The “European Union” was first mooted in 1972 by the Heads of State and Government in Paris. Its stuttering progress thereafter variously through the Stuttgart Declaration in 1983 then the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to the failed Constitutional Treaty and finally the Lisbon Treaty has lead us to a position which is less than clear. Nor is it clear whether we proceed further and in which direction, towards integration or disintegration. Whilst there have been some advances for federalists there have also been some aspects which are essentially moving in the opposite direction. Examples can be found through the powers given to national parliaments to intervene, the underlining of the fact that the Member States are in control and so on.

One author has said “the Lisbon Treaty is a different political animal as compared with the Constitutional Treaty; while that Treaty was an attempt to mark a historic step in a federalist direction this ambition has been abandoned with the Lisbon Treaty” (Jean Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty, Cambridge University Press, pg 327). Perhaps this however goes a little too far.

For one thing there have been advances too. These can be found in the changed circumstances of the former third Pillar – the fact that the possibility of decision by Qualified Majority Voting in the Council has been introduced in this area and in others is of importance. So also is the increase in powers of the European Parliament. This too moves in a federalist direction. Also the emphasis placed on values is important. Rifkin (The European Dream, Penguin, pg 212) has said that “much of the Constitution is given over to the issue of fundamental human rights. It might be said that human rights are at the very heart and soul of the document”. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union reads as follows “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in the society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.

There have been other advances. The European Union has a significantly enhanced role in regard to physical safety and the civil liberties of its citizens. We have too the beginnings of a more effective external representation through the External Action Service, combined with the reinforced powers of the Union’s High Representative. There is some hope, although I am not too optimistic about it, that this may help the Union to present a more cohesive external position through speaking with one voice.

However, we are now in the position where, as many contributors have pointed out in recent times, that apparently there is no appetite for further constitutional change in Europe. But it is also true to say that we today face a truly existential debate that may demand advances. This relates to the survival of the Euro following the debt crisis. This has the potential to either push towards further integration through the imposition of new disciplines (following the report of the Task Force under President Von Rompuy) or, alternatively, a more bleak scenario may ensue. Mrs. Merkel has already trenchantly said that this issue of the Euro ultimately is an issue relating to the very survival of the Union itself.

I have not read the history of the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty but I suspect that the rather inadequate mechanism for discipline on economic matters relating to members of the Euro zone was itself the subject matter of some prolonged debate. The Lisbon Treaty has little to say on this topic and the failure to say anything was caused by the fact that there was no agreement to any change in the Euro’s governance. This probably resulted from the fact that the Euro had worked apparently reasonably well during the first decade of its existence but now events have transpired that show that this is no longer the case. It is in a perilous position. It is far from clear as to how the various debt crises around the peripheral states in the Union will unfold. It is also unclear as to whether there will be an agreement for the necessary reforms of economic governance at national level. Indeed there is a question as to whether any conclusions on this governance can be adequate if such reforms must be capable of implementation without Treaty change. Certainly a large number of member states are very fearful about having to submit to a new Treaty which, in some cases, would necessitate yet another referendum. If anything were to happen to the Euro in my view the whole edifice is threatened.

We should not fail to recall, on this the 60^th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration that Europe was to be built “through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”. Now is the opportunity to demonstrate the solidarity that is required and whilst some preliminary demonstration has already taken place through inter alia the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility, more will be required. Since the creation of the Euro the institutional mechanism to support it has really only been the European Central Bank. This has, of course, been a genuine and real European institution at the level of the Euro zone. But when it was created some Member States (and notably Germany) demanded the retention of the greatest possible freedom of macro economic decision making. The Growth and Stability Pact provided them very bare minimum of governance for the Euro zone and that is all we got. There was no real economic policy making mechanism. Partially as a result of this we have seen a proliferation of States simply ignoring the requirements of the Growth & Stability Pact. The first to do so ironically were Germany and France. Another element of the institutional failure was the immediate uncertain response of the Euro zone to the sovereign debt crisis.

It is far from clear whether any greater support for the principle of solidarity will be available in the event of the crisis continuing or becoming exacerbated as likely will be the case. Germany’s leadership in these areas has been less than one would have wished for. Even in the context of the disciplines for the future, Germany appears to be reluctant to go beyond the essential framework originally agreed.

Germany has gone through a lot of belt tightening over the last few years. It spent €1.6 trillion on the integration of East Germany and through sacrifice and clear thinking recalibrated its economy more generally. Its people have shown little interest in financially supporting other Euro zone countries.

So, clearly, we have much further to go than where we are at present if we are to demonstrate “de facto solidarity”. The future of the Euro ultimately requires supreme acts of leadership particularly I would say in Germany.