our very division will often act as an incitement to those who do not share our values to advance doctrines and causes that may have catastrophic consequences. Some ten years ago, Fukuyama wrote about the triumph of the shared values of the transatlantic partners that helped to make a reality of John F Kennedy’s ‘interdependent world’. Today it is hardly surprising that Fukuyama writes of our deep differences, but the fact that he goes on to dismiss the suggestion that they may be transitory is I hope unduly pessimistic. I do not agree with him. However if these differences are permitted to persist and fester then they may become embedded in a way which is difficult to displace. They also risk damaging vital interests that we share in the economic sphere.

Let us be clear, there is an element of truth in Kagan’s thesis that attitudes to international relations are different on both sides of the Atlantic. Understandably, for example, there are many in the United States political establishment that share a robust view of the concept and application of national sovereignty and who oppose the imposition of any constraints on the nation state. For these the American Constitution is the only ultimate authority and therefore charges of acting unilaterally are not understood in the same way as they might be even here in Britain where untrammelled sovereignty remains a vital issue for some. However in Europe even the most reluctant Europeans have become used to legal, indeed supranational, constraints.

The development of unilateralism, in the sense of remaining outside multilateral treaties and acting alone rather than collectively is a charge that has often been leveled at the United States not merely in recent times. One should bear in mind however that the United States has always been ambivalent about multilateralism. (Look back to the debate about the International Trade Organisation in the late 40’s for example.) On the other we must remind ourselves that it has also been a, perhaps the, fundamental player in developing international law. One can look for an example of the role played by the United States in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, the Human Rights Covenants and establishment of the IMF, World Bank and GATT. More recently the creation of the WTO was only achieved with the active support of the US. However even when it helps to create multilateral obligations it must be conceded that it is not always anxious to pursue them itself. As one writer has put it “the United States leads in fostering treaty negotiations but it has an increased tendency to opt out of the resulting treaties”. The International Criminal Court, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, The Amended Convention on the Law of the Sea, The Kyoto Protocol and The Convention on Biological Diversity are examples. So there has been a selective commitment to multilateralism and the events that have occurred subsequent to September the 11th continue to show ambivalence and indeed internal dispute in the United States about the correct course to follow. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the United States, in the final analysis, sometimes prefers to act alone.

I have mentioned some differences that have become evident in public attitudes too. The Pew Research Institute (chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) has conducted the most detailed surveys of public opinion currently available. In its late March 2003 analysis the following examples demonstrate what I mean. In 1999, 83% of the British people had a favourable view of the US. In March 2003 this had dropped by 48%. In France the figures were 62% to 31%, in Germany 78% to 25%, Italy 76% to 34%, Spain 50% to14% and in ‘New Europe’ Poland went from 86% to 50%. A counter intuitive and startling additional finding in the report was that in the United States 62% of the people believed that US/European diplomatic and security ties should remain close rather than be more independent. On the other hand no European country had more than 50% in favour of ties remaining close rather than becoming more independent. This latter finding in fact bears out and is entirely consistent with polling in Eurobarometer in Europe in recent years which shows a significant majority in Europe being in favour of a more united defence and foreign policy.

More recently the German Marshall Fund assessment of transatlantic trends published last week makes interesting reading. It underlines many positive findings as well as negative ones. For example, we broadly agree on the threats facing us. Also there is strong support for the United Nations on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed a 2002 survey showed that Americans preferred working through multilateral channels as much as Europeans. While Europeans have grown more critical of US global leadership, perhaps surprisingly American support for a strong European partner has increased. The bottom line is that Europeans appear to like the US less while Americans like the EU slightly more. Of course there are differences in European attitudes to the US (most markedly between Great Britain and France) but there are significant similarities too between all Europeans.

How did the European public reaction to the US grow so rapidly? One aspect must surely have been the strident rhetoric coming from some in Washington. Much of this rhetoric seemed almost calculated to enrage Europeans and one hopes that it is now going to reduce in volume and intensity. Some of the powerful voices from Washington were dismissive of the UN as an institution long before Iraq came before the Security Council. It was presented as almost an irrelevance before its authority was sought. Some senior members of the administration commented in very strong and anti-multilateralist terms in the lead up to the Iraq debate in the UN. I think that one may legitimately speculate that we might well have been able to find an accommodation between the different views on how to deal with Iraq if a different and more effective dialogue had taken place.

In significant respects however the Europeans are also real culprits. How can we complain about US leadership not taking sufficient account of us when we have been totally inadequate in presenting coherent and even in attempting to find unified positions? How can we balance views that are somewhat dissimilar when we ourselves are sending different messages?

Immediately following September 11th, the EU had been united in its sympathy and support for the United States but our system of internal dialogue then failed to develop a proper debate and position on Iraq.

Initially this was found in the ‘directoire’ approach demonstrated by the mini-summit of France, Germany and the United Kingdom which took place in Ghent in October 2001 in order to have a pre-discussion before an EU summit. President Prodi commented on the meeting that ‘it was a shame’ as indeed it was. Then came Germany’s September 2002 election campaign where Chancellor Schroder struck out alone on President Bush’s policy in direct terms. Again this was not the subject of any prior discussion as far as I am aware with the European partners. Condoleezza Rice complained then of the ‘poisoned state of German/US relations’. The next event of note was the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Friendship Treaty on the 22nd January 2003. On this occasion President Chirac and Chancellor Schroder pledged to increase cooperation against an Iraq war, again without any adequate prior consultation with EU partners. Then on the 30th January 2003, 8 European leaders signed an open letter backing the US without consulting France, Germany or the Greek Presidency. This was criticized by the Presidency in office, through Mr Simitis. We also had the position of the so-called Vilnius 10 which seems to have been influenced if not designed on the other side of the Atlantic. Then on the 2nd May 2003, Don Rumsfeld made the announcement that Poland would take charge of one of the three zones the US will establish in Iraq. (This is apparently how European Foreign Ministers learned the news as they met on the Greek island of Kastellorizo). These divisions have led some observers to conclude, in the context of the European Convention, that the European Common Foreign and Security Policy is a dead letter. On the other hand, others have not been slow to say that they demonstrate the inadequacy of existing Treaty provisions which have been ignored one way or another during the unfolding of these events. I fall into the latter category and believe that if the institutional structure for the Common Foreign and Security Council had been developed more on the community method that had worked so effectively in other areas things might have been different. In other words it was not merely the absence of will but the absence of institutional structures that led to the debacle.

Some US think-tanks at least but perhaps also some Members of the Administration appear to believe that divisions in Europe are not necessarily a bad thing. Divisions between Old Europe and New Europe have been underlined. The long standing US policy, first developed during the period of Dean Acheson following the last war and subscribed to by successive Presidents right up to the 90s, had been that European integration is in principle a good thing. President Kennedy expressed a view which reflected many others before and after him. He reiterated American policy to Europe and he said ‘We Americans do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner’. Some neo-conservatives in Washington appear to have a different view about the desirability of a more united European capacity on foreign and defence policy. It is apparently perceived as a challenge to the US rather than a potentially helpful development. This is profoundly misguided.

The Convention on the Future of Europe has proposed significant changes to improve CSFP. We will have, when its proposals are adopted, a Foreign Secretary and an enhanced foreign service. I believe the idea of a double hatted Foreign Secretary serving both the Commission and the Council is the correct course to adopt in that it is as far as we can go at this time.

To my mind the essential issue in developing effective EU positions on foreign policy and defence is not the alleged difficulty of reconciling the irreconcilable. This analysis suggests deep-seated differences in Europe on fundamental issues. In fact Europeans in their public opinion, and their governments, generally basically agree on foreign policy issues. One example is on the Israel/Palestine issue. They have not, however, put in place the machinery to develop common positions effectively. This is not primarily a matter of majority voting, which on many issues of this kind would not be currently remotely acceptable, but it is a matter of institutions and political will. The requirement for unanimity did not preclude the advance of unified European positions on very many difficult issues particularly prior to the adoption of the Single European Act when additional majority voting was introduced. The key element in achieving so much was the existence of an independent institution that made balanced proposals in the common European interest. The Commission did not of course decide anything in legislative terms but it did and does propose policies having sought to reconcile the interests of the Member States in order to secure their adoption. The structure now proposed for foreign policy is too intergovernmental for my taste but goes as far as is perhaps feasible at this time. At least the Foreign Minister has a limited power of initiative, an enhanced bureaucratic support and a network of 126 EU delegations worldwide at his disposal. Furthermore the shock of our divisions on Iraq has apparently had some positive effects. The broad acceptance of the Solana Strategy paper in Thessalonica in June on the major threats facing Europe and how to deal with them was a good signal. So too is an apparently generally agreed approach towards Iran.

The question of the development of our relationship with US should not be posed as an alternative between an adversarial or a harmonious relationship. Discussion of a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar world is unhelpful. It is surely quite possible to have a partnership which develops on a certain parity of esteem and respect. It cannot be presented as functioning as either an accommodation or a constraint. For such a partnership to exist there is a need to have, and indeed to define, the common values and principles to which the parties adhere but there is also a further condition. It must be finally possible to disagree without necessarily giving rise to offence but only after real attempts, based on our longstanding relationship, to reach agreement. The partners must make substantial contributions. Otherwise the partnership will be characterized by dependence rather than interdependence. However in this regard I am not talking just about defence capacity. The EU knows a lot more about nation building than the US and has much to contribute here just as we contribute far more development aid. Just as the Member States need to enhance their joint capacity to act militarily the US needs to become more involved in nation building. The EU for example has done much good work in the Balkans that has not perhaps gained sufficient recognition.

So I do not believe in the unipolar world but nor do I believe in competing visions. I believe in a partnership across the Atlantic that is supportive of shared values but also that can also act as a check and a balance. Nobody has a monopoly on being right.

Last April Javier Solana spoke in Harvard University of finding a common purpose between the transatlantic partners through committing ourselves to four key principles. These were: first that we are allies and partners. Second that we make fair contributions. Third that we tackle causes and not just symptoms and finally that we act together to sustain a world based on rules. As he said, these are not new. They have been the bedrock of our relationship across the Atlantic for 50 years. (On the issue of making fair contributions Europe’s commitment to the non-military contributions is 3 – 4 times that of the United States.) However we cannot forever refuse, as a bloc that is at least as wealthy cumulatively as the United States, with more men under arms and a greater population, to provide a real security and defence commitment. So we need now to move forward together and to expand whatever efforts and time as is necessary within reason to do so. It is not a denial of our constructive relationship with the United States to suggest that it is desirable that we should be able to express own view with some authority on global events. Unilateralism is not therefore a sustainable policy for the United States in an interdependent world and dialogue should involve Brussels far more and not just capitals.

Therefore the most fundamental step to put the transatlantic relationship on a proper footing for the future is for both sides to recognize the crucial importance of more united European positions. In order to achieve this there is a vital need for the minimal new structures in the European Union proposed by the Convention. Some European political leaders appear sometimes to be implacably opposed to anything that constrains them in the positions that they wish to take. This is a mistake. Some of the main political actors in the United States today also seem to lack the vision demonstrated in the past by the American architects of many of the global institutions. They understood the concept of interdependence. In most situations the absence of a common European position (on matters of foreign policy) leaves everyone on both sides of the Atlantic exposed and vulnerable.

It is surely apparent that continuing to play the old game of shifting alliances will not work. It did not work in the 19th century and it certainly will not work in our new interdependent world where global destruction is a real risk. We in Europe have tried to use the US as a balancing factor before in our domestic disagreements. George Canning modestly told the House of Commons in 1826 that he called the New World into existence “to Redress the Balance of the Old”. Canning also remarked shortly before his death “Things are getting back to a wholesome state. Every nation for itself, and God for us all.” Perhaps he should have concluded by saying “God help us all”. In the modern world a recipe of every nation for itself is a recipe for disaster and this should be recognised on both sides of the Atlantic.

This is the text of a speech delivered by Peter Sutherland to the Royal Institute of International Affairs.