In his seminal speech on European integration in the University of Zurich on September 19^th 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of the old continent as being, “united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He portrayed the base of Greco-Roman culture and the Christian faith and ethics as “being at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. He returned to the theme of shared roots at the Congress of The Hague on 7^th May 1948. There he spoke of European integration founded upon that “glorious treasure of literature, of romance, of ethics, of thought and toleration belonging to us all, which is the inheritance of us all”. Indeed it was the agonies of divisive histories, rather than any sense of a shared European identity, that drove the Founding Fathers, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenaur and de Gasperi, to propose a new institutional structure to help reconciliation and future peace. However it is clear that they were all conscious too of that shared inheritance. It is worth remembering that there were other reasons also that motivated them, such as the rejection of what one observer has described as, “The false universalism of communism and the false particularism of fascism, one of which sought to make everyone the same and the other of which refused any sense of common humanity”.

Those times are now long past and the context of our present debate is different. The threat of fratricidal conflict in Europe has receded and our peoples sometimes seem unconcerned by it. Also, apart from the faltering memories of past conflicts, we no longer have the need to be cemented together in mutual protection from the USSR. However I believe that our shared values have endured. They remain as a base for a project that is, in my opinion, the most noble political project in European history. There is a moral basis for the project of European integration, which I regard as being every bit as important as its economic rationale.

It is inevitable that attitudes to European integration today, particularly amongst the young, have changed. They are challenged by new realities such as the enlargement of the European Union. Their motivation for a belief in the process of integration can no longer simply be promoted by the recollections of terrible events now only within the living memory of a small and diminishing minority. Nor do they appear conscious that the great success of European integration was a significant causative factor in the collapse of the oppressive, immoral and irrational Communist system of the Soviet Union and its satellites. I believe that there is a moral and cultural case for the European Union which goes beyond the specific and contemporary concerns of any individual generation. But this long-term case needs to be recast and restated in terms comprehensible to today’s Europeans. This will be assisted by an understanding of two essential points that are the subject of this lecture: the first of these is that we are building on a foundation of shared values. The second is that the fundamental relationship between the nation state and the citizen has been radically changed by the globalising and increasingly interdependent world of today and this change demands responses that can only be provided by a truly European policy.

It is worth remembering that it had been the nation state that created many of the problems integration was intended to address. In 1826 the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, pronounced following the collapse of the Congress of Vienna system, “Things are getting back to a wholesome state, every nation for itself, and God for us all”. (He might have said “God help us all”). His world was that which many of us hope that we have escaped, fearing as President Mitterrand said in his farewell speech to the European Parliament, “Le nationalisme, c’est la guerre”. So let me say something about nationalism and the nation state. What is this concept of a nation state? It means different things to different people. Jeremy Rifkin (The European Dream p. 166) has written, “The popular conception of the Nation State…is rooted in common culture, language and customs. (But) in reality is more of … an artificial construct…”. Often, in order to create it, he wrote it was necessary to, “…create a compelling story about a common past, one convincing enough to capture the imagination of the people and convince them of their shared identity and common destiny.” The reality however is of course more complex. There are indeed shared histories and values and the binding together of communities has many valid and positive aspects that are not contrived. It has to be admitted however that in many cases the alleged unity of peoples has been a recent phenomenon and is less than fully convincing historically. National languages have been important in this but, for example, in 1789 only a small percentage of the French people spoke French and in 1861 only 2% of Italians spoke Italian. Castilian too was long a minority language in Spain. After the Reformation religion also had an effect in creating a sense of shared identity with some and division from others. Sometimes this created majorities in a nation state and had the divisive effect of creating a question mark over the nationality of minorities. But that too is a matter that has passed into history except in tiny pockets like Northern Ireland and the Balkans where it has helped to define tribal loyalty. However, the fact is that many people in Europe feel an intense and often passionate sense of belonging to a nation state. The Danish intellectual Toger Seidenfaden wrote, “There is no European people, no European ethnicity, no European demos …. as a consequence the EU is notoriously incapable of generating popular enthusiasm on any major scale. This is, of course, one of its most attractive features”. Whilst this comment goes a little too far for my taste one can see what he meant.

Ernest Revan has written that the nation is a spiritual principle consisting of two things, ”A common legacy of rich memories from the past and a consensus to forget the oppressions and injustices that once divided the members of the nation”. We have all seen this in action. If one looked into the heart of most Europeans today they would see themselves as part of one nation or another although their DNA may well provide evidence of a more complex reality. Unfortunately very many probably essentially see their race as being “better” in one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and perhaps the price for the cohesion of a community. Of course, too, there are confusing overlaps between nations within nations. Examples proliferate around Europe. The British are comprised by a group of perceived nationalities as are the Spanish and many others. The question as to where their ultimate loyalty lies would be hard to answer for many a Scot, a Walloon, a Bavarian or a Catalan.

In his History of Europe, Norman Davies draws a distinction between civilisation and culture. The former is defined as, “the sum total of ideas and traditions which had been inherited from the ancient world and from Christianity”. In other words it constitutes what binds us together. Culture, on the other hand is seen by him as growing “from the every day life of the people……In earlier times civilisation was extolled and culture despised. Nationalism did the opposite.” In other words in modern times our focus has been excessively directed towards our differences rather than that which binds us together.

 It would be a distortion of history to argue that the whole endeavour of European integration became a reality just because of the idealism of the Founding Fathers in their belief that nationalism had to be defeated. Many of them were indeed driven by a fundamental motivation based on a belief in the dignity of man. They believed that federalism would provide an answer to the contradictions of that Christian message all too evident in the recent history of the first half of the twentieth century. However, it must also be accepted that the project would never have been launched without economic logic and perceptions of self interest. Andrew Moravcsik in his important work was probably correct in pointing out that if European integration was not seen as being economically beneficial it would not have happened. (Indeed it may even be the case that Britain’s clear anti-federalism from the outset would not have been crucial in determining its opposition if, at the time its trade was four times greater with Europe than with the Commonwealth rather than the converse as it actually was.)

 So, if nationalism has divided us in history what identity do we share that permits some of us to dream of further integration? In answering that question let me turn to values. I believe that what was perceived by those visionary men in the early days was both a potential to reject the tribalism of the past and to build a new Europe on the foundations of shared values. They were all Christian Democrats and shared a common view of the world. On the 24^th March this year in the Vatican, speaking at an event marking the 50^th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Pope Benedict made the point that an authentic ‘common home’ cannot be built without considering the identity of the people of the continent of ours. He went on “it is a question of a historical, cultural and moral identity before being a geographic, economic or political one; an identity comprised of a set of universal values that Christianity helped forge, thus giving Christianity not only a historical but a foundational role vis-à-vis Europe”. The Founding Fathers would have agreed with him.

 Much of the debate about the ill-fated, and now we are told doomed, Constitutional Treaty regarding references to God and Christianity revolved around this claim of a foundational role. In “Ecclesia in Europa” John Paul II appealed on behalf of the Church to those drawing up the Constitutional Treaty. He called for a reference to the religious, and in particular Christian, heritage of Europe. Shortly before his election to the Papacy Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger addressed this issue also in his book, “Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures”. He concluded that the motivations for the double refusal to refer to God and Christianity were based upon the presupposition that “only the radical culture, born of the Enlightenment, which has attained its full development in our own age, can be constitutive of European identity”. As he pointed out this Enlightenment culture is substantially defined by the rights to liberty. But that concept of “liberty” is not in itself enough because he believed it has to be rooted in more fundamental beliefs.

 The final text of the Constitutional Treaty did however contain recognition that human beings are more than citizens of a state or of a union. In this sense it confirmed that neither human laws nor policies are absolute. Furthermore freedom of religion, the right to education in conformity with religious convictions, respecting the status of churches and recognising their identity and specific contributions were included. It was also declared, in the preamble, that the European Union springs, amongst other things, from a religious inheritance. These provisions went some way to meet the objections raised by the Pope and others. I believe that, irrespective of the words used, the reality of the EU, as it has evolved is that it has at its core, the enduring principles of Christianity. Furthermore they remain the basis for going further. Of course, this is not to deny Christianity’s past and terrible failures to protect and vindicate the values it proclaims. Nor is it to suggest that Christians’ belief in those values is in some sense exclusive and not shared by many others.

What Europeans share above all, and have reflected in the construction of the EU, is a belief in the rights and the obligations of the individual. This belief in the Rights of Man had its genesis in Europe long before the Enlightenment or the French Revolution. They are, above all, the product of Christian thinking from the earliest times. As Siedentop has put it “Christian ontology provided the foundation for what are usually described as liberal values in the West – for the commitment to equality and reciprocity, as well as the postulate of individual freedom. These commitments are primary and foundational whereas Western tolerance, pluralism and even scepticism are derivative and secondary. Western culture is founded on shared beliefs and when it fails to acknowledge and defend such beliefs its identity is eroded”. The Greeks and the secular liberals of recent centuries have had a real role in propagating the principle of equality. The Greek concept of moral equality was not universal – some being recognised as more equal than others. The secular liberals do not subscribe to the fact that there is a transcendent moral order beyond rationality on its own within which “liberty” must be placed. The right to liberty – moral equality – does not exist in a vacuum. Secular liberalism has emanated from the basic Christian principle of the equality of mankind and the unity of the human race. This is the key to our shared identity and the foundation of our integration. As Pope Benedict XVI (Cardinal Ratzinger as he then was) has said in his dialogue with Juergen Habermas the Christian view is that a proper appreciation and understanding of rights is inextricably linked to a belief in God.

 My conclusion is that a European identity exists because of the shared belief in a universal equality that is not defined by race, gender or religion. In particular it is one that provides equal freedom under a shared moral code. It is grounded in the Christian teaching on the brotherhood of man. Siedentop has written that “invoking conscience and choice against involuntary forms of association can plausibly be described as the genius of European civilization”. A genius that should be particularly appreciated by those who lived behind the Iron Curtain.

However, the concept of freedom of conscience and the nature of the rights resulting from a concept of “moral equality” has to recognise that the mere statement of general rights cannot always define their full meaning. Nor does it provide for the reconciliation sometimes required between apparently conflicting rights. I do not believe that a Kantian approach is sufficient to deal with the definition of rights or their reconciliation. To define the meaning of rights or to reconcile them requires something more than a utilitarian analysis. It is interesting to see how the Supreme Court of the United States and indeed the Irish Supreme Court have tried to grapple with the definition of the nature and extent of unspecified human rights in their respective written Constitutions. They seem to me to have had ultimate recourse to a conception of rights that are “antecedent” to positive law. Justice cannot be defined as being morally arbitrary and it has been said that, in the end of the day, the power of judicial review of rights in Western democracies depends upon “the judges own moral vision”. (Michael Perry in his authoritative book on the US system, ‘The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights’, Yale University Press Page 123). That moral vision is in turn predicated upon a conception of fundamental values that Christianity, notwithstanding all its bad moments, has articulated and developed. Indeed Pope John Paul made the point clearly to the European Parliament on 11^th October 1988.

 Apart from human rights as usually defined, Europeans generally also share a conception of solidarity reflected in a commitment to what Ludwig Erhart described as the “social market economy”. This is not merely consistent with Christian principles but reflective of them. Shirley Williams has defined this as “a free market curbed and regulated to conform to social goals”. These social goals have led to an EU society which is “more egalitarian and inclusive” than that of the US. Guillermo de la Dehesa in his book Europe at the Crossroads points to some of the differences. For example, the income ratio between the 10% richest and 10% poorest individuals in society was 5.6 times larger in the US and only 3.5 times larger between the upper and lower deciles in the EU. The percentage of population in relative poverty is almost the double in the US of that in the EU and the percentage of children in relative poverty more than double. But our social model is different in other respects too. For example in the level of prison population, where there are 2 million in US jails but only 900,000 in the EU (notwithstanding a much bigger population in Europe). The death penalty too is effectively outlawed throughout Europe whereas in the US it is widely used.

In international relations also the European position has increasingly converged to its own particular place. This is demonstrated by recent Euro barometer surveys that show that more than 50% of Europeans in every Member State (including the United Kingdom) favour a “European Foreign Policy”. No doubt it is expressed in these terms to distinguish it from current US policy. However, whilst Robert Kagan’s description of Europe as Venus and the US as Mars will be an enduring image it is a somewhat simplistic one. But while the Europe of Kant’s Perpetual Peace or, alternatively the Hobbesian America defending and promoting the liberal order by force, are caricatures they do contain an element of truth. In particular, it is clear that the EU believes far more in the use of “soft power” than the United States. Also it is more willing to accept limitations on its sovereignty. The EU too is the largest donor to the developing world on any statistical analysis. Apart from these matters, and no doubt as a result of its own experience in the integration process, the EU is far more multilateralist in its approach to finding solutions to global problems. This is demonstrated by the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other international treaties all ratified by Europe but declined by the US. Again this is distinctive for Europe and its values.

 So “identity” is often defined by difference from others and even though the US and its values were born out of Europe, European and American paths have diverged. One significant element of difference is the far greater individualism of the US. Jeremy Rifkin, in “the European Dream” says that this divergence about individualism sets the American Dream apart from its European antecedents. Whether in gun control, attitudes to wealth or the consequence of criminal culpability the US applies values and judgements in a different way to us. So while the Western mind (influenced by Christianity) may put a premium on the individual some Christian traditions are more individualist than others.

One of the reasons why we need more of Europe rather than less in developing our policies for the future is to deal with a new aspect of moral choice. This relates to what Rifkin calls “cold evil”. In this he refers to “actions whose effects are so far removed from the behaviour that caused them that no causal relationship is suspected, no sense of guilt or wrongdoing is felt and no collective responsibility is exercised to punish the errant behaviour”. Climate change is a classic example.

The issue of climate change presents one of the greatest moral challenges in human history. To accept painful measures with substantial costs today, to avert a catastrophe that will occur some time into the future, is difficult enough. To combine with that the need to synchronise the appropriate responses around the globe because we all must do it together will demand a multilateral response that has no historical precedent.

We are currently at a stage where there is emerging clarity on the necessary targets for the reduction of carbon emissions and there is an emerging desire to act. This is hardly surprising as we know, for example, from the Assessment Report of the IFCC that 11 of the last 12 years rank among the 12 warmest years on record and this is no coincidence. This clarity is evident not merely in the circles of environmental pressure groups but also from diverse groups of legislators, academia, industry and investors. We can also be encouraged by changes in public opinion reflected by so many politicians jumping on a band wagon until recently only occupied by Al Gore and a relatively few others. The International Herald Tribune recently carried out a survey in six countries including the US and it found that about 75% or more of people thought their country was not doing enough. Sir Nicholas Stern’s report last year made it clear that we must act now or the financial and human costs later will be enormous. We know that there is no silver bullet or soft options and the only way we can handle the issue effectively is through governments and a combination of actions requiring taxation, regulation and incentives. We know too that carbon emission trading schemes are probably part of the answer. It is abundantly clear that the EU will have to lead. In my opinion it can only do so through the tried and tested mechanism of using the Commission to propose solutions. If it is simply left to capitals they will probably fail as they have done in so many cases of simple intergovernmentalism in the past. The example of the Single Market (or “1992” initiative) only worked because of the use of the Community method. By this I mean the development of policies by an executive working in the common interest and, where possible, majority voting by the Member States for their adoption. It needs to be used here again. The “common good” has to be seen in the universalist context here more than in most areas and this, as I have said, is a particular inheritance from Christian principles.

The failure of Europe to develop an effective common foreign policy too is in significant measure the result of the failure of the institutionalised intergovernmental structure created by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Whilst it has had some successes this structure has failed to create common positions on all issues not because of fundamental disagreements but because it has permitted independent initiatives from Member States without prior consultation or attempts to reach consensus. Iraq is the obvious example. On the other hand the Lebanese intervention, nominally a European one, is a partly positive development but one nonetheless that also demonstrated the weakness of our existing mechanisms rather than their strength. As one diplomat put it “The EU played only a symbolic role”.

Clearly however the massive divisions over Iraq demonstrated the real weaknesses in this structure. The Maastricht Treaty had proclaimed “A common foreign and security policy is hereby established”. Like so many other grand statements of intent this was not given the institutional or financial backup to make it a reality. One of the alleged objectives of CFSP was to “safeguard common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union.” Yet its budget is 1/1000^th part of the EU budget (which itself is about 1% of the total GDP of the Member States). The Foreign Offices of the EU never wanted CSFP to work. The aspirations for European defence, namely “the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” is risible as a contribution to real progress. Complete national freedom of action was in reality ensured by the Maastricht Treaty and what followed it. The whole business was a victory for those who wanted nothing to be done. The wholly foreseeable result was the division about Iraq, not least because the issue was never truly debated at EU level. This was a division that could have been avoided and has left scars not merely with the French and British but also with some new Member States. And disagreements have become evident too in respect of relations with Russia. However I believe that this sorry history is still remediable because it is so obvious that our individual and collective weakness will ultimately permit threats to develop which we will be unable to contain. In the end of the day we cannot simply rely on the US. Nor can we in Europe deny our moral obligation to play a role in advancing the values that we claim are central to our conception of civilisation.

So the examples of climate change and foreign policy are two areas where I believe that the values that we share have a part to play in making the world a better place and which can best be advanced through the European construction. But they are not the only ones. For one thing we should surely develop a framework and policy for humanitarian intervention. In this context Kosovo and Sierra Leone provide positive examples but the global community has failed to act in respect of others such as Rwanda and Darfur to name but two.

Migration policies too can only be properly developed through European policies and again these should be influenced by the concept of the equality of man. Without arguing that it is possible to have unrestricted migration we should surely recognise that there is a contradiction between our former condemnation (on grounds of human rights) of the Soviet Union in its refusal to permit people to leave and the case made by some that we have no obligation at all to permit migrants to enter Europe. Globalisation is not just about trade, it is above all about people and our policies should start from a multilateral dialogue that links development with migration and an understanding that migrants have rights including to the maximum extent possible the right to legally enter host countries. On the other hand we must unequivocally also uphold the rights we believe in within our own societies and not permit a mistaken concept of multiculturalism to require us to derogate from them.

Where does the United Kingdom fit into this business of the European Union and its values? The United Kingdom has consistently viewed European integration through a unique prism. It has sought, from the very beginning, to reduce the ambitions of the EU to being a largely intergovernmental institution providing a market. It has resisted the enlargement of competences into non-economic areas and has consistently advocated widening rather than deepening. Also it has sought to reduce its budget (and not just in respect of the CAP). This now stands at approximately only 1% of EU GDP. Public opinion in the United Kingdom has been consistently more negative towards the whole project than elsewhere. In the last Euro barometer polling only 34% of the United Kingdom thought the EU to be ‘a good thing’ – the lowest figure in Europe. A new poll conducted by ICM research and quoted in the Sunday Telegraph of 29^th April apparently established that an overwhelming majority of people (69%) want a referendum on Britain’s relationship with Europe and the possibility of “loosening” ties. This would entail “opting out of political, and economic integration”. Only 27% wanted to stay as members on current terms and 36% said they preferred a looser relationship. 29% said that the UK should withdraw completely. This finding, if correct, is a tragedy for the UK and for the rest of Europe. I believe that it is probably accurate – and is an unsustainable position for the future. Now we are probably heading in the direction of substantial opposition from the United Kingdom with regard to the reduced proposals that will be proposed in the place of the Constitutional Treaty. It is worth noting here that the overwhelming majority of other countries within EU either already have or could readily adopt this treaty in its entirety. When France and The Netherlands rejected the Treaty much of the British media thought this to be cause for celebration. Since then these rejections have been sold as a rejection by both countries of “Brussels”. Of course this is not anything like the full story. The votes were against everything from Chirac, to migration, to Turkey’s accession and the “Anglo-Saxon” economic model. In fact the EU is markedly more popular in both France and The Netherlands than in Britain (and in fact over 80% in The Netherlands think it to be a good thing). This negativity in the United Kingdom has to change or else the EU will never be able to play the role in the world that it should. But nor will the United Kingdom. The great contributions Great Britain can make in the areas of democracy, tolerance and respect for the rule of law will be far less than they should be in shaping the future. The EU badly needs the United Kingdom as a constructive participant in the shaping and leadership of the Union.

 So, to conclude, I would argue that the integration of Europe has been a remarkably good thing. The evidence of its success is there to see. Not merely have we had peace, we have had reconciliation. Not merely have we had democracy we have seen the consistent defeat and marginalisation of extremism in every country in the Union. This is no coincidence. It is clearly linked to the EU itself and is in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. Furthermore the EU’s economic policies have themselves been based on a concept of freedom for the individual to compete tempered by a need to help the disadvantaged through a welfare state. There has been some evidence too of solidarity within the EU through the structural funds and even the Common Agricultural Policy. The funding for this has come largely from the richer countries. (Few will fail to recall the generosity of Chancellor Kohl in doubling the structural funds at the time of the passage of the Single European Act.) Our basic principles regarding our external responsibilities have been evident also in the development aid provided from the EU and its constituency Member States to the developing world. So, the EU has not merely succeeded in the obvious way of providing free movement of goods, of services, of people and of capital and by developing a common currency. It has core values evident in its policies. The fact that many of its achievements have been claimed to be the product of a secularised, indeed often anti-religious, world cannot in fact obscure the reality that Christianity has been at the foundations of those achievements.